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1 INTRODUCTION 
A major challenge in contemporary business environments is recruiting qualified staff that 
meets the increasing job requirements. Due to the fierce competition for talent and the 
demographic change characterizing labor markets, firms and the economy as a whole are 
required to activate unused potential and rely on demographic groups insufficiently 
considered in previous hiring campaigns (e.g. The Bundestag, 2002; European 
Commission, 2011). However, looking at the stylized facts for Germany and other 
industrialized countries reveals that, among others, women and ethnic minorities still 
have worse employment outcomes in comparison to men and native Germans, 
respectively. They have inferior human capital endowments when entering the labor 
market, have lower labor force participation and employment rates, are underrepresented 
in high-paying industries, occupations and firms and are eventually paid less (see chapter 
2). A compelling explanation for these outcome differences is the prevalence of 
discrimination in the market place which has been a point of focus among equal rights 
activists, policy makers and researchers all over the world. According to the German 
General Act on Equal Treatment (AGG) from 2006, discrimination exists whenever 
individuals are subject to differential treatment on the grounds of race or ethnicity, 
gender, religion or ideology, disability, age or sexual orientation.  
Discrimination has been found to prevail in various domains (e.g. Riach and Rich, 2002; 
Pager and Shepherd, 2008). Research areas include the housing, credit and product 
market. Studies on housing discrimination focus on residential segregation and rely on 
field experiments that investigate differences in access to purchase and rental units 
(Yinger, 1986; Ross and Turner, 2005; Ewens et al., 2012). Discriminatory behavior in the 
credit market is predominantly demonstrated in the context of mortgage lending. Here, 
administrative data including a wide range of financial and property background variables 
are used, just as data from audited inquiries by testers from varied racial backgrounds 
(Munnell et al., 1996; Ladd, 1998; Pope and Sydnor, 2011). With respect to service and 
product markets, the most prominent research papers compare price offers to otherwise 
equally endowed racial groups by conducting field experiments (Ayres, 1995; Ayres and 
Siegelman, 1995), analyzing the correlation between the share of blacks and the price level 
in the local area (Graddy, 1997) and investigating systematic group differences between 
court cases filed for consumer discrimination (Harris et al., 2005). Systematic 
disadvantages in these markets have not only been documented in cases of racial and 
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ethnic minorities, but also prevail against women (Ayres and Siegelman, 1995; Goldberg, 
1996; Harless and Hoffer, 2002) and disabled people (Gneezy and List, 2004). 
The largest body of theoretical and empirical literature on discrimination, however, 
undoubtedly exists in the labor market. Altonji and Blank (1999: 3168) define 
discrimination here as “[…] a situation in which persons who provide labor market 
services and who are equally productive in a physical or material sense are treated 
unequally in a way that is related to an observable characteristic such as race, ethnicity, or 
gender.” Engaging in this field of research matters for two reasons: first, because 
discrimination is prohibited by law (e.g. AGG, 2006) and, second, because differential 
treatment based on factors unrelated to productivity creates costs to employers and may 
lead to forgone income (e.g. Becker, 1971). The latter perspective is supported by 
empirical studies using firm-level and sports data. Gwartney and Haworth (1974), for 
example, provide evidence from professional baseball and find that clubs contracting an 
above-average share of black players are able to significantly increase both their wins per 
unit costs and home team attendance. Similar results are presented by Szymanski (2000). 
Using longitudinal data from English soccer over a period of 16 years (including 39 
teams), he finds a positive relationship between team performance and the share of black 
players on a team. More precisely, the costs per unit of success are 5 percent higher for 
discriminators, i.e., those teams whose proportion of blacks is below the league average. 
Put differently, clubs that disfavor black players have to pay a 5 percent premium on top of 
their wage bill to be as successful as non-discriminators.  
Hellerstein et al. (2002) extend the empirical literature on discrimination to the business 
environment. They match U.S. census and survey data including information on workforce 
characteristics and profitability measures, which is then particularly used to assess the 
correlation between the share of females and company success. The analysis supports the 
hypothesis that the proportion of women has a positive impact on profitability and that 
companies with an above average share of women outperform discriminators. Long-term 
effects with respect to gender discrimination and firm closure, however, cannot be 
identified. This, on the other hand, is suggested in a study by Weber and Zulehner (2009). 
Analyzing the survival rates of around 30,000 startups in Austria, they find that firms with 
a share of women below the average survive 18 months less as compared to those with an 
average or above-average percentage. Moreover, the surviving startups systematically 
increase the proportion of female employees as a rational reaction to the prevailing 
market mechanisms. The bottom line of all these studies is essentially the same: firms 
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benefit from effectively avoiding labor market discrimination. 
Despite its legal and economic importance, researchers find it hard to undoubtedly 
identify the prevalence of discrimination and its driving factors (e.g. Pager and Shepherd, 
2008; Lang and Lehmann, 2012; Charles and Guryan, 2013). The methods used 
particularly depend on which stage of the employer-employee interaction is considered. 
Wage discrimination, for example, is predominantly looked at by conducting regression 
analyses using administrative data (e.g. Hellerstein and Neumark, 2006). Differential 
treatment across groups is then investigated controlling for differences in e.g. worker and 
job characteristics. Decomposition techniques further allow disentangling the effects from 
differences in characteristics and returns to these characteristics (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 
1973). The use of administrative data generally carries the risk of omitted variable biases 
and unobserved heterogeneity in individual characteristics both because detailed 
productivity measures are rarely available (Altonji and Blank, 1999). Moreover, these data 
may well serve for assessing wage gaps across groups, but are either unavailable or 
inappropriate for uncovering discrimination in access to certain jobs and hierarchical 
positions. Conducting surveys on attitudes and discriminatory practices against minority 
groups, on the other hand, would very likely elicit dishonest responses and thus biased 
results. Pager and Quillian (2005), for instance, reveal significant differences between 
what employers state and how they actually (re)act. In other words, stated and revealed 
preferences are likely to diverge. 
A way to overcome the methodological challenges touched above is the use of field 
experiments (Harrison and List, 2004). Unfortunately, only a few studies are able to 
explore the effect of institutional changes on firms’ recruiting behavior. One prominent 
exception is Goldin and Rouse (2000). They make use of a natural experiment, i.e., a 
procedural change in the hiring process of U.S. orchestras from open to blind auditions, 
and find a significant increase in the share of women after the sex of the candidates has 
been anonymized during the initial stage of the screening process. Alternatively, a strand 
of literature has used the audit and correspondence method in order to detect 
discrimination in access to employment (e.g. Charles and Guryan, 2013). These studies try 
to separate any joint effects that go back to differences in worker and workplace 
characteristics by matching job candidates with respect to socio-economic characteristics 
and human capital endowments. The experimental design further allows effectively 
reducing the biasing effects from i.) self-selection into industries and occupations, ii.) 
unobserved heterogeneity (of applicant characteristics), iii.) social desirability (which is 
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especially an issue when using survey data) and iv.) applicants’ unrevealed preferences. 
The matched pairs apply for the same job providing the same amount and quality of 
productivity information. Yet, the applications differ with respect to one major 
characteristic which distinguishes the majority from the minority group, i.e., for instance, 
applicants’ gender or ethnic origin. Any statistically significant differences in firms’ 
aggregate responses to each group can then be regarded as evidence for discrimination 
(Riach and Rich, 2002). 
The prevalence of systematic differences in employment outcomes, however, raises the 
question as for its underlying sources. In fact, researchers find different explanations for 
unequal treatment depending on their field of study. Pager and Shepherd (2008), for 
example, identify sociological and psychological causes for discrimination which they 
classify into individual, organizational and structural factors. These factors in turn are 
found to shape people’s tastes and group perceptions and thus form the grounds for two 
fundamental economic theories of discrimination, namely taste-based (Becker, 1971) and 
statistical discrimination (Arrow, 1971; Phelps, 1972; Aigner and Cain, 1977), which 
constitute the theoretical framework of the present thesis. 
1.1 RESEARCH GAP AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Reviewing empirical studies on unequal treatment, research on wage discrimination has 
clearly drawn the most attention inside and outside the German labor market (e.g. Darity 
and Mason, 1998; Altonji and Blank, 1999). Yet, wage discrimination may only be the ‘tip 
of the iceberg’ as group differences in pay are influenced by factors that, on their own, may 
be subject to discrimination. Previous findings particularly highlight the role of group 
segregation across industries and occupations on remuneration (e.g. Groshen, 1991; Fields 
and Wolff, 1995; Huffman and Cohen, 2004). Whenever a demographic group is 
systematically disadvantaged entering certain jobs while another group has unrestricted 
access, inequalities of the gender distribution across sectors are produced. The effect of 
these inequalities may be twofold. On the one hand, they may enhance the wage gap even 
though this may not provoke outright pay discrimination and, on the other hand, they may 
induce self-selection since disadvantaged groups adapt their career plans as a response to 
anticipated labor market drawbacks (Pager and Shepherd, 2008). Thus, assessing 
discrimination during initiation of work relationships, i.e., in the recruitment process, 
seems to be of particular interest and can be considered a precursor of discriminatory 
practices at later stages. 
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Empirical research on hiring discrimination has been conducted in multiple countries 
considering various demographic groups and using a wide array of methodological 
approaches (e.g. Riach and Rich, 2002). At first glance, the findings from most of these 
studies seem to be very homogenous. Regarding gender discrimination, for example, 
differential treatment is found to vary by job type where women are discriminated in 
male-dominated jobs while men are disfavored in female-dominated professions. Racial 
and ethnic minorities, on the other hand, are found to be disadvantaged independent of 
job types, but dependent on skin color and nationality. However, there are some 
exceptions that particularly demonstrate that the prevalence and magnitude of 
discrimination may be sensitive to certain conditions. These conditions in turn may reflect 
employers’ motives to treat one group worse than another, all other things being equal. 
Indeed, there is spurious evidence that employers discriminate based on their distastes 
and productivity perceptions linked to group membership. Empirically, though, the 
emphasis thus far has predominantly been put on whether and to what extent 
discrimination exists. Disentangling the effects from taste-based and statistical 
discrimination is therefore one major challenge that will be addressed during the course 
of this thesis (Charles and Guryan, 2013). 
Bearing in mind the enormous theoretical and empirical work on hiring discrimination, 
quite surprisingly, research in the German labor market is quite limited. Even 
demographic characteristics most commonly investigated in the existing literature, i.e., 
gender and ethnic origin, lack thorough evidence in particular concerning access to 
employment. The stylized facts and previous empirical research suggest that differential 
treatment in disfavor of either group prevails. Preliminary evidence supports this notion. 
Goldberg et al. (1996), for instance, investigate discrimination against native (first 
generation) Turks in eleven occupations in the mid-1990s and find evidence of significant 
disadvantages against the minority group. Furthermore, in a more recent study, Kaas and 
Manger (2012) find an average probability of receiving a positive response from 
employers that is 5 percentage points lower for candidates with a Turkish-sounding name 
as compared to their German-named counterparts. They also demonstrate that 
discrimination disappears if the applications include an additional reference which they 
interpret as evidence for statistical discrimination. However, whether their results also 
hold in another institutional context remains to be tested. Moreover, unlike for ethnic 
minorities, even less research has been undertaken on gender differences in access to 
employment and the conditions under which differential treatment evolves.  
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The purpose of this thesis therefore aims to extend prior research by investigating gender 
and ethnic discrimination in the recruitment process of German employers. Using 
correspondence testing, further insights should be provided into the prevalence as well as 
the factors influencing discrimination. In particular, the study compares response 
probabilities of men and women as well as native Germans and second generation Turks 
when applying for apprenticeship positions in predominantly technical occupations. The 
experimental design allows separating whether employers’ decisions are in line with the 
predictions of the taste-based and/or statistical discrimination approach. Specifically, the 
thesis investigates the following questions: 
 Do females and/or second generation Turks suffer from hiring discrimination in 
the German labor market for apprenticeships? 
 If so, what are the factors that enforce or mitigate discriminatory behavior? 
 Do taste-based and statistical discrimination affect the prevalence and/or 
magnitude of differential treatment? 
The results may not only be of interest to the scientific community, but may be of 
significant practical importance. First of all, the study identifies whether discrimination is 
an issue that is relevant – statistically and economically. If so, it sheds more light on its 
underlying sources. In fact, policy implications might differ depending on the type of 
discrimination. In Germany, for example, policy makers have recently tested the 
introduction of anonymous applications in order to increase the chances of minorities of 
being invited to a job interview (Krause et al., 2010; Krause et al., 2012b). Now, in order to 
assess the rationality of such measures, empirical studies should, on the one hand, ex ante 
identify the prevalence and causes of discrimination and, on the other hand, evaluate their 
success ex post (Åslund and Nordström Skans, 2012). The former aspect clearly motivates 
this thesis. 
1.2 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: chapter 2 presents stylized facts that 
highlight the situation of women (2.1) and ethnic minorities (2.2) in the German labor 
market and descriptively compares their situation with the respective majority group 
(males and native Germans).  
Chapter 3 gives a literature overview that, on the one hand, discusses the advantages and 
drawbacks of different methodological approaches used to identify discrimination (3.1) 
and, on the other hand, reviews previous empirical findings investigating different labor 
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market outcomes by gender (3.2.1) and ethnic origin (3.2.2). The empirical methods are 
further classified into regression-based approaches (3.1.1) and experiments (3.1.2) where 
laboratory (3.1.2.1) and field experiments (3.1.2.2) are distinguished. Insights on gender 
(3.2.1) and ethnic differences (3.2.2) are provided separately for wages and employment 
rates and for research inside and outside the German labor market. Concerning wage 
inequalities, only a brief overview of existing work is given whereas, with regard to 
employment differences, particularly the results from correspondence studies are focused 
upon. Moreover, in section 3.2.3, empirical research that reveals various sources of 
discrimination is presented. Here, the emphasis is especially placed on the separation of 
economically motivated factors. 
Chapter 4 starts with the theoretical framework. Recruiting is analyzed within a principal-
agent setting (4.1.1) and theories explaining labor market inequalities are developed 
(4.1.2). More specifically, different employment outcomes are explained by pre-market 
inequalities (4.1.2.1), human capital theory (4.1.2.2), segmented labor market theory 
(4.1.2.3) as well as theories of labor market discrimination (4.1.2.4). The latter are further 
divided into economic, i.e., taste-based (4.1.2.4.1) and statistical discrimination (4.1.2.4.2), 
and non-economic theories (4.1.2.5). After that, section 4.2 presents the conceptual 
framework that formally describes the hiring decision with special reference to the 
prevalence of different sources of discrimination. Based on the theoretical and empirical 
considerations, section 4.3 then develops testable hypotheses for both the study on gender 
and ethnic discrimination.  
Chapter 5 comprises the empirical part. In section 5.1, the importance and suitability of 
the labor market for apprenticeships is highlighted (5.1.1.1 and 5.1.1.2) and the 
experimental design is described in detail (5.1.2–5.1.5). Section 5.2 presents the data 
(5.2.1), descriptive results (5.2.2) and empirical analyses (5.2.3) of the gender study. It 
further tests the hypotheses, discusses the findings and relates them to theory as well as to 
prior empirical research inside and outside the German labor market (5.2.4). Section 5.3 
has a similar structure reporting the results on ethnic discrimination. Additionally, section 
5.4 provides a brief methodological note that compares the outcomes of pairwise and 
single application tests and demonstrates the reliability of the correspondence approach. 
Finally, chapter 6 draws conclusions, highlights the contributions to both the scientific 
community and practice and provides directions for future research. 
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2 STYLIZED FACTS 
This section reports stylized facts about the labor market situation of men and women as 
well as native Germans and people with migration background. It highlights the existing 
discrepancies in labor market outcomes between majority and minority workers and 
provides tentative evidence on where these observable employment differences might 
stem from. 
2.1 THE SITUATION OF WOMEN IN THE GERMAN LABOR MARKET 
Annual data from the German Federal Employment Agency (BA) shows that after a decline 
from 2001 until 2005, the employment ratio for both men and women has been rising 
except for a slight drop in 2009. The difference between men and women, however, is 
quite substantial but has also been declining over the last decade. While in 2012, 56.3 
percent of the male population aged between 15 and 65 were gainfully employed, the 
respective figure for females was 6.9 percentage points lower. Coming from a 9.2 
percentage points gap in 2001, the gender difference in employment has been oscillating 
around 7 percentage points within the last four years (see figure 2-1). The European 
Commission (2010) shows similar trends across the EU-27 countries and reports an 
average employment gap of 13.7 percentage points in 2008 and thus a significant 
reduction compared to 1998 (18.7 percentage points difference). 
Figure 2-1:  Average Employment Participation Rate of Men and Women Aged 15 and 65 Years in 
Germany 
 
Notes:  The employment participation rate depicts the ratio of all full-time, part-time or marginally employed 
among the entire population aged between 15 and 65 years.  
Source: Own illustration based on BA (2013c). 
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Analogous to employment participation rates, figure 2-2 depicts unemployment among all 
employees separated by gender. After a peak in 2005 with around 13 percent, average 
unemployment rates decreased to 7.6 percent in 2012. Quite noticeably, the 
unemployment ratio of men has been exceeding the respective figure for women over the 
last decade except for the years 2006 until 2008. This is quite the opposite compared to 
the EU-27 average where women perform relatively worse compared to men (European 
Commission, 2010). Analyses from the BA (2012a) further reveal that transition rates in 
the labor market for men are higher relative to the labor market for women. The latter 
have a lower risk of becoming unemployed (0.8 versus 1.0 percent), but once being out of 
work also suffer from lower chances of finding a new job (6.0 versus 8.2 percent). 
Accordingly, the average unemployment duration of men (34.3 weeks) fell below the 
average duration of women (39.9 weeks) in 2011. Besides, the share of people who have 
been unemployed for 12 months or more was slightly lower for men (34 percent) than for 
women (37 percent). 
Figure 2-2:  Average Unemployment Rate of Men and Women in Germany 
 
Source: Own illustration based on BA (2013a). 
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sectors do not only offer more stable working environments, but also permit more flexible 
working contracts which is underlined by a relatively high fraction of part-timers (BA, 
2012c). As a consequence, the share of part-timers among women is significantly higher 
than among men. While every fifteenth man has reduced working times, roughly one out 
of three women does (BA, 2013d). These statistics go along with the EU-27 average that 
reveals an overrepresentation of women in part-time employment (European 
Commission, 2010). Gender differences also turn out to be quite substantial if firms’ 
hierarchical levels are taken into account. Male employees are more likely to be found in 
high-skilled positions whereas women make up a larger fraction in skilled and unskilled 
jobs. However, the difference is most substantial in management positions that are almost 
twice as often filled by male than by female employees (Destatis, 2012b). 
With respect to human capital endowments by gender, a first look at the latest figures 
from 2011 indicates that the share of high school graduates among the entire German 
population is higher for men than for women. However, the picture might be misleading. If 
scholastic achievements are observed separately by age cohorts, the fraction of female 
high school graduates turns out to be above the male share for people aged between 25-35 
years and younger (Destatis, 2012b). A similar development can be observed with respect 
to professional qualifications. In the population, the difference between male and female 
unskilled workers is quite substantial (10.4 percentage points in 2011). Restricting the 
sample to all 25-35 year olds, though, makes this gap disappear. In the same vein, men 
having a degree from a professional school or university are overrepresented in the entire 
population, but are significantly outperformed by women among those aged between 25 
and 35. Quite noticeably, all figures on human capital endowments and labor market 
segregation fit well into the EU-27 averages where women outperform men concerning 
the acquisition of university degrees but, given these superior human capital endowments, 
are channeled into lower-paying sectors (e.g. overrepresented in jobs such as health care 
and education) and hierarchical levels (e.g. underrepresented in management positions). 
While the position of women in the labor market concerning educational endowments and 
professional qualifications has improved relatively to men, these developments thus far do 
not seem to have an impact on the gender pay gap. Figure 2-3 depicts average gross 
monthly earnings of all full-time employees working in the manufacturing and service 
sector. The ‘raw’ wage differences between men and women have been persistent over 
more than a decade and have only marginally declined from 26.4 percentage points in 
2001 down to 22.9 percentage points in 2012. This, in fact, is clearly above EU-27 average 
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which was reported to be 17.6 percentage points in 2007 (European Commission, 2010).  
Figure 2-3: Average Monthly Earnings of Men and Women Working Full-Time in the Manufacturing 
and Service Sector in Germany 
 
Notes: Reported earnings exclude fringe benefits. 
Source: Own illustration based on Destatis (2013). 
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requirements imposed on official statistics concerning information on migration status 
have been raised. Particularly the latest Microcensus offers detailed information separated 
by, inter alia, foreigners with own migration experience, Germans with own migration 
experience, foreigners without own migration experience and Germans without own 
migration experience (Destatis, 2012b). Accordingly, the first two are referred to as people 
with direct migration background while the latter constitute people with indirect 
migration background in the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP, 2012). Both statistics 
are also used to describe the labor market situation of migrants in this section. 
Nevertheless, where data are not available in detail, the figures on foreigners are used as a 
proxy. Aldashev et al. (2007), for example, find that the earnings prospects of people with 
migration background are similar to those of foreigners justifying the use of citizenship to 
approximate labor market outcomes.  
Figure 2-4:  Average Employment Participation Rates of Germans and Foreigners Aged 15 and 65 
Years in Germany 
 
Source: Own illustration based on BA (2013c). 
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have been gainfully employed. 
A closer look at GSOEP data for the same period of time, but with a special focus on 
migration status, indicates that the participation rates are quite heterogeneous across 
groups. Figure 2-5 suggests that ethnic differences in the share of people employed seem 
to be considerably smaller and have diminished over time. However, it has to be noted 
that immigrants most likely constitute a positively selected population in the panel so that 
participation rates may be overestimated.1 In all cases, the ratios correlate and still show 
differences between native Germans and people with a migration history. 
Figure 2-5:  Average Participation Rates of People with and without Migration Background in 
Germany 
 
Source: Own illustration based on GSOEP data (GSOEP, 2012). 
Compared to participation rates, unemployment rates separated by citizenship point in an 
opposite direction (see figure 2-6). Data from the BA for the last decade outline substantial 
and persistent differences between Germans and foreigners that reached their maximum 
(13.4 percentage points) during the economic downturn in 2005 and have, since, slightly 
decreased to 9.6 percentage points. Whereas in 2012 only 6.9 percent of all native German 
employees were registered as unemployed, more than twice the share of non-Germans 
was out of work (16.5 percent). 
                                                             
1 Note that apart from the participation rates of immigrants both the average and German employment ratio 
turn out to be higher in GSOEP data than in the statistics of the BA. I assume that especially sample 
selection issues drive these effects (see also Kroh, 2012). 
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Figure 2-6:  Average Unemployment Rate of German and Foreign Employees in Germany 
 
Source: Own illustration based on BA (2013b). 
Referring to the distribution across sectors and branches, the stylized facts show that 
foreigners are overrepresented (relative to their share in the population) in hospitality, 
agriculture, transportation, construction and manufacturing and are less likely to be found 
in healthcare, finance and governmental occupations (BA, 2012c; GSOEP, 2012). Apart 
from that, the latest figures indicate that apart from an overall increase in the number of 
employees with reduced working hours during the last decade, among native Germans 
every fourth person was employed part-time in 2011, whereas among foreigners every 
fifth person had reduced working hours (Destatis, 2012a; GSOEP 2012; BA, 2013d).2  
Labor market differences become most obvious if ethnic distributions at different 
hierarchical levels are considered. GSOEP data reveal that roughly 25 percent of native 
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percent of people with a migration background can be found in such positions. Apart from 
that, the ratio of unskilled employees is almost twice as large for people with migration 
background than for native Germans (GSOEP, 2012). Since hierarchical levels are closely 
related to educational and professional endowments, the job level differences are not at all 
surprising.  
Looking at the recent figures on educational endowments conditional on citizenship and 
                                                             
2  Note that the higher fraction of native German part-timers primarily goes back to a higher participation 
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constitute a higher share of part-time employees. 
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migration experience shows that native Germans have the lowest share of people with less 
than eight years of schooling. In contrast, a comparison of school dropout rates by 
different immigrant groups indicates that foreigners with own migration experience 
perform the worst. Simultaneously, however, they have the highest fraction of high school 
graduates (together with native Germans). What seems to be very odd in the first place, 
becomes quite reasonable if immigrant groups are considered separately. For example, it 
turns out that immigrants from EU countries outperform Turkish immigrants with respect 
to dropout and high school rates (Destatis, 2012a). This finding highlights significant 
variations in (pre) labor market performance among different immigrant groups. 
Furthermore, Microcensus data indicate that the socialization process in German society 
may affect performance at school as second generation immigrants perform better than 
first generation immigrants (Destatis, 2012a).  
Similar to the distribution of educational endowments is the distribution of professional 
qualifications. The share of unqualified people is lowest among native Germans (15.4 
percent) and highest among the foreign population that immigrated to Germany (48.5 
percent). Again, a separation by selected ethnic origins shows substantial differences in 
the distribution of professional qualifications. Compared to the average of all people with 
a migration background, EU-27 immigrants have the highest fraction of university 
graduates and the lowest fraction of unqualified people. The latter, though, are most 
prominent among Turkish immigrants and German-born Turks (Destatis, 2012a). 
Figure 2-7:  Average Monthly Earnings of Germans and Foreigners in Germany 
 
Source: Own illustration based on GSOEP data (2012). 
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the differences demonstrated above should map into a wage gap between native Germans 
and people with migration background. Although not accounting for additional control 
variables other than working hours, figure 2-7 emphasises this relationship. The average 
monthly earnings of Germans have exceeded foreigners’ wages over the last decade. Pay 
differences have varied quite notably ranging from 7.7 up to 14.0 percentage points and 
have apparently increased during the financial crises from 2008 until 2011. However, 
without including a proper selection of potential covariates (such as human capital 
variables), the existing wage gap might be a result of both, differences in supply- and 
demand-side factors. Thus, more detailed evidence is required that analyzes ethnic 
employment and wage differences conditional on these factors. Such evidence will be 
provided in the next chapter. 
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3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section first discusses different methods researchers apply in order to assess the 
presence and extent of labor market discrimination. In particular, the advantages and 
drawbacks of regression-based and experimental approaches are evaluated with regard to 
pay and hiring discrimination. Secondly, empirical research conducted in and beyond the 
German labor market is reviewed. Finally, empirical studies that successfully distinguish 
between different types of discrimination are presented in order to highlight the 
contrasting findings with respect to taste-based and statistical discrimination. 
3.1 EMPIRICAL METHODS FOR UNVEILING DISCRIMINATION 
A major challenge empiricists face when detecting actual labor market discrimination is to 
overcome the discrepancies between what economists call ‘stated’ and ‘revealed’ 
preferences. As will be shown, neither do employers truthfully state their preferences for 
certain demographic groups (e.g. Pager and Quillian, 2005), nor are minority workers able 
(or willing) to objectively evaluate the extent of discrimination they have suffered from 
during their working careers (e.g. Pager and Shepherd, 2008). Thus, the main objective of 
the following sections is to discuss whether and how different methods for unveiling 
discrimination tackle this challenge and present unbiased results of discriminatory 
treatment. 
 REGRESSION-BASED METHODS  3.1.1
Researchers broadly apply econometric tools such as regression techniques to 
microeconomic data. These data are either generated by surveys, collected by the 
government, provided by firms or emerge from what economists call ‘natural 
experiments’. A prominent example that matches data from individual workers with 
establishment information is the Linked-Employer-Employee dataset (LIAB) which is 
administered and processed by the BA. Furthermore, the German Socio-Economic Panel, a 
longitudinal household survey conducted since 1984, and the Microcensus, a 
representative cross-sectional dataset covering 1% of all German households, provide rich 
sets of data that allow thorough analyses at the household and the individual level. 
Equivalents from the U.S. are, among others, the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(NLSY), the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) (both longitudinal) and the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) (cross-sectional). 
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The surveys mentioned above obviously do not enquire employers’ preferences towards 
certain demographic groups, nor do they ask employees whether they have been subject 
to any form of discrimination in the past. Both such designs would produce substantial 
bias as perceived disadvantages may be highly subjective and involve interviewer effects 
while employers, on the other hand, would certainly not admit discriminatory behavior 
since they would then have to face legal consequences harming their reputation (Pager 
and Shepherd, 2008).3 Pager and Quillian (2005) convincingly demonstrate that personal 
distastes might not be truthfully stated or, to put it in their words, employers are not 
necessarily “walking the talk”. They compare the results of a telephone survey with hiring 
probabilities from an audit study where black and white ex-offenders apply for a real job. 
Their findings suggest that firms which stated a higher likelihood of employing ex-
offenders in a telephone interview actually revealed the same hiring probability than the 
average employer in the sample. Additionally, survey results do not show any racial 
differences in hiring while, in practice, blacks were significantly disadvantaged compared 
to white applicants (for similar findings on discrepancies between actions and stated 
views, see also Firth (1982)). Thus, empirical results based on self-reported behavior of 
employers or perceived discrimination of employees might be highly misleading and 
produce statistical artifacts (Pager and Shepherd, 2008). 
However, even more ‘objective’ data do not permit the researcher to quantify the extent of 
direct labor market discrimination. Rather, the unexplained differentials from regression 
outputs can be considered a plausible proxy for discrimination, all other factors kept 
constant (Altonji and Blank, 1999). Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) introduced a 
framework that decomposes wage differentials into a fraction affected by endogenous 
variables such as productivity differences and differences in human capital endowments 
and a fraction explained by exogenous variables such as socio-economic differences. As 
their decomposition framework is widely considered as fundamental to research on wage 
discrimination and has seen a lot of derivatives and extensions (e.g. Brown et al., 1980; 
Reimers, 1983; Cotton, 1988; Neumark, 1988; see Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) and Silber 
and Weber (1999) for comparisons based on empirical data), it should briefly be 
discussed. 
                                                             
3  In some studies, for example, subjects are asked for their past experiences with discrimination (e.g. 
Forstenlechner and Al-Waqfi, 2010). Obviously, these kinds of surveys are very prone to biases due to, 
inter alia, interviewer effects and a different understanding of what constitutes discrimination. 
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The basic idea is that the raw wage differential between demographic groups (e.g. blacks 
and whites or men and women) is attributable to differences in mean endowments, on the 
one hand, and differences in regression coefficients, i.e., in the returns to these 
endowments, on the other hand. Different rates of return imply that the market evaluates 
an identical set of endowments differently by demographic groups. It is this difference that 
can be interpreted as evidence of discrimination. In addition, any difference in the 
unexplained portion of the regression functions, i.e., in the shift coefficients (intercepts), 
also points at discriminatory behavior in either pre- or current labor market situations. 
Hence, using the last two measures, the fraction of discrimination among the entire wage 
differential can be calculated. 
In order to decompose the effects of individual characteristics and the effects of 
discrimination, two regression models (denoted as the structural and the reduced form) 
for each demographic group are developed where the (log of hourly or annually) wage 
serves as the dependent variable. The structural model includes what is considered the 
full set of variables to estimate the wage regressions. This set consists of endogenous 
variables that provide information on e.g. education, industry, occupational position, 
vocational training, union membership and tenure and exogenous variables such as family 
background information, age, health conditions and the area of residence.4 Some variables 
such as parents’ education do not have a direct impact on the wage level but affect other 
endogenous variables such as education or career choice. For this reason a reduced form 
of the wage regression is estimated. Accordingly, the structural form estimates the wage 
conditional on the current socioeconomic situation while the reduced form estimates the 
wage based on the circumstances determined by birth. 
In order to interpret the regression results, the between-group difference attributable to 
different endowments and the difference attributable to differences in the coefficients are 
compared. The latter provides information on how much the low-wage group (e.g. female 
employees) would earn if it had the same coefficients, i.e., for example, the same returns to 
schooling, as the high wage group (male employees). As explained above, differences in 
the estimated and the shift coefficients between the two groups indicate discrimination 
which can be expressed as a ratio of the raw wage differential in both models. Deducting 
the ratio of the reduced model from the ratio of the structural model yields the fraction of 
                                                             
4 Note that the number and the nature of the independent variables are highly dependent on the data 
available. The variables listed here are taken from Blinder (1973). 
  
20 
 
discriminatory treatment that is based on unequal opportunities in access to, for instance, 
educational or occupational traits. Consequently, the decomposition technique enables 
researchers to break down the raw wage differential into a fraction that can be attributed 
to inferior endowments in the variables determined by birth, into a fraction that reflects 
direct discrimination in the wage setting process and into a fraction that accounts for 
discriminatory treatment in achieving the endogenous variables, i.e., pre-market 
discrimination. 
The wage decomposition can well be explained by the studies of Blinder (1973) and 
Oaxaca (1973). The former uses data from the PSID survey in order to investigate the 
reasons for racial and gender pay differentials in the U.S. Besides actual hourly wage rates, 
the dataset includes detailed family background information which permits the 
dichotomization between endogenous and exogenous variables and thus a decomposition 
of the regression estimates. With respect to the 50.8 percent wage premium of white 
compared to black workers, Blinder finds that 30 percent are attributable to the latters’ 
inferior endowment in socio-demographic characteristics such as parents’ education or 
residential area of birth, 40 percent point at direct discrimination in the wage rates and 30 
percent account for blacks’ poorer opportunities in access to e.g. education. In contrast, he 
shows that the wage differential between white male and female employees (which adds 
up to 45.8 percent in favor of the former) is not based on differences in family background 
characteristics, but on differences in the regression and shift coefficients of the structural 
regression, i.e., direct wage discrimination (about two thirds of the raw differential) and 
inferior access of females to education and certain occupations (about one third of the raw 
differential). 
The study by Oaxaca (1973) analyzes gender differences in hourly wages of white and 
black workers using a subsample of the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) from 1967. 
He finds a gender pay gap of 54 percent in case of whites and of 49 percent in case of 
blacks, respectively. Decomposing these results reveals that discrimination accounts for 
58.4 and 55.6 percent of the entire wage gap. More precisely, 19.3 (38.0) percent of the 
white (black) pay differential can be attributed to discriminatory treatment of females in 
access to certain occupations while 39.1 (17.6) percent account for differential evaluations 
of mean individual characteristics and (unexplained) differences in the shift coefficients. 
Hence, discrimination is the major source of the gender pay gap. Nevertheless, much of the 
wage differential does not stem from unequal pay for equal work, i.e., direct pay 
discrimination, but occupational segregation with women concentrating in lower-paying 
  
21 
 
(service) jobs. 
Independent of the econometric strategy, Altonji and Blank (1999) claim that the 
unexplained wage gap serves as an adequate proxy for labor market discrimination, but 
does not present a very direct form to measure systematic group differences.5 Two main 
factors may bias the unexplained wage differential. Firstly, if occupational sorting and 
human capital investments in education and training were endogenous, i.e., influenced by 
(pre-) labor market discrimination, the unexplained gap would understate the extent of 
discrimination since it was partly captured by other independent variables included in the 
regression model. Whether the independent variables are affected by discrimination or 
whether differences in endowments simply represent different preferences is crucial, 
though very hard to disentangle by means of regression techniques (and also not fully 
accounted for by Oaxaca and Blinder’s structural and reduced model). For example, 
women may dispose of inferior human capital endowments because they did not have 
equal opportunities in acquiring such endowments. On the other hand, they may invest 
less in their own human capital, may not apply for jobs in male-dominated occupations or 
may not aspire for senior positions because they anticipate unequal opportunities and 
adapt their career choices accordingly. Also, this could be a rational reaction when 
expecting a shorter career length (due to e.g. child-bearing activities). 
Secondly, the extent of discrimination would be overstated if productivity relevant 
characteristics were omitted from the wage regression, i.e., included in the error term. 
Oaxaca (1973) admits that the estimated effect of discrimination crucially depends on the 
choice of the independent variables and that the unexplained gap may eventually 
disappear if a sufficient number of wage determinants is included. Farkas and Vicknair 
(1996), Neal and Johnson (1996) and Heckman et al. (2006), for instance, find a significant 
decrease or even complete disappearance of the gender pay gap if cognitive and non-
cognitive abilities and skills other than schooling are incorporated in the wage regression. 
Yet, their results are refuted by Carneiro et al. (2005) and Lang and Manove (2011) who 
show that the inclusion of education causes the unexplained differentials to reemerge.6 
                                                             
5  That is why recent studies sometimes use terms like “residual gap” (Fransen et al., 2012) or 
“unobservable” component of earnings (Lee and Lee, 2012) instead of “discrimination” as a more neutral 
way to describe the unexplained wage gap. 
6  Charles and Guryan (2011) also criticize the linear relationship assumed in models of the decomposition 
framework and point out that the impact of skills and abilities on labor market outcomes are most likely 
nonlinear and of unknown functional form which may cause substantial bias when assessing the extent of 
discrimination. 
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This debate outlines that regression-based findings on wage discrimination are very 
sensitive to alternative model specifications. Unfortunately, administrative data generally 
fail to provide detailed information on the production process and workers’ productivity. 
A way to overcome these problems may be the use of insider data including detailed 
productivity information at an individual level. Such data, however, are rare, are 
commonly subject to strict data protection requirements and, of course, do not allow 
generalization.  
Turning back to the findings by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973), a substantial fraction 
of the gender and racial pay gap can be attributed to occupational sorting, i.e., a systematic 
variation of demographic groups across jobs and industries. Even though the 
decomposition framework permits a thorough analysis of wage differentials and provides 
consistent (though potentially biased) evidence on pay discrimination, it may not be a 
suitable tool for assessing discrimination at an even earlier stage of the employer-
employee interaction, that is, during the hiring process, or, later, during promotions to 
higher hierarchical levels (e.g. Petersen and Saporta, 2004; Charles and Guryan, 2011).7  
The stylized facts from the German labor market demonstrate that demographic groups 
systematically differ regarding their distribution across occupations and hierarchical 
levels. In other words, labor markets are often horizontally and vertically segregated. 
Reasons for that not only go back to employers’ discriminatory behavior. In fact, supply-
side determinants that differ at the entry stage into employment as well as at later career 
stages may also have an impact on different employment outcomes across demographic 
groups (e.g. Lang and Manove, 2011). Analogously to the discussion on wage differentials, 
endogeneity issues play an important role as regression-based analyses lack evidence on 
the counterfactual situation, i.e., a market without discrimination (Harrison and List, 
2004). Demographic groups may self-select into different occupations and hierarchical 
levels as a response to pre-labor market or anticipated discrimination, or simply because 
they have different preferences that, in turn, may be induced by societal role models 
(Eberharter, 2012). In addition, other factors such as the use of referral networks (e.g. 
Petersen et al., 2000; Ioannides and Loury, 2004; Caliendo et al., 2011), performance in 
                                                             
7  Unequal opportunities in access to higher hierarchical levels, i.e., a glass-ceiling effect, have been 
documented in the seminal work by Lazear and Rosen (1990) and reproduced in various institutional 
settings (e.g. Weinberger, 2011; Johnston and Lee, 2012; Gobillon et al., 2012). Petersen and Saporta 
(2004) use the term “allocative discrimination” to account for the fact that discriminatory treatment may 
simultaneously be observed at various stages of the employer-employee interaction. 
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competition (Gneezy et al., 2003; Jurajda and Münich, 2011) and different dropout rates in 
the course of the hiring process (Arvey et al., 1975) may affect employment outcomes 
across demographic groups.  
If not appropriately considered in the analyses, these factors would significantly bias 
findings on differential treatment and thus over- or underestimate the extent of 
discrimination. Consequently, Lang and Lehmann (2012: 8) point out that separating the 
effects of discrimination in the recruitment process from any other effects embedded in 
applicants’ characteristics and their job search behavior may be even more challenging 
(compared to wage regressions). One major issue is data availability. Unlike wages, 
administrative data on unemployment rates and duration, entry and exit from 
unemployment as well as labor market participation contain only few, if any, individual-
level information. Furthermore, company data from application processing are hardly 
available (exceptions are Arvey et al. (1975) and Petersen and Saporta (2004)) and, if so, 
only report who is hired, but lack information about who gets rejected. By generating 
(own) experimental data, however, researchers control for most of the above-mentioned 
supply-side differences and are thus able to directly identify discrimination in the 
recruitment process. Yet, experiments also face methodological challenges which will be 
discussed in the following. 
 EXPERIMENTS 3.1.2
Experiments allow controlling for any joint effects in the independent variables and try to 
minimize any bias originating from unobserved heterogeneity in workers’ characteristics. 
The goal is to create a counterfactual situation in order to separate a treatment effect, i.e., 
observe the outcome of an untreated subject had it been treated. Thus, compared to 
administrative data, experiments provide a rather direct way to investigate discrimination 
in the labor market and allow generating data for empirical questions that would most 
likely have remained unanswered if only administrative data were available. In contrast, 
they enable the researcher to adequately match candidates and implement truly 
exogenous differences (e.g. of applicants’ gender) that are unaffected by any endogenous 
variables determined in the field (Falk and Fehr, 2003). For example, male and female 
applicants may anticipate discrimination in jobs predominately occupied by the opposite 
sex which would discourage them from applying. Alternatively, only a highly-selected 
population, e.g. only high quality candidates, applies for non-stereotyped jobs. Such 
selection effects would significantly affect gender differences. Besides, pre-market 
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disadvantages in the attainment of educational endowments may encourage occupational 
herding. If, for instance, women were systematically discriminated in Math which would 
negatively affect their grades, lower employment rates in technical occupations where 
Math grades are more important than, say, grades in Politics, would be a rational 
consequence rather than hiring discrimination. Being able to directly control these 
mechanisms is a major advantage of experiments. A direct test of discrimination would 
match two otherwise equally equipped candidates that apply for the same job and only 
differ with respect to one demographic characteristic. This procedure not only creates a 
treatment and a control group, but the experimental setting also permits replicability of 
the findings. 
Harrison and List (2004) list various methods to create the counterfactual. These methods 
are either econometric tools used together with administrative data such as propensity 
score matching and instrumental variable regressions or rely on natural or controlled 
experiments. In line with their name, natural experiments compare the outcomes between 
a treatment and a control group in a naturally occurring environment. Thus, subjects can 
be observed in a real context that involves real stakes. Unfortunately, researchers do not 
come across such data very often (for an exception of this, see e.g. Goldin and Rouse 
(2000) and Wozniak (2012)). This in turn calls for the implementation of experiments that 
construct a control group via randomization. 
3.1.2.1 LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS 
Where alternative data are not available or do not contain sufficient information to draw 
causal inferences, data may be generated in the laboratory.8 Here, researchers have the 
possibility to observe exogenous ceteris paribus changes as subjects’ preferences are 
induced by controlled effort cost and production functions. Thus, endogeneity problems 
can be dealt with to a certain extent which allows the experimenter to clearly identify e.g. 
factors influencing the decision. Additionally, biases due to information asymmetries and 
unobserved activities such as sabotage can be excluded or separated (by observing e.g. 
outcome differences between anonymous and face-to-face interactions) as the 
experimental framework and subjects’ communication is under the researcher’s control. 
                                                             
8  Researchers distinguish various forms of laboratory experiments including scenario and neuroeconomic 
experiments. Here, only the general advantages and disadvantages of laboratory experiments are 
elaborated. A thorough discussion would be beyond the scope of this thesis and can be found in e.g. 
Harrison and List (2004).   
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In the same vein, the underlying circumstances are known and can be influenced by the 
researcher. Such circumstances include the number of subjects involved in an interaction 
and whether this interaction is repeated or just one-shot. Lastly, the thorough control also 
permits replicability of the experiment and its results, which facilitates the verification or 
falsification of the hypotheses developed (Falk and Fehr, 2003).    
However, laboratory experiments face several objections that need to be carefully 
addressed. Firstly, the majority of laboratory experiments use students as the subject pool 
because they are generally easy to get access to, do understand the underlying rules and 
have rather low opportunity costs. Critics argue that students may not be representative, 
may lack experience with certain tasks and provide little socio-demographic variability. 
Conversely, the incomplete control over recruiting of subjects from outside university 
carries the risk of further sample selection and attrition bias. Research comparing the 
results from different subject populations varies with respect to the quantitative findings, 
but shows strong similarities in the qualitative patterns (Falk and Fehr, 2003). 
Secondly, commodities chosen in an experiment might not appropriately represent those 
in the field and, as a consequence, might cause subjects to behave differently. In other 
words, relatively low incentives may induce different behavior as opposed to rather high 
incentives (such as monetary payouts or legal consequences). However, Camerer and 
Hogarth (1999) outline that subjects’ behavior is very little if at all dependent upon 
changes in expected earnings. Besides, any reservations about the size of the stacks may 
be tackled by conducting experiments in poor countries where the stakes are more 
meaningful to the subjects (Falk and Fehr, 2003).  
Thirdly, a small number of observations may limit the applicability of parametric data 
analysis techniques and may fail to produce statistically robust results. These limitations, 
however, are rather weak since observations can be increased at any time. Moreover, 
researchers have engaged in large scale experiments that allow a comparison to the 
results from small sample studies (see Falk and Fehr (2003) for prominent examples).        
Fourthly, tight control may carry the risk that subjects behave differently when they are 
observed, i.e., either feel social pressure to behave in a certain manner (known as the 
‘Hawthorne effect’) or act how they believe the experimenter wants them to act (the so-
called ‘experimenter effect’) (Harrison and List, 2004). 
Fifthly (and probably most commonly mentioned in the literature), criticisms have been 
raised concerning the internal and external validity of laboratory experiments. While 
internal validity may be implemented by a proper experimental design, external validity 
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includes more general objections on whether the inferences drawn prevail outside the 
laboratory. Realism can for example be added by conducting real effort experiments and 
providing a real context (Falk and Fehr, 2003). More convincingly (or at least 
complementary) and beneficial to the generalizability of the findings from laboratory 
experiments, however, may be the implementation of field experiments. 
3.1.2.2 FIELD EXPERIMENTS 
The nature and design of field experiments is quite similar to laboratory experiments. 
Harrison and List (2004) classify field experiments as artefactual, framed or natural. While 
the first two have an informed nonstandard subject pool, natural field experiments 
observe uninformed subjects following their every-day business. So, ideally, external 
validity is maximized by the field environment and internal validity is maintained by a 
sufficient set of controls. Furthermore, natural experiments guarantee that subjects do not 
only make simple statements, but actually (re)act according to their preferences (recall 
the initial discussion about ‘stated’ and ‘revealed’ preferences).   
Field experiments investigating hiring discrimination can be designed in various ways. A 
strand of literature has used matched-pair experiments denoted as audit or 
correspondence testing in order to find differences in access to employment conditional 
on a treatment variable such as gender or ethnic origin. These methods try to control for 
any effects that stem from differences in workers and workplace characteristics by 
matching equally qualified pairs of job candidates who apply for the same position. The 
applications only differ with respect to one major characteristic which distinguishes the 
majority from the minority group where the former (latter) generally represents a higher 
(lower) share of employees in the respective labor market segment. Based on firms’ 
aggregate callbacks to each group, the prevalence of differential treatment can be tested. A 
callback is generally referred to as a situation where the employer promotes the candidate 
to the next stage of the recruitment process which could be, for example, a job interview. 
Since individual characteristics are controlled for, differences in market expectations, 
preferences and social ties (networks) can be ignored and the effects of group-specific 
selection into certain occupations and hierarchical levels can be excluded, any aggregate 
callback differences that turn out to be statistically significant can be attributed to 
discriminatory practices on behalf of employers (Riach and Rich, 2002; Pager, 2007). 
Prior matched-pair studies use different measures to report the extent of discrimination. 
The main differences stem from the treatment of firms that do not call back any of the 
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applicants. Riach and Rich (2002) discuss how the results from correspondence and audit 
studies should be reported and interpreted. They argue that employers rejecting both 
applicants should be treated as non-observations as it is not clear to the researcher 
whether an actual evaluation of the candidates has taken place or whether the vacancy 
was already filled which would have made such an assessment obsolete. Thus, they 
recommend calculating the net discrimination rate by subtracting the number of occasions 
where only the majority candidate received a callback from the number of occasions 
where only the minority candidate received a callback conditional on employer’s callback 
to at least one candidate. Consider (1) as the total number of matched pairs, (2) as the 
number of cases where neither of the candidates received a callback, (3) as those 
occasions where at least one candidate received a callback, (4) as situations where both 
received a callback, (5) as ‘majority-only’ callbacks and (6) as observations of ‘minority-
only’ callbacks, this formally yields: 
                        
( )  ( )
( )
  
The gross discrimination rate, on the other hand, considers all employers addressed which 
makes it a less conservative measure of differential treatment. Hence, 
                          
( )  ( )
( )
  
Analogous to the net and gross discrimination rates, dividing the ratio of majority 
callbacks by the ratio of minority callbacks among those employers that gave at least one 
candidate a positive response yields the odds ratio: 
           
( )  ( )
( )
( )  ( )
( )
  
Including the observations of those firms ignoring both applications (2), yields the 
following success ratio: 
              
( )  ( )
( )
( )  ( )
( )
  
The measures presented are the same independent of whether audit or correspondence 
testing is applied. However, both methods differ with respect to their experimental design. 
While the former train real-life applicants such that similar behavior during telephone and 
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job interviews is evoked, the latter only send out résumés of fictitious applicants. Thus, 
audit studies allow the researcher to evaluate discriminatory practices at every stage of 
the hiring process. Heckman and Siegelman (1993) and Heckman (1998), however, point 
out the problems that occur due to demand effects and a lack of control, especially during 
a personal job interview. The correspondence method, in comparison, gives unaltered 
evidence of unequal treatment since it focuses on written applications that minimize 
unobserved heterogeneity. The major shortcoming of this method is that observations are 
confined to the first step in the recruitment process. Nevertheless, this problem seems to 
be less severe. In fact, reviewing the results of previous audit studies, Riach and Rich 
(2002) show that discrimination is most evident before personal contact takes place, i.e., 
when written applications are assessed. 
Further criticisms highlight the problem of effective matching (Heckman and Siegelman, 
1993; Heckman, 1998). In this respect, Harrison and List (2004) note that partial matching 
may sometimes be worse than no matching. For example, if men and women are expected 
to have the same average productivity, but different in-group productivity variances, it 
depends on the employer’s threshold level which group he prefers. If the threshold level is 
high, it is rational to choose a member of the higher variance group since a higher fraction 
will meet the high standard. Conversely, if the threshold level is rather low, the lower 
variance group should be favored as they are less likely not to meet firms’ requirements. 
In other words, candidates that look homogenous on any other characteristics except for 
the one treated (e.g. gender or ethnicity) are not necessarily perceived as being equal 
which might cause bias in the regression estimates produced. Consequently, study designs 
should include variations in other individual characteristics to allow for an investigation of 
the treatment effect conditional on other independent variables.9  
Another objection to be addressed has to do with hidden connotations of individual 
characteristics such as names and profile pictures. Correspondence studies usually use the 
former as an indicator of candidates’ gender and/or ethnic affiliation. Typically, name 
registers are consulted to choose a set of (gendered) native and ethnic-sounding names. 
However, Fryer and Levitt (2004), for instance, show that names may not only convey 
information on group membership, but might be associated with socioeconomic status. 
Further studies reveal that names are used to infer people’s age, attractiveness and 
                                                             
9  See Neumark (2012) for a thorough discussion of implicit assumptions (embedded in correspondence 
studies) on group differences in the unobservables and their effect on employment outcomes. 
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intelligence (e.g. Rudolph and Spörrle, 1999; Rudolph et al., 2007; Cotton et al., 2008; Arai 
and Skogman Thoursie, 2009; Watson et al., 2011). These findings indicate that employers 
may form productivity beliefs based on applicants’ names rather than their gender or 
ethnic origin which would dilute experimental control and make the separation of an 
unbiased treatment effect impossible. Therefore, a proper correspondence design requires 
the implementation and control of name effects (see e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004) 
for within-group name-based outcome differences in a correspondence setting). Similarly, 
the attachment of a profile picture which is common in the German labor market needs to 
take into account beauty effects as, inter alia, investigated by Hamermesh and Biddle 
(1994), Mobius and Rosenblat (2006) and Rooth (2009). Especially if differential 
treatment based on age or gender is evaluated, beauty controls need to be considered. 
This could be done by implementing a variety of profile pictures that are then included as 
dummy variables in the econometric analyses. 
Additional challenges have their origin in the nature of the correspondence method and 
the recruitment practices in general. Since the hiring process within a firm is like a ‘black 
box’ to the researcher, employers’ responses do not reveal whether callbacks are based on 
individual or group decision making. While the latter permits social learning, the former 
does not. This, however, may lead to systematically different employment outcomes 
across groups and may thus affect the extent of discrimination. Apart from that, the type of 
jobs suitable for audit and correspondence studies are limited. Senior positions, for 
instance, require prior professional experience which is hard to signal due to a lack of 
credible references. Besides, the longer the employment history and the more credentials 
are provided, the higher is the treatment effect bias unintentionally created by 
unobservable productivity information. Also, both audit and correspondence methods are 
suitable for revealing discrimination in recruitment, but are rather inappropriate 
procedures for uncovering discrimination in other domains of the employee-employer 
interaction such as access to training, promotions and lay-offs.   
Lastly, researchers criticize the deceptive nature of audit and correspondence studies. 
Riach and Rich (2004) deal with the question of whether these methods are ethical and 
represent a legitimate research practice. Referring to benefits and drawbacks of 
alternative methods presented above, they trade off the disadvantages some demographic 
groups have from discriminatory practices against the economic costs employers face 
when processing fictitious applications. They conclude that an application of the matched-
pair experiments using fictitious applications is well justified if certain quality standards 
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implicitly agreed upon throughout the history of these methods are met (see e.g. Riach and 
Rich, 2002). Above all, this includes promptly and politely withdrawing from the 
applications in case of employers’ callbacks. 
In the labor market, Fidell (1970), Levinson (1975) and Firth (1982) were the first to use 
audit and correspondence methods to study gender differences in hiring, while Jowell and 
Prescott-Clarke (1970), Newman (1978) and Firth (1981) conducted matched-pair testing 
to assess ethnic discrimination in the recruitment process. Later, the use was extended to 
other socio-demographic characteristics such as age (Bendick et al., 1999; Lahey, 2008; 
Riach and Rich, 2006a, 2007b, 2007a), religious affiliation (Banerjee et al., 2009; King and 
Ahmad, 2010; Siddique, 2011), obesity and attractiveness (Agerström and Rooth, 2011; 
Rooth, 2009; López Bóo et al., 2013; Ruffle and Shtudiner, 2013), sexual orientation 
(Ahmed and Hammarstedt, 2009; Weichselbaumer, 2013), leisure time activities and 
physical fitness (Rooth, 2011), maths skills (Koedel and Tyhurst, 2012), criminal records 
(Baert and Verhofstadt, 2013) and unemployment experiences (Falk et al., 2005; 
Oberholzer-Gee, 2008). In addition, domains other than the labor market were addressed 
(see e.g. Ross and Turner (2005) for the housing and Gneezy and List (2004) for the 
product market). Detailed results of more recent studies on gender and ethnic 
discrimination will be presented in the subsequent section. 
Summaryzing, a review of the methods applied in the empirical literature on labor market 
discrimination shows that regression-based studies prevail with respect to the analysis of 
wage differentials while experimental approaches are most commonly used when 
assessing differences in hiring. In the context of the latter, field experiments have proven 
advantageous compared to laboratory experiments as well as administrative and/or 
survey data. They provide a real context, minimize selection and firm specific effects and 
do not depend on different perspectives, expectations and information available to the 
respondents. In addition, they most strongly promise to reveal employers’ true rather than 
their stated preferences. Due to these advantages, the correspondence method will be 
applied for data collection in this thesis. 
3.2 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON DIFFERENT LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES BY GENDER 
AND ETHNIC BACKGROUND 
This section discusses empirical findings on wage and hiring differences by gender and 
ethnic origin. Unlike the stylized facts from chapter 2 that display largely unconditional 
employment and wage differences, the studies reviewed below control for confounding 
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effects, decompose the existing gaps and try to identify the prevalence and extent of labor 
market discrimination against women as well as racial and ethnic minorities. Of course, 
the literature presents only a snapshot of the available work and focuses on seminal 
papers as well as the most recent publications. Findings from outside the German labor 
market are largely restricted to research in the U.S. while empirical studies on the German 
labor market are presented separately. 
 DIFFERENT LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES BY GENDER 3.2.1
As direct evidence on gender hiring discrimination in the German labor market is very 
limited, the following subsections focus on related literature that provides supply- and 
demand-side explanations for the prevailing gender differences inside and outside the 
German labor market. First, the findings on wage and, afterwards, the findings on 
employment disparities are presented where labor market discrimination is identified by 
a variety of methods as discussed in section 3.1.  
3.2.1.1 FINDINGS ON GENDER WAGE DIFFERENCES OUTSIDE THE GERMAN LABOR MARKET 
Economists studying the causes and consequences of the gender wage gap can look back 
on a long history of empirical research of which some widely cited papers are presented 
below. Decomposing the factors impacting on median hourly and weekly earnings of male 
and female full-time employees, Blau and Beller (1988) find a narrowing gender pay gap 
in the U.S. In particular, cross-sectional estimates from 1971 and 1981 CPS data show an 
increase in the female-male wage ratio. Their results suggest that, firstly, a decline in 
direct wage discrimination and, secondly, changing gender roles may account for this 
trend. As a result, women have increased labor force participation which has, in turn, 
increasingly fostered their own and employers’ decision to invest in general and specific 
human capital. On the other hand, occupational segregation and women’s lower returns to 
schooling are found to mitigate the reduction in wage differentials. In the same vein, Blau 
and Kahn (1997) find with PSID data that both relative improvements of women’s human 
capital endowments as compared to men’s and a decline in discrimination against female 
employees have led to a decrease in the U.S. gender wage gap between 1979 and 1988. In 
particular, women’s average labor market experience increased relative to men’s, they 
benefitted from changes in occupational patterns that strengthened the role of jobs in the 
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service sector where women were overrepresented and they were less affected from real 
wage losses due to deunionization.10 These effects outweighed changes in the wage 
structure that particularly disfavored low-skilled workers among whom women were 
overrepresented. As both labor supply and demand of females increased, the overall 
progress in particular for high-skilled women was slowed down (O'Neill and Polachek, 
1993).11 Consecutive analyses point toward a slowdown in the convergence of wage 
differentials between men and women in the 1990s as compared to the 1980s. Comparing 
hourly earnings from three waves of PSID data (1979, 1989 and 1998) reveals that while 
women’s human capital endowments continued to increase and returns to skills remained 
constant, developments towards a rather equal gender distribution across occupations 
stagnated. Where women entering the labor market were a positively selected population 
in the 1980s, changes in women’s labor force structure might have provoked systematic 
variations in unmeasured characteristics slowing down the decline in the gender pay gap 
(e.g. Darity and Mason, 1998; Blau and Kahn, 2006; Mulligan and Rubinstein, 2008).12 
As the studies presented above indicate, gender differences in human capital endowments 
are generally held responsible for a substantial part of the gender pay gap. One reason 
why these differences occur can be found in women engaging in childbearing and -rearing 
activities. Anticipating parental leave may deter both employers and employees from 
undertaking human capital investments thus leading to systematic gender differences. 
Furthermore, employment interruptions associated with motherhood create a relative 
gender gap in accumulated labor market experience. As a result, women earn less than 
men which is why the literature often refers to the so-called ‘family’ or ‘motherhood’ gap 
(e.g. Mincer and Polachek, 1974; Miller, 1987; Korenman and Neumark, 1992; Waldfogel, 
                                                             
10  In general, empirical analyses indicate that the degree of unionization is negatively related to the gender 
pay gap (e.g. Even and Macpherson, 1993; Doiron and Riddell, 1994). 
11  Blau and Kahn (1992, 1999, 2000, 2003) show that changes in the wage structure not only explain within-
country variations in the gender pay gap over time, but also help to explain cross-country wage 
differences. Their findings consistently indicate that women tend to be “swimming upstream”. While 
human capital endowments have narrowed, the returns to high skills (which women were, on average, 
inferiorly endowed with) increased relative to the returns to low skills. 
12  For similar results from meta-analyses using studies with data from inside and outside the U.S., see e.g. 
Jarrell and Stanley (1998, 2004) and Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005). Reassessing the results 
by Blau and Kahn (2006), Lee and Lee (2012), however, offer quite surprising insights. They find that the 
reported decrease in the gender pay gap may be prone to measurement error and, in fact, be smaller than 
suggested. The reason is that the earnings variable systematically differs depending on whether the survey 
is self-reported or proxied by another household member. As more women have become household 
leaders over time and have thus self-reported their earnings in the survey, gender differentials may have 
been systematically biased. These findings underline the sensitivity of survey data and the necessity of 
being aware of any potential sample selection effects. 
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1997, 1998; Erosa et al., 2002; Brown et al., 2011; Theunissen et al., 2011; Belley et al., 
2012; Glauber, 2012).13  
Even though former studies interpret the unexplained gender wage differentials as 
appropriate evidence for discriminatory treatment, unobserved heterogeneity of 
productivity-related characteristics as well as problems from omitted variable bias 
remain. Madden (1987) carefully addresses these issues and reveals that gender 
differences do not occur as a result of (unobservable) investment decisions, but due to 
gender discrimination in access to training. Contrasting this, Kim and Polachek (1994) 
show that addressing unobserved heterogeneity significantly decreases the unexplained 
gender wage gap. They built a balanced panel from PSID data with more than 2,600 
individuals over a course of 12 years (1976-1987) and estimate fixed and random effects 
models. Their main finding demonstrates that adjusting for worker heterogeneity results 
in a decrease of the unexplained wage differential from 40 to 20 percent. Addressing 
endogeneity that stems from e.g. the decision (not) to take up employment (because the 
wage offers are below workers’ reservation wages) decreases the unexplained gender pay 
gap even further to less than 10 percent.  
Apart from gender differences in labor force participation rates, horizontal and vertical 
segregation remain persistent factors influencing the gender wage differential. Even 
though women’s earnings have grown faster than men’s due to a shift to higher-level 
occupations and steeper wage growth within job levels (Gittleman and Howell, 1995), 
women still tend to be overrepresented in low-paying industries and low-skilled 
occupations (e.g. Darity and Mason, 1998; Blau and Kahn, 2000). Put differently, it is the 
gender composition across industries and jobs that significantly contributes towards 
explaining the gender wage gap (e.g. Sorensen, 1990; Groshen, 1991; Fields and Wolff, 
1995). However, empirical estimates on the extent of this crowding effect yield varying 
results depending on the data and aggregation of occupational controls (e.g. Dolton and 
Kidd, 1994; Bayard et al., 2003). While some researchers find that remuneration within 
job-cells, i.e., the same occupations within the same establishments, only marginally differs 
across the sexes (e.g. Groshen, 1991), others reveal that women still earn significantly less 
than men even within narrowly defined jobs at the same employer (e.g. Gupta and 
                                                             
13  Furthermore, another strand of research finds women to trade in more flexible and family-friendly 
working conditions for lower wages and promotion probabilities which circulates under the term 
‘compensating differentials’ in the literature (e.g. Filer, 1985; Glass, 1990; Glass and Camarigg, 1992). 
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Rothstein, 2005; Bayard et al., 2003). Using longitudinal data, Macpherson and Hirsch 
(1995) further show that as much as two thirds of the gender composition effects on 
wages are endogenous and can be explained by occupational characteristics and 
unmeasured skill and taste differences.14 Gender wage differences, though, have not only 
been found to arise from occupational crowding, i.e., the so-called ‘glass door’ effect, but 
may also be caused by segregation across hierarchical levels, commonly referred to as the 
‘glass ceiling’ effect. Quantile regression results from Europe, the U.S. and Canada indicate 
that the gender pay gap is most prominent in the upper tail of the earnings distribution 
(Arulampalam et al., 2007; Chzhen and Mumford, 2011; Weinberger, 2011; Javdani, 2013). 
In line with the findings by Madden (1987), Lips (2013) argues that the pre-market choice 
to invest in human capital cannot be considered as gender neutral, but may be affected by 
a gender-specific component that itself might entail discrimination. In contrast, women 
may voluntarily invest less in pre-market human capital than their male counterparts as 
they have different preferences for such investments. In order to address these opposing 
approaches (assigning labor market differences to either the demand or supply side), in 
the last decade, researchers have been trying to incorporate variables that reflect gender 
differences in (wage and career) expectations (e.g. Filippin and Ichino, 2005; Chevalier, 
2007; Grove et al., 2011; Schweitzer et al., 2011; Frick and Maihaus, 2013), (educational, 
job choice, risk and competitive) preferences (e.g. Bowles et al., 2001; Croson and Gneezy, 
2009) and non-cognitive skills (e.g. Heckman et al., 2006; Müller and Plug, 2006). The 
explanatory power of these variables, however, seems to vary quite substantially. As a 
consequence, the effects from changing social attitudes (about the role of women in 
society) on the gender wage gap also remain rather suggestive. 
One prominent exception is the study by Backes-Gellner et al. (2013) which assesses the 
relationship between regional differences in the attitude towards women in the labor 
market and wages. Therefore, the authors use the Swiss Earnings Structure Survey (ESS), 
an employer-employee linked dataset, and approval rates to two amendments in the Swiss 
constitution (1981 and 2000) promoting gender equality in the labor market (and thus 
make use of variations in people’s revealed rather than stated preferences). Most notably, 
                                                             
14  Some authors also report a systematic shortfall of wages in female- as compared to male-dominated jobs 
although skill requirements and other wage-relevant factors are comparable (e.g. England et al., 1988). 
This phenomenon is also referred to as ‘valuative discrimination’ in the literature (e.g. Petersen and 
Saporta, 2004). However, the documentation is difficult and empirical papers produce rather mixed results 
(see the discussion by Tam (1997), England et al. (2000) and Tam (2000)). 
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they find that within-firm remuneration varies across cantons and gender. The gender pay 
gap is larger in cantons with a lower approval rate and explains about 50 percent of the 
within-firm variation of the gender pay gap, ceteris paribus. Similarly, Fortin (2005), 
conducting cross-country comparisons between 25 OECD countries with data from the 
World Values Surveys (which, in turn, only includes information on people’s stated 
preferences), establishes a relationship between egalitarian views on gender issues in the 
labor market and actual employment differences. While recent age cohorts have a rather 
liberal attitude and support labor market equality, perceptions of women as homemakers 
are found to cause a slowdown of the narrowing gender wage gap. Both of the 
aforementioned studies can thus be regarded as strong evidence for a linkage between 
societal role models and the gender pay gap where the former may substantially impact on 
the latter. 
3.2.1.2 FINDINGS ON GENDER WAGE DIFFERENCES IN THE GERMAN LABOR MARKET 
Given the extensive research on the reasons for the gender pay gap, empirical studies 
focusing on the German labor market are relatively scarce. Finke (2011) uses the 
Structural Earnings Survey (SES) 2006, a dataset including rich information on gross 
hourly wages as well as socio-economic and job characteristics, to investigate the gender 
pay gap in Germany. Comparing more than 1.5 million male and female employees, she 
finds a raw wage differential of 22.2 percent of which roughly two thirds (62.7 percent) 
are explained by differences in endowments while 8 percent of the wage gap remain 
unexplained. Looking at the variation explained by the regression model, differences in 
jobs and hierarchical positions have the largest impact (44.1 of 62.7 percent). Concerning 
the unexplained part, the major effect is captured by the constant which, on the one hand, 
may stem from direct pay discrimination but, on the other hand, may also reflect 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
Further analyses that investigate the distribution of men and women across industries and 
hierarchical levels and its impact on wages have been conducted by Fitzenberger and 
Wunderlich (2002), Busch and Holst (2011, 2012) and Bechara (2012). The latter reveals 
that at the time of labor market entry, the gender wage gap can be almost fully explained 
by women selecting into lower-paying occupations and firms. Fitzenberger and 
Wunderlich (2002) assess gender wage differences across the skill distribution in 
Germany over a period of more than 20 years (1975-1995) controlling for cohort effects. 
In the observation period, they find a narrowing wage gap. However, earnings growth 
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differs across skill levels with low- and medium-skilled women benefitting most while the 
reduction of pay differences is particularly small for high-skilled females as opposed to 
their equally-qualified male counterparts. Busch and Holst (2011) investigate the effect of 
horizontal and vertical segregation on gender wage differentials in management positions. 
Using GSOEP data from 2001-2008 and controlling for selection into managerial positions 
as well as differences in human capital endowments, they find support for a systematic 
wage lag in female-dominated as opposed to male-dominated jobs resulting in lower pay 
for women. A decomposition of the wage differential further reveals that 35 percent of the 
variation in wages cannot be explained by the regression model which they suggest might 
indicate discriminatory practices prevalent in the labor market. Further studies reveal that 
wage discrimination in female occupations is restricted to large employers (Busch and 
Holst, 2012), is significantly smaller in public as opposed to private companies (Melly, 
2005) and turns out to be most prominent in firms without a works council (Jirjahn, 
2011).  
Contrary to the former studies that use large-scale publicly available datasets, Pfeifer and 
Sohr (2009) use firm-level data from one single German company covering a period of 
seven years (1999-2005). They find an unconditional gender pay gap of 15 percent for 
blue-collar and 26 percent for white-collar workers. This gap however decreases to 13 
percent for both production and administration workers if individual characteristics 
reflecting human capital endowments and working hours are included in the estimation. 
The gender pay differential even further declines (3.5 percent for blue-collar and 8 
percent for white collar workers) as soon as controls for hierarchical levels are included in 
the wage regressions. Examining the earnings profiles, the results indicate that the gender 
pay gap for white-collar workers decreases with tenure.15 
3.2.1.3 FINDINGS ON GENDER EMPLOYMENT DIFFERENCES OUTSIDE THE GERMAN LABOR 
MARKET 
Quite a few challenges prevail when the reasons of gender differentials in access to 
employment should be assessed. These challenges particularly concern the availability of 
data with an adequate set of control variables. Therefore, the regression-based literature 
                                                             
15  Pfeifer and Sohr (2009) interpret their findings as evidence for statistical discrimination (see also section 
3.2.3.3). Inherently, employers pay women less than men since they have less accurate expectations about 
women’s productivity. However, learning that women are as productive as men, employers adjust their 
wages which leads to a reduction of the gender pay gap over time. 
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is rather scarce. Indeed, research generally focuses on the effects of occupational 
segregation on wages rather than identifying the factors for occupational segregation and 
differential treatment in access to employment (e.g. Darity and Mason, 1998). Some 
exceptions, however, are available.  
Investigating U.S. Census and survey data from 1940 to the late 1980s, Coleman and 
Pencavel (1993) show that women’s labor market attachment differs across skill levels. In 
fact, high-skilled women have increased their working hours since World War II, but low-
skilled women significantly reduced them as opportunity costs of taking up employment 
have risen or, put differently, reservation wages have increased. England (1982) uses NLS 
data from 1967 to show that among 30 to 44 year old women, the type of occupation does 
not have an impact on the effect of the time spent out of the labor force on wages. In other 
words, selecting into female- rather than male-dominated jobs does not seem to make a 
difference. Reviewing the U.S. literature, she also claims that segregation and child-rearing 
as the two main determinants of the gender pay gap are unrelated. More precisely, women 
do not trade in career interruptions and mother-friendly work environments for on-the-
job training, higher earnings and better career prospects (which contrasts the findings 
presented in footnote 13) (England, 2005).  
However, empirical research on the effect of gender-specific job choices seems to shed 
more light on differences in hiring outcomes. Eberharter (2012) assesses the impact of 
individual and family background characteristics on occupational choice and its relation to 
wages across different countries. Relying on longitudinal data from the U.S. (PSID), the 
U.K. (BHPS) and Germany (GSOEP) over a period of three decades (1980-2010), she 
demonstrates that even though the level of horizontal and vertical segregation has 
decreased from one generation to the next, occupational choice is still gender-specific and 
does not markedly differ across countries. The reason for that may be rooted in applicants’ 
preferences as e.g. shown by Fernandez and Friedrich (2011). They use data from 5,315 
telephone applications successfully directed to a call center over a 13-month period. At the 
application stage, the job candidates were asked about their preferences for typically 
male- (computer programmer) and female-dominated (receptionist) occupations. Not 
surprisingly, gender stereotyping already exist at the pre-hiring stage. Even though hiring 
probabilities were unknown to the candidates and (self-assessed) skills were held 
constant, female applicants gave the job as a receptionist a significantly higher rating than 
male applicants while men preferred the rather masculine occupation as a computer 
programmer. 
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Apart from supply-side evidence on why segregation in the labor market occurs, hiring 
differentials are also found to originate from demand-side factors. Various laboratory 
experiments provide clear evidence for gender-stereotyping in the evaluation of 
application forms where men are perceived as more suitable for tenured and high-level 
positions as well as in male-dominated domains (Fidell, 1970). Additional information on 
applicants’ quality, though, eliminates or, at least, reduces this ‘gender-job-bias’ (Glick et 
al., 1988; Heilman et al., 1988). 
Outside the laboratory gender discrimination in access to employment has been the 
subject of research in a number of countries and occupations. Goldin and Rouse (2000) 
use audition records and personnel rosters to study the effect of a procedural change in 
the hiring process of U.S. orchestras on the employment of female musicians. Observing 
588 auditions with more than 7,000 individuals over a course of almost 40 years, they find 
that the change from open to blind auditions explains approximately one third of the 
increasing fraction of women among new hires while an increase of women in the 
applicant pool is responsible for another third. Overall, the introduction of blind auditions 
accounts for 25 percent of the increase in the share of women being employed which they 
suggest provides evidence for discrimination against female musicians. 
Since natural experiments such as the one quoted are rare, researchers have started to 
carry out their own field experiments relying on matched-pair testing. Most of these 
studies investigate whether gender discrimination is influenced by the job type and may 
thus affect horizontal sex segregation. As one of the first, Levinson (1975) uses telephone 
inquiries in order to test for differential treatment in ‘sex-inappropriate’ jobs, that is, 
whenever the majority of people employed in a certain occupation is of the opposite sex. 
Overall, he finds evidence of what he denotes as “clear-cut” discrimination, i.e., cases 
where either of the candidates is rejected while the counterpart is either redirected or 
directly interviewed, in one third of the 246 inquiries. Yet, women in male-dominated jobs 
are discriminated somewhat less (28 percent) than men in female-dominated occupations 
(44 percent). One explanation he suggests is that employers fear being regarded as 
discriminatory against women. Apart from that, he concludes that the degree of sex-
stereotyping measured as the proportion of opposite sex employees in a specific 
occupation affects the extent of differential treatment. Hence, not surprisingly, Nunes and 
Seligman (2000) testing in-person applications of male and female candidates in auto-
shops located in San Francisco, find strong evidence for discrimination against the female 
applicant. 
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Apart from the findings from audit studies, researchers conducting correspondence tests 
have come to quite similar results of which a selection is summarized in table A-1 in the 
appendix. Reasons for contradictory results across countries may, on the one hand, have 
their root in differences in occupational gender distributions (Booth and Leigh, 2010). On 
the other hand, cross-country differences in labor market regulations (especially with 
respect to prevailing affirmative action policies) and gender roles in society may help to 
explain the heterogeneous results. For instance, in the Swedish labor market where 
gender differences have historically been smaller than in other countries, Carlsson (2010) 
does not find significantly lower callback rates for women in male-dominated jobs.  
Looking more closely at discrimination towards women, Hitt and Zikmund (1985) reveal 
that the gender effect per se is not statistically significant. However, if applications of 
women signal a commitment to equal employment opportunity issues, hiring differences 
occur. A similar idea is pursued by Weichselbaumer (2004) who investigates 
discrimination of male applicants in female-dominated jobs and of female candidates in 
male-dominated jobs in the Austrian labor market. In particular, she studies how different 
sex stereotypes and personalities affect gender discrimination. Therefore, she 
distinguishes between résumés of women that convey feminine traits and appearance and 
those that convey rather masculine characteristics. Across the entire sample, 
discrimination towards men and women prevails in female-dominated and male-
dominated jobs, respectively. Perhaps surprisingly, results do not change when 
personality is controlled for. Neither do ‘masculine’ women have an advantage in male-
dominated jobs compared to women with rather ‘feminine’ characteristics (both perform 
significantly worse than the male candidate), nor do ‘masculine’ women have a 
disadvantage when applying for female-dominated occupations. 
Apart from the importance of job types, correspondence tests are also implemented to 
study the role of (expected) maternity and parenthood on hiring probabilities. While 
Albert et al. (2011) fail to find relative discrimination against 37-year-old married women 
with children in the Spanish labor market, the results by Correll et al. (2007), using field 
data from the U.S., indicate that mothers suffer from significantly lower callback rates as 
opposed to childless women. Furthermore, evidence from France and the U.K. highlights 
that expected maternity particularly disadvantages women in getting access to high-
skilled and career-oriented jobs (Firth, 1982; Duguet et al., 2005; Petit, 2007).  
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3.2.1.4 FINDINGS ON GENDER EMPLOYMENT DIFFERENCES IN THE GERMAN LABOR MARKET 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, empirical findings on direct gender discrimination 
using the audit and correspondence method do not exist in the German labor market. In 
fact, even regression-based studies that focus on hiring differences and the reasons for 
occupational gender segregation are rather scarce.  
Fitzenberger et al. (2004) compare labor force participation and employment rates of men 
and women from West Germany over a period of 20 years (1976-1995). They use 
Microcensus data in order to compute employment and participation profiles by gender 
that account for time, age and birth cohort effects. Their findings indicate that employment 
and participation rates of men and women have narrowed over time. While men’s labor 
market attachment has declined, women’s participation rates have increased due to 
changes in labor demand and increasing opportunities of part-time employment. In 
particular, low- and medium-skilled women are responsible for this trend as their 
opportunity costs of not entering the labor force have increased. However, while age-
employment profiles of males remained unaffected, those of females are still characterized 
by an M-shape due to the family phase. Employment patterns further indicate that full-
time employment decreases while part-time employment strongly increases with age. This 
development is primarily influenced by female cohort effects suggesting that medium- and 
high-skilled women increasingly engage in part-time employment.  
Given these general employment patterns, Kunze and Troske (2009) investigate gender 
differences in job mobility and job search behavior of displaced men and women 
contingent on the life-cycle. They use a two percent random sample drawn from the social 
security records covering almost three decades (1975-2001). The dataset only includes 20 
to 60 year old workers who have been displaced due to establishment closures and 
contains information on employment spells and wages. Estimating different survival 
models and controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, the authors find that gender 
differences in displacement spells are primarily influenced by female workers in their 
prime age (between 20 and 35 years) who have significantly longer unemployment spells 
than their male counterparts. In fact, in the age cohort 56 to 60 years, women even have 
shorter spells of displacement than men. Thus, the results suggest that fertility decisions 
and (expected) maternity help to explain gender differences in labor market participation. 
Further estimates indicate that wage drops after displacements are slightly higher for 
women than for men (Crossley et al., 1994). Even though only prevailing in some age 
cohorts (20-25 and 46-50 years), these findings once again indicate that access 
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opportunities to (new) employment may impact wages differently by gender. 
3.2.1.5 CONCLUSION 
Empirical research has demonstrated that while women have increasingly entered the 
labor market and have benefitted from narrowing human capital endowments, they are 
still paid lower wages due to, inter alia, the anticipated costs of maternity leave, 
decreasing returns to skills in low-skilled jobs, direct wage discrimination as well as 
occupational segregation. Labor market segregation, in turn, has been shown to result in 
both, women being overrepresented in lower-status and lower-paid jobs as well as women 
dominating in lower hierarchical positions within occupational categories. 
Overall, research in the German labor market yields quite similar findings than studies 
from abroad: differences in individual characteristics and segregation across industries 
and hierarchical levels explain the major fraction of the pay gap. Besides, there is still a 
substantial share of unexplained differences that may be a result of wage discrimination. 
However, while human capital endowments have converged over time, labor market 
segregation still seems to be a major determinant of the gender pay gap, especially as 
female occupations are found to face a wage penalty compared to male-dominated jobs. 
The question thus remains whether gender differences in access to certain jobs and 
occupations influence the wage effect and whether these differences originate from the 
labor-supply or -demand side. Here, regression-based evidence provides rather mixed 
results indicating that self-selection as well as discrimination by employers explain the 
variations in participation rates and occupational distributions. Direct evidence from 
previous correspondence and audit studies, however, supports that gender discrimination 
is present in ‘sex-inappropriate’ jobs for both male and female applicants. Hence, Riach 
and Rich (2002) conclude that prior findings are consistent with the hypothesis that 
gender roles in society have an impact on horizontal sex segregation as they evoke gender 
discrimination in certain occupations. 
 DIFFERENT LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES BY ETHNIC BACKGROUND 3.2.2
Analogously to the literature review on the development and sources of gender 
differences in the labor market, the subsequent section provides an overview of some 
frequently cited papers investigating ethnic wage and employment inequalities. In order 
to account for country-specific peculiarities, empirical results from the German labor 
market are again presented separately. 
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3.2.2.1 FINDINGS ON ETHNIC WAGE DIFFERENCES OUTSIDE THE GERMAN LABOR MARKET 
When analyzing relative black-white earnings in the U.S. over time, a lot of similarities to 
the development of the gender pay gap and to wage inequalities of immigrants in other 
industrialized countries can be observed.16 During the 1950s to 1970s, the racial wage gap 
has narrowed with two reasons accounting for this development. On the one hand, blacks 
have benefitted from more resources in education which improved schooling quality 
relative to whites (Smith and Welch, 1989). And, on the other hand, legislative 
enforcements, particularly the Civil Rights Act, have contributed to labor market equality 
as blacks increasingly invested in human capital and had better access to certain 
occupations and industries (Card and Krueger, 1993). As a result, the racial skill gap has 
continuously decreased until the late 1990s (Altonji et al., 2012).  
However, the narrowing of the wage gap due to skill convergences has slowed down and 
even reversed during the 1980s (see Juhn et al. (1991) for an extended discussion). Firstly, 
the wage structure started to change. The change particularly disadvantaged low-skilled 
workers among which blacks (and other ethnic minorities such as Hispanics) were 
overrepresented (e.g. O'Neill, 1990; Gottschalk, 1997). In response to this price reduction, 
labor force participation in the low-skilled sector fell as the wages offered deceeded 
reservation wages. The population of blacks who remained in the workforce was thus 
positively selected. Empirically, such selection needs to be properly accounted for and, 
indeed, has reduced the black-white wage convergence of males even further (e.g. Brown, 
1984; Chandra, 2000; Juhn, 2003; Western and Pettit, 2005; Fearon and Wald, 2011; Hunt, 
2012).17 
Secondly, the extent of labor market discrimination was found to have increased during 
the late 1970s to 1980s. While in 1976 about 19 percent of the wage gap between black 
and white men could be attributed to different intercepts and lower return rates for 
blacks, this share increased to 26 percent in 1985 (Cancio et al., 1996). In line with that, 
                                                             
16  Note that most of the research presented below investigates wage differentials between blacks and whites 
in the U.S. Yet, inferences from these findings on the prevalence and extent of discrimination against other 
ethnic groups and in other labor markets need to be drawn carefully. To illustrate this, previous research 
has used skin-shades to proxy different ethnic affiliations (e.g. Telles and Murguia, 1990; Darity et al., 
1996; Goldsmith et al., 2007). Indeed, these studies have established a relationship between skin-shades 
and wage differences. The results suggest that a ‘darker’ skin color, ceteris paribus, leads to a larger wage 
gap. Thus, the reported black-white wage differentials may rather constitute the upper bound compared to 
other immigrant-native wage disparities. 
17  With respect to females, the situation is somewhat similar. Unlike whites, the population of black females 
in the labor market is positively selected. Consequently, wage gap estimates are likely to underestimate the 
actual extent of wage differentials (Anderson and Shapiro, 1996). 
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Altonji and Blank (1999) find that the fraction of the black-white wage gap explained by 
differences in return rates and the intercepts has increased when CPS data from 1979 and 
1995 are compared. Their results indicate that earnings differences have increased from 
16.5 to 21.1 percentage points. Even though both the amount attributable to endowments 
and parameters increased, the impact of the latter reflecting discrimination rose relative 
to the former. In other words, groups’ (skill) endowments narrowed, but were more 
unequally rewarded.  
Using longitudinal data from the NLS (1966-1981), Kilbourne et al. (1994) find that labor 
market experience, education and cognitive skill requirements as a proxy for hierarchical 
positions make up the largest proportion of the racial earnings gap for both men and 
women. In contrast, other independent variables such as marital status, the share of 
female employees and industrial segmentation contribute only marginally, if at all. Though 
not explicitly discussed by the authors, a rather substantial fraction of the pay gap still 
remains unexplained which may, inter alia, indicate the prevalence of labor market 
discrimination (and thus supports the findings presented above).  
If, however, the main covariates such as schooling or labor market experience 
systematically differ as a consequence of e.g. racial group differences in family and school 
environments, the actual wage gap may be over- or underestimated and spurious evidence 
of discrimination may be provided. In order to control for these potential differences, an 
unbiased measure of skills and abilities is required. Fortunately, the NLS include 
information on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), a measure of verbal and 
mathematical skills originally designed to determine an individual’s qualifications for 
military service. Arguing that these test scores are racially unbiased and reflect differences 
in schooling quality and family background, O'Neill (1990) shows that controlling for 
AFQT scores, schooling and potential labor market experience reduces the white wage 
premium quite substantially. About three quarters of the remaining black-white earnings 
gap among 22-29 year old men can be explained by her regression model. In fact, adding 
actual labor market experience makes the wage differential almost fully disappear. Later, 
Neal and Johnson (1996) have somewhat reproduced these findings. They included AFQT 
scores as the only productivity-related measure revealing that pre-market skill differences 
explain the entire racial pay gap for females and a substantial fraction for males. 
Therefore, they conclude that policy actions should focus on the alignment of schooling 
quality rather than quantity when tackling racial differences in labor market outcomes 
(see also Maxwell, 1993). However, there is no consensus about the O'Neill and Neal and 
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Johnson results. Rodgers and Spriggs (1996) and Carneiro et al. (2005), for example, show 
that wage differences reemerge if alternative model specifications are considered. This 
discussion illustrates that the racial pay gap may already originate from pre-market 
differences even though they are likely not to be responsible for the entire disparity.18 
Apart from pre-market factors, experience, seniority, training and job mobility are 
documented to affect racial wage differences. Though, it is again not clear whether this is 
due to an endowment or a return effect. D'Amico and Maxwell (1994) show that 
disparities in experience endowments rather than different return rates are the main force 
behind the black-white earnings disparities in early career years. Yet, following young 
high school graduates from the NLSY sample over 13 years (1979-1991), Bratsberg and 
Terrell (1998) refute these results and report that blacks are less rewarded for 
accumulated experience than whites. 
Further evidence on wage differentials between natives and ethnic minorities can be 
traced back to differences in occupational and hierarchical distributions (e.g. Carrington 
and Troske, 1998; Huffman and Cohen, 2004; Aydemir and Skuterud, 2008; Pendakur and 
Woodcock, 2010). Barth et al. (2012) demonstrate with employer-employee linked data 
from Norway that differences in unemployment spells and career prospects explain 40 
percent of the wage gap between natives and immigrants. In particular, immigrants fail to 
advance to higher-paying firms and thus experience flatter wage growth than their native 
counterparts. In the same vein, Eliasson (2013) reports that inequalities with regard to job 
mobility among the highly educated in the Swedish labor market account for a large 
fraction of the ethnic wage gap. These two examples indicate that, similar to gender wage 
differences, horizontal and vertical segregation need to be considered as additional factors 
influencing the ethnic and racial wage gap. 
3.2.2.2 FINDINGS ON ETHNIC WAGE DIFFERENCES IN THE GERMAN LABOR MARKET 
In order to put the existing evidence into perspective and to find similarities in the 
qualitative results, it may be worthwhile explicitly focusing on empirical findings on ethnic 
                                                             
18 For a brief overview on the debate of AFQT scores, see also Darity and Mason (1998), Lang and Manove 
(2011) and Lang and Lehmann (2012). The impact of pre-market factors in explaining the wage gap is also 
found to differ depending on ethnic origin as e.g. shown by Black et al. (2006). 
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wage differences from the German labor market.19 Velling (1995) analyzes a one percent 
sample of the 1989 employment register data including historical labor market 
information of 11,657 foreigners (from 14 different countries) and 105,204 Germans. He 
finds that differences in endowments make up the largest share (roughly 80 percent) of 
the overall wage gap which varies between 12.6 and 13.1 percent. The remainder can be 
attributed to discrimination where the magnitude is slightly higher (and thus endowment 
effects lower) if occupation dummies are excluded from the wage regressions. Using 14 
waves of the GSOEP (1984-1997), Constant and Massey (2005) yield similar results. 
Despite assimilation in educational attainments, foreigners earn significantly less as they 
are overrepresented in lower status jobs and suffer from discrimination in the process of 
climbing up the job ladder (see also Riphahn, 2003). Yet, if occupational status is 
controlled for, average weekly earnings differentials decrease over time and completely 
disappear after 23 years.20 Direct wage discrimination therefore only plays a minor role. 
Whether the assimilation of wages differs between immigrant cohorts and skill groups, is, 
inter alia, investigated by Fertig and Schurer (2007). They analyze GSOEP data from 1984-
2004 and show that earnings growth of ethnic Germans and persons who immigrated 
between 1988 and 2002 converges after 10 years. These results are robust to controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity across groups and sample attrition bias in the GSOEP.21 Older 
immigrant cohorts (1955-1968 and 1974-1987), though, are found to suffer from flatter 
earnings profiles over their careers so that the wage gap widens rather than narrows over 
time. Detailed analyses by skill levels further reveal that differences in the earnings-
experience profile are largest if high-skilled Germans and first generation immigrants are 
compared. Furthermore, with respect to industry differences, it is noticeable that the 
largest differences in the returns to experience occur in industries where the share of 
immigrants is lowest (Zibrowius, 2012). 
Aldashev et al. (2007) use a more detailed distinction of people’s migration history and 
compare the earnings prospects of native Germans, ethnic Germans, persons with 
                                                             
19  Note that the studies presented below compare the wages of employees in the German labor market. For 
empirical evidence on ethnic earnings differentials of the self-employed, see e.g. Constant and 
Shachmurove (2006), Constant et al. (2007), and Constant (2009). 
20  Quite surprisingly and in contrast to prior empirical studies, Schmidt (1997) does not find significant 
monthly earnings differences between natives, ethnic German migrants, and foreign guest-workers if 
educational endowments, occupational status and industries are accounted for. 
21  Constant and Massey (2003) evaluate the impact of selective out-migration on earnings assimilation using 
GSOEP data (1984-1997). They fail to find evidence for a selectivity bias driving the cross-sectional 
estimates of the immigrant-native wage gap during the observation period. 
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migration background and foreigners. Using GSOEP data over an 11 year period (1995-
2005), they particularly look at the returns to educational achievements where 
achievements from abroad and from Germany are distinguished. In line with Fertig and 
Schurer (2007), they find that earnings of foreigners and people with migration 
background are significantly below those of natives regardless of gender and skill level 
(except for medium-skilled women). Moreover, these differences are found to widen with 
age and are highest among high-skilled employees. However, earnings histories of 
foreigners compared to people with migration background differ just as little as earnings 
of native and ethnic Germans (except for the high-skilled). With regard to differences in 
return rates, their results confirm the prevailing consensus that educational endowments 
received in Germany are rewarded significantly higher than those received abroad. This is 
particularly true for school and university degrees and is less pronounced in case of 
professional training. 
Even though it does not matter empirically whether a somewhat narrow (people with 
foreign citizenship) or broad (people with migration background) definition of ethnic 
minorities is used, decomposing factors of differential treatment and analyzing wage 
assimilation processes by different ethnic affiliations produces quite heterogeneous 
results. For example, Lehmer and Ludsteck (2011) evaluate wage differences between 
native Germans and groups of immigrants (EU, East EU, Other East and Turkey) focusing 
on immigrants entering the German labor market between 1995 and 2000. As expected, 
decomposition analyses yield quite different results across groups (see also Velling, 1995). 
Netting out the effects due to differences in characteristics leaves an unexplained gap of 
more than 50 percent for most nationalities considered. However, if occupations are 
controlled for, the impact of characteristics increases. Nevertheless, the unexplained wage 
gap still accounts for 20 to 30 percent which, according to the authors, points toward 
direct wage discrimination and occupational segregation. Lastly, wage differentials are 
found to vary over the earnings distribution for citizens of some countries (including those 
from the EU) where the results of quantile regressions indicate sticky floor effects as 
discrimination seems to be larger in case of low-income earners (see also 
Panagiotis/Schluter, 2012). All these findings indicate that the factors influencing 
differential treatment and thus the magnitude of discrimination need to be separately 
addressed for each immigrant group (see also Lehmer and Ludsteck, 2012). Moreover, 
concerning intergenerational wage assimilations, a narrowing of the ethnic-native wage 
gap from first to second generation immigrants can be found only for some, but not all 
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ethnic minorities (Algan et al., 2010). 
3.2.2.3 FINDINGS ON ETHNIC EMPLOYMENT DIFFERENCES OUTSIDE THE GERMAN LABOR 
MARKET 
Few empirical papers have been published thus far to investigate whether ethnic 
differences in unemployment and labor force participation rates are accounted for by 
differences in observable and unobservable characteristics (Charles and Guryan, 2011). 
Bound and Freeman (1992) decompose the racial employment gap of young men 
contingent on educational levels (college, high school, school dropouts) and regions 
(Midwest, Northeast, South). They investigate CPS data from the mid-1970s to late 1980s 
and provide evidence that changes in industry and occupational composition, 
(de)unionization, decreasing minimum wages, relative educational improvements of 
whites and decreasing demand for blue-collar jobs have all contributed to a substantial 
drop in the employment of blacks. 
The labor market situation of women, in contrast, does not seem to be characterized by 
diverging employment rates of blacks and whites (e.g. King, 1992; Anderson and Shapiro, 
1996). Looking at census data twenty years prior (1940), during (1960) and after (1980) 
anti-discrimination legislation, Cunningham and Zalokar (1992) find occupational status 
convergence of black women leading to a narrowing black-white wage gap. For example, 
between 1940 and 1980 the share of women in private household jobs decreased 
dramatically (from 58.4 to 6.2 percent) while during the same period the share of 
professional and technical workers (from 4.6 to 16.1 percent) as well as clerical staff (from 
1.3 to 29.0 percent) increased substantially and even exceeded the overall trend towards 
more skilled labor. 
Apart from disparities in employment and occupational distributions, racial and ethnic 
differences in unemployment risks have widely been investigated. Fairlie and Sundstrom 
(1997), for example, use the Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) to study the changes of 
the racial unemployment gap in the U.S. for more than a century (1880-1990). They 
demonstrate that the unemployment rates did not differ until the late 1930s. After 1940, 
however, unemployment rates of blacks decreased less than those of whites and ended up 
at a ratio of two to one. This ratio remained almost constant until the 1990s and even 
increased thereafter. Still, part of the unemployment gap and its increase remain 
unexplained which the authors admit may be partly related to omitted variables such as 
changes in legislation, crime and family structures, but may also leave room for racial 
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discrimination. Chiswick et al. (1997) investigate unemployment and employment 
patterns of U.S. immigrants with CPS data from 1979, 1983, 1986 and 1988. Unlike racial 
differences, both rates converge and gaps disappear after 3 and 10 years after arrival in 
the U.S., respectively. However, with respect to employment outcomes, differences across 
immigrant groups are observed with Asians doing best and Mexicans worst. Likewise, Arai 
and Vilhelmsson (2004) find higher unemployment risks for non-Europeans than for 
Europeans in the Swedish labor market even after controlling for the impact of worker 
characteristics, wage rates and unemployment risks across establishments. Both findings 
seem to suggest group differences in hiring discrimination. The latter explanation finds 
further support in Rooth (2002). He compares the employment outcomes of native 
Swedes with those of ethnic minority men who were adopted by Swedish families. All 
other things being equal, employment probabilities of these two groups differ by almost 
10 percentage points. However, the differences vary by ethnic origin. Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition further reveals that more than two thirds of the variation in employment 
cannot be explained by schooling, age, marital status and the local unemployment rate. 
Acknowledging the peculiarities of adoptees’ ethnic backgrounds leads the author to 
suggest that the unexplained gap originates from skin-color discrimination. Not 
surprisingly, these results are also in line with the findings on skin shades and wages 
presented in section 3.2.2.1.  
Direct evidence on hiring discrimination has most convincingly been produced by field 
experiments such as correspondence and audit studies. Among these, without any doubt, 
racial and ethnic differences have attracted most researchers’ attention (see table A-2 in 
the appendix for a selective list of correspondence studies and their results). Jowell and 
Prescott-Clarke (1970) were one of the first researchers who sent out fictitious résumés 
and reported the callbacks for British, Australian, West Indian, Pakistani and Cypriot 
applicants in the British labor market. All in all, they replied to 128 job offers in various 
occupations, e.g. sales and marketing, accountancy and office management, electrical 
engineering and secretarial jobs. As a result, they find that non-white (the latter three 
ethnic groups) as opposed to white (native Brits and Australians) candidates receive 
significantly fewer positive responses. Furthermore, altering the level of qualification 
shows that immigrants realize only minor returns to schooling and thus benefit less from 
higher quality résumés. A follow up study by McIntosh and Smith (1974) that doubled the 
number of observations supports the aforementioned findings. They trained and matched 
British, Greek and West Indian job candidates who then applied by phone. Callback rates 
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between the first two groups do not turn out to be statistically different from each other. 
However, comparing firms’ responses to the British and West Indian candidate yields a 
significantly lower callback rate for the latter. 
The study by Riach and Rich (1991) was one of the first that used matched-pair testing 
outside the U.K. They created fictitious job pairs of male and female applicants and applied 
as sales representatives, clerks and secretaries in Australia showing that minority groups, 
i.e., Vietnamese and Greek immigrants, face discrimination in the recruitment process. 
Shortly thereafter, correspondence studies were also carried out in the U.S. (Bendick et al., 
1991; Bendick et al., 1994; Kenney and Wissoker, 1994) and all across Europe. Bovenkerk 
et al. (1996), for instance, find differential treatment of male and female Moroccan and 
Surinamese immigrants in the Netherlands. Similar findings are reported by Angel de 
Prada et al. (1996), Arrijn et al. (1998) and Allasino et al. (2004) for male Moroccans in 
Spain, Belgium and Italy, respectively. A common trait of all these studies is that 
discrimination is most prominent in and often restricted to the first stage of the hiring 
process. In France, for example, Cediey and Foroni (2008) point out that 85 percent of all 
instances of discrimination against North and Sub-Saharan Africans are based on the 
evaluation of written applications, i.e., during the first step of the hiring process. 
What can be considered as the most prominent work in this field is the paper by Bertrand 
and Mullainathan (2004). By sending out almost 5,000 applications in response to 1,323 
job offers in the Chicago and Boston metropolitan areas, they show that African-Americans 
have a 50 percent lower callback rate compared to white Americans. Moreover, the results 
demonstrate that these differences neither vary across industries and occupations, nor are 
they contingent on the socio-economic characteristics of the applicants’ neighborhood, on 
whether the firm is an equal opportunity employer or not and on whether the employer 
operates in the public or private sector. Bertrand and Mullainathan also altered the quality 
of résumés and sent out one pair of high and low quality applications to each vacancy. By 
doing so, they show that white applicants realize higher returns (in terms of callbacks) for 
high quality résumés than black candidates. Pager (2003), Pager and Quillian (2005) and 
Pager et al. (2009) support these results and, perhaps surprisingly, show that blacks 
statistically have the same callback rates than whites with a criminal record.  
Regarding intergenerational differences, Carlsson and Rooth (2007) and Carlsson (2010) 
find differential treatment disadvantaging Middle-Eastern applicants in Sweden which 
according to the latter persists for first and second generation immigrants. Both studies 
also indicate that male recruiters discriminate significantly more. Remarkably, Oreopoulos 
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(2011) shows that discrimination exists in case of both, immigrants as well as native 
Canadians that have an ethnic-sounding name. Similarly, McGinnity and Lunn (2011) 
highlight that discrimination is not necessarily restricted to ethnic groups with other skin-
colors and/or from low wage countries. They show that differential treatment in the Irish 
labor market is consistent for minority groups originating from Africa, Asia and Western 
Europe (Germany). Finally, research interacting ethnic origin with gender indicates that 
the effects may differ for men and women (e.g. Arai et al., 2011; Andriessen et al., 2012; 
Derous and Ryan, 2012). Arai et al. (2011), for example, show that high-quality résumés 
benefit minority women more than men and make discrimination disappear. 22 
Applying for small business transfers, i.e., taking over an existing business due to e.g. 
retirement of the previous owner, Ahmed et al. (2009) use the correspondence method to 
demonstrate that hiring discrimination not only exists in case of dependent employment, 
but may also affect the chances of becoming self-employed. Furthermore, Edin and 
Lagerström (2004), Eriksson and Lagerström (2012) and Blommaert et al. (2013) show 
that equally qualified job seekers from ethnic minorities are not only discriminated when 
actively applying for a job, but are also less likely to be contacted via an online hiring 
platform. 
3.2.2.4 FINDINGS ON ETHNIC EMPLOYMENT DIFFERENCES IN THE GERMAN LABOR MARKET 
The subsequently quoted studies represent a selection of empirical research conducted in 
Germany analyzing ethnic differences in unemployment risk and duration as well as 
employment participation rates and occupational distributions. Previous research has 
primarily relied on publicly available data with only a few exceptions having conducted 
field experiments. Kogan (2004), for example, investigates the transition into employment 
and unemployment using GSOEP data over a six year period (1995-2000). Her results 
indicate that native-immigrant differences are influenced by both human capital 
differences and segmentation across industries and occupational positions. In particular, 
first generation immigrants are channeled into unskilled labor and sectors where labor 
demand highly fluctuates which results in lower employment rates compared to native 
Germans (see also Constant, 1998). Second generation and EU immigrants, in contrast, do 
                                                             
22  Additional reasons for minority-majority group differences in hiring are found to be based on systematic 
differences in application processing (e.g. Arvey et al., 1975), in recruiters’ behavior (e.g. Giuliano and 
Levine, 2009; Giuliano and Ransom, 2011) and in applicants’ job search methods (e.g. Holzer, 1987; 
Segendorf and Rooth, 2006). 
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not seem to be disadvantaged in finding new employment and bear the same risk of 
becoming unemployed as native Germans if tenure and job characteristics are accounted 
for. Unemployment duration also contributes substantially to differences between native 
Germans and immigrants’ career paths which most obviously differ between natives and 
Turkish immigrants (Kogan, 2007). Kalter and Granato (2002) and Uhlendorff and 
Zimmermann (2006) support the finding that immigrant Turks in particular have 
significantly longer unemployment spells and are less likely to enter new employment. 
Most noticeably, their results extend to second generation Turks while, in line with Kogan 
(2004), guest-workers from other nationalities and their descendants are, ceteris paribus, 
hardly or not disadvantaged at all. 
Other researchers have used employment probabilities as the outcome variable to 
measure ethnic differences in the German labor market. The main findings, however, 
remain the same. Despite controlling for socio-economic characteristics, employment gaps 
remain quite substantial. Algan et al. (2010), for example, find these gaps to vary across 
ethnic groups where both first and second generation Turks suffer most and have a 15.2 
and 18.6 percent lower chance of being employed compared to native Germans. In other 
words, Turkish descendants are unable to realize superior employment outcomes than 
their parents. Further research by Kalter (2008), Heath et al. (2008) and Luthra (2013) 
report similar results and argues that some immigrant groups perform better over time 
and assimilate more quickly than others. 
The importance of where educational endowments are attained is investigated by Brück-
Klingberg et al. (2011). In particular, they study how different skill levels affect the hiring 
probability contingent on ethnic origin. Using survival estimates, they show that the 
return rates of education attained abroad and in Germany differ significantly. As a result, 
transition from unemployment to employment takes longer for both foreigners and ethnic 
minorities with German citizenship as opposed to native Germans. 
Apart from differences in employment probabilities and distributions across sectors, 
immigrants are also found to be less likely to climb up the career ladder. Using GSOEP data 
(1984-1997), Constant and Massey (2005) find systematic differences in the allocation of 
occupational positions with workers of a migration background being less able to 
translate their human capital into higher job prestige. Similar results are produced by 
Luthra (2013) who analyzes employment outcomes and occupational attainments for 
different immigrant groups. Using Microcensus data from 2005, she shows that second 
generation immigrants of both sexes perform differently across immigrant groups but 
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worse compared to native Germans. 
The empirical findings from the German labor market presented thus far lack a direct 
measure of discrimination. Even though unemployment duration and employment gaps 
cannot completely be explained by human capital endowments and differences in the 
distributions across sectors, the unexplained fraction of the regression models may not 
necessarily reflect discriminatory treatment, but may also capture the effects from omitted 
variables such as family background information, language skills and social ties. Two 
studies try to circumvent these problems and assess the prevalence and extent of 
discrimination in access to employment by controlled field experiments. The results of 
both indicate that hiring differentials based on applicants’ ethnic background may well be 
affected by the demand side and constitute discrimination on behalf of employers. 
Goldberg et al. (1996) conduct an audit and correspondence test where matched pairs of 
first generation Turkish immigrants and native Germans apply for semi- and higher-
qualified jobs, respectively. In the audit study, the candidates made telephone inquiries to 
333 job offers. In the end, members of the minority group were invited in 46 percent of all 
applications while the majority candidates received a callback in 53 percent of the cases 
yielding a 7 percentage points difference. Similarly, sending out more than 2,800 written 
applications in Berlin and the Rhine-Ruhr region, the authors find a 1 percentage point 
lower callback probability for the immigrant group. Unfortunately, no information on the 
statistical significance of these results is provided. Instead, the authors use the net 
discrimination rate which in both instances indicates unequal treatment at statistically 
conventional levels. A closer look also reveals that with regard to the correspondence 
study, discrimination of the minority candidates is restricted to commercial jobs only. 
Thus, the evidence is rather weak. More convincingly, Kaas and Manger (2012) find 
discrimination against equally qualified second generation Turks who apply for business 
internships. Here, the minority candidate is 5 percentage points less likely to receive a 
callback from employers. However, callback rate differences decline and become 
insignificant if the minority applicant attaches an additional reference letter providing 
favorable information on e.g. his qualifications, work effort and motivation. 
3.2.2.5 CONCLUSION 
Overall, differences in human capital endowments are shown to explain the largest 
fraction of the prevailing ethnic and racial wage gap inside and outside the German labor 
market. However, both average endowments and the size of earnings differentials vary 
  
53 
 
quite substantially across immigrant groups. Consequently, the wage gap of some 
immigrant groups has narrowed over time while in case of others it has remained constant 
or has even increased. Similarly, while the unexplained fraction of the earnings estimates 
seems to have decreased after World War II, a substantial share still goes back to direct 
wage discrimination. 
Another factor influencing ethnic wage disparities can be found in horizontal and vertical 
segregation with blacks and immigrants being channeled into lower-paying sectors and 
positions. Again, these phenomena can be traced back to discrimination in access to 
certain jobs. The findings quoted above point at substantial differences with respect to 
labor market participation, employment, unemployment and occupational distributions. In 
particular, the matched-pair studies presented provide direct evidence of discrimination 
in hiring towards certain minority groups, though they are (mostly) unable to identify its 
sources. With respect to discriminatory practices against blacks, Riach and Rich (2002: 
503) conclude that prior field experiments “are more consistent with the majority white 
populations having a general ’distaste‘ (Becker, 1971), or ‘social custom‘ (Akerlof, 1980), 
which motivates employers to discriminate against non-white applicants.” However, it is 
yet not clear whether these conclusions hold true for immigrant groups in different 
countries and labor market segments.  
 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON DIFFERENT SOURCES OF DISCRIMINATION 3.2.3
Charles and Guryan (2011) and Neumark (2012) argue that it is a fundamental challenge 
to disentangle the effects from taste-based and statistical discrimination. Firstly, because 
both approaches predict the same labor market outcome, i.e., discrimination towards a 
certain demographic group and, secondly, because findings supporting one approach can 
often be explained by some version of the other. In the following section, selected studies 
are presented that provide empirical evidence for either taste-based or statistical 
discrimination. However, not surprisingly, many of these studies find support for both 
theories.  
3.2.3.1 MIXED EVIDENCE 
Gneezy et al. (2012) analyze a series of field experiments on age, gender, race, sexual 
orientation and disability discrimination and conclude that characteristics given by birth 
such as race or gender underlie statistical discrimination whereas other characteristics 
that may be subject to change while a person grows up such as sexual orientation are 
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associated with taste-based discrimination. However, their results are based on studies 
outside the labor market. In fact, they conduct an audit study in the product market where 
ten white and black testers bargain for a car purchase at five different dealers in the 
Chicago area. In order to reduce unobserved heterogeneity, the testers are instructed to 
stick to a uniform pre-determined bargaining strategy. While no racial differences with 
respect to initial and final offers for low-end cars can be observed, interestingly, blacks on 
average receive a 1.5 percent ($630) higher initial and a 3 percent ($1,010) higher final 
offer for high-end cars. If car dealers had distastes for racial minorities, they would offer 
higher prices to minority buyers of both low- and high-end cars. As the price differences 
only exist in the high-end market, the authors expect statistical discrimination to be 
present. Unfortunately, however, they do not provide further empirical evidence on e.g. 
different search costs across groups depending on the cars’ quality levels. Thus, their 
interpretation remains rather suggestive and leaves room for alternative explanations.23 
Sometimes the empirical evidence neither convincingly supports taste nor statistical 
discrimination as shown in the study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). On the one 
hand, customer discrimination is very unlikely to account for the racial hiring gap as the 
extent of discrimination does not vary conditional on whether or not the jobs require high 
communication skills and customer contact. On the other hand, statistical discrimination 
would suggest that the provision of additional productivity related information would 
decrease or perhaps even eliminate differential treatment. However, the opposite holds: 
callback rate differences are largest whenever high-quality applications including 
supplementary credentials are dispatched. As an alternative explanation, the authors 
argue that racial differences occur because recruiters start with sifting the pool of 
applicants and stop reading the applications if they are confronted with a distinctively 
black name. Ironically, they do not mention that this is what would be expected by either 
taste or statistical discrimination, i.e., group membership serves as a pre-selection device 
due to employers’ distastes or group-based productivity beliefs.   
In contrast to Bertrand and Mullainathan, Carlsson and Rooth (2008) find evidence for 
both economic explanations on why (ethnic) minorities are discriminated. In particular, 
they relate 23 percent of the hiring gap to the minority applicants’ foreign qualifications 
                                                             
23  Scott Morton et al. (2003) provide more convincing evidence for the prevalence of statistical 
discrimination in the market of new car purchases. They show that while minority customers pay a 2% 
price premium offline, the difference in buying prices disappears if online purchases are considered. They 
explain their findings by reduced information costs through on the Internet. 
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which they interpret as evidence for statistical discrimination and the remaining 77 
percent to group membership per se. Decomposing the remaining difference indicates a 
mixture of both, on the one hand, employer and coworker discrimination as male 
recruiters and firms with a high share of male workers discriminate somewhat more and, 
on the other hand, statistical discrimination as recruiters presumably (need to) rely on 
sifting due to time constraints which results in a predominant rejection of minority 
applicants. Either way, all papers quoted so far outline the ambiguities that evolve if the 
different sources of discrimination should undoubtedly be identified. 
3.2.3.2 EVIDENCE SUPPORTING TASTE-BASED DISCRIMINATION 
Taste-based discrimination has been found to negatively affect the labor market outcomes 
of both women and ethnic minorities. Analyzing job offers from a Chinese internet job 
board, Kuhn and Shen (2013) show that preference related job targeting, i.e., 
discrimination against either men or women in opposite-sex stereotyped jobs, 
significantly decreases with the jobs’ respective skill requirements. As with higher job 
requirements, search costs, foregone income for not filling the position and potential 
losses associated with adverse selection increase, their findings are in line with Becker’s 
taste approach (Becker, 1971). In the same vein, Baert et al. (2013) conduct a 
correspondence test to uncover ethnic hiring discrimination in Belgium’s youth labor 
market addressing occupations that differ with respect to the demand for labor. Indeed, 
the results reveal that employers respond to scarcity. While callbacks do not differ for 
vacancies that are difficult to fill, the minority candidates are clearly discriminated in 
occupations where demand for labor is rather low. 24 
The question, to what extent taste discrimination against ethnic minorities can be 
                                                             
24  Somewhat related to taste-based discrimination is monopsonistic discrimination which is caused by group 
differences in labor-supply elasticities. The effects originating from these differences are illustrated by 
Hirsch et al. (2009). They exploit regional variations in demand-side competition for labor to assess the 
gender pay gap. Firms in metropolitan areas that face harsh competition for talents in the labor market are 
found to discriminate consistently less (over a 30 year period) than their counterparts from rural areas. 
The authors argue that unlike in Becker’s model, employers in rural areas do not incur costs by 
discriminating the female minority because, otherwise, these employers would be driven out of the market 
in the long run which is not observed in the data. In contrast, women living in “hot-spots” simply have 
more outside options and therefore higher wage elasticities than in regions where alternatives are limited. 
As a consequence, employers’ monopsy power and thus their ability to discriminate is somewhat 
constrained in big cities whereas in rural areas the opposite applies. Similar results are also published by 
Hirsch et al. (2010) and Ransom and Oaxaca (2010) who analyze differences in employment and quit rates 
conditional on gender-specific wage elasticities. Furthermore, Hirsch and Jahn (2012) demonstrate that, 
for the same reason, ethnic minorities are willing to accept lower wage offers than their native 
counterparts. 
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explained by societal attitudes towards these minorities has also been addressed in the 
recent literature (e.g. Charles and Guryan, 2008). Some of this research has linked the 
results from matched-pair studies with information on public opinions. Carlsson and 
Rooth (2011), for example, use survey data on attitudes towards ethnic minorities and the 
results of a previous correspondence test in the Swedish labor market. They assume that 
employers located in a certain region adapt the population’s opinion on immigrants in that 
area. In fact, their findings reveal that discrimination is more likely in areas where the 
average employer has a more negative attitude against immigrants. However, this effect is 
only statistically significant if the sample is restricted to low-skilled occupations. Similarly, 
Rooth (2010) asks recruiters primarily involved in a fictitious field experiment to 
participate in an implicit association test that measures automatic attitudes and 
stereotypes towards ethnic minorities (for more details about the implicit association test, 
see section 4.1.2.5). The results show that implicit associations towards Arab-Muslim 
candidates are negatively correlated with callback rates and affect the outcome of the 
recruitment process to a statistically significant extent (for similar results from the 
Australian labor market, see Booth et al. (2012)).25 
Further evidence of discrimination in line with Becker is provided by Szymanski (2000) 
who exploits data from professional soccer. He shows that some clubs are willing to accept 
poorer performance on the pitch than others by signing a below-average share of black 
players. Undoubtedly, these findings support preference-based discrimination. Moreover, 
as any (negative) effects on attendance as a potential signal for customer discrimination 
can be excluded, differential treatment likely goes back to either club owners’ or other 
teammates’ prejudices against black players, i.e., denotes employer or coworker 
discrimination. 
Empirical studies that explicitly investigate whether taste-based discrimination originates 
from employers, coworkers or customers are mainly restricted to the latter (e.g. Holzer 
and Ihlanfeldt, 1998). Audit study results from restaurant hiring by Neumark (1996), for 
example, indicate that discrimination against women might be based on customers’ 
preferences. While callback rates to male and female applicants do not differ in low- and 
                                                             
25 Temporary events provoking increased media coverage and public perceptions, in contrast, are not found 
to affect the extent of discriminatory behavior. Neither do Åslund and Rooth (2005) find higher 
employment differentials of ethnic minorities after 9-11, nor do Carlsson and Rooth (2012) find lower 
hiring gaps after the use of correspondence testing was widely discussed in the media (see Pope et al. 
(2011) for opposite results in the sports environment). 
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medium-priced establishments, they do in high-priced restaurants where both male 
waitpersons and male customers dominate. Although these customers are not expected to 
have a general distaste towards women, hiring male staff signals tradition and prestige on 
behalf of the restaurants and thus may be thought to emphasize its superior positioning. 
Some latest field results from the Netherlands point into the same direction and uncover 
customer discrimination as a potential source of why people with a foreign sounding name 
have lower chances of being recruited compared to their native counterparts. In 
particular, majority-minority callback differences are twice as high in jobs that require 
(high) customer contact (8 percentage points) than in those without (4 percentage points) 
(Andriessen et al., 2012).26 
While previous research reports some convincing evidence for customer discrimination, 
researchers have thus far struggled to unveil and disentangle the effects that originate 
from employers’ and coworkers’ preferences. One exception includes the studies by Haile 
(2009, 2012, 2013) who shows that disabled, female and minority coworkers decrease 
employees’ well-being which, in turn, might induce employers to place these group at a 
disadvantage in the recruitment process. 
3.2.3.3 EVIDENCE SUPPORTING STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION 
In addition to taste-based discrimination, many authors have related their findings on 
gender and ethnic labor market disparities to statistical discrimination. Gneezy et al. 
(2012) conduct experiments that test people’s willingness to help others in everyday life 
situations. For these experiments, age-, gender- and race-matched testers were confronted 
with two distinct tasks. First, they should drop either a pen or a pair of keys and report 
whether they were picked up and returned by someone else. And, second, they should ask 
for a dollar for the parking meter or directions to a well-known location somewhere 
around. Overall, young black men did significantly worse in both tasks. The performance 
of older minority candidates, however, did not differ compared to the control group. 
Relating these findings to criminal records in Chicago during that time shows why: crime 
rates among young black men were by far the highest. Thus, the modest willingness to 
help young black men stems from people’s fear of being robbed. People use group 
                                                             
26  Another strand of research again uses sports data to show that customers’ tastes foster racial (ethnic) 
employment and wage disparities (e.g. Kahn and Sherer, 1988; Kalter, 1999). For an overview of these 
studies, see also Kahn (1991). More recently, though, Kahn (2009) reports that racial hiring, wage and 
retention differences in U.S. basketball have been eliminated due to a decline in customer discrimination. 
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membership to draw inferences on the probability of being subject to robbery and 
therefore rationally prefer to help the white rather than the black testers. Theoretically, 
their behavior goes along with statistical discrimination. In the same vein, Knowles et al. 
(2001) provide interesting evidence that police officers search cars of black drivers more 
often for carrying drugs not because of racial distastes, but because they try to maximize 
their ratio of successful searches. They develop a model that relaxes assumptions 
according to which racial prejudices impact on policemen’s decisions. In particular, they 
allow blacks to respond to increased searches by reducing illegal activities. In fact, this is 
exactly what the data suggest. Even though blacks have a higher probability of their 
vehicles being subject to search (as a result of inferences made by the police officers), guilt 
probabilities do not differ between blacks and whites.  
In the labor market, regression-based studies by Neumark (1999) and Pinkston (2003) 
find that a large portion of females’ wage setbacks can be explained by men’s productivity 
signals having a stronger effect on starting wages because they are perceived as more 
reliable by employers. In line with what Pinkston denotes as screening discrimination, 
employer learning through tenure then has a greater impact on women’s than on men’s 
wage profiles. In other words, as employers’ beliefs on women’s future productivity 
become more accurate, gender wage differences decline. Further evidence for employer 
learning reducing labor market inequalities is also provided when the black-white wage 
gap is analyzed (e.g. Pinkston, 2006; Kim, 2012). 
However, not only repeated interactions, but also the provision of credible signals may 
lead to decreasing labor market differences as denoted by Siniver (2011). He exploits a 
natural experiment to investigate the reasons for which immigrant physicians in Israel are 
discriminated on the basis of wages. In particular, physicians entering Israel prior and past 
the introduction of an obligatory licensing examination in 1989 are observed. The study 
provides two important insights. First, compared to physicians who immigrated prior to 
the obligatory licensing, the institutional regulation has affected the remuneration of post-
licensing immigrants positively. And, second, the post 1989 immigrant-native wage gap 
has disappeared after 5.5 years while that of earlier immigrants remained. Both, the 
discontinuity in 1989 and the wage convergence of the treated group, i.e., those physicians 
that were required to take a test on their qualifications, point at statistical discrimination 
since the official approval of immigrant physicians’ licenses has decreased employers’ 
uncertainty about physicians’ productivity and have thus led to a removal of labor market 
differences over time. In line with these findings, Kaas and Manger (2012) provide field 
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evidence demonstrating that ethnic hiring differentials in the German labor market are 
motivated by statistical rather than taste-based discrimination. In particular, they show 
that the inclusion of additional productivity information leads to a convergence of hiring 
probabilities of native and immigrant applicants while in the absence of such credentials, 
the latter are significantly disadvantaged in terms of callback rates. Again, these findings 
support the idea that employers are inherently less able to correctly predict minorities’ 
future productivity and therefore use the (usually lower) group average as a proxy. Due to 
the provision of credible signals, these group proxies become relatively unimportant so 
that especially minority applicants are evaluated on the basis of observable characteristics 
conveyed by their applications. 
Finally, the importance of additional information available to the employer is also 
supported by findings from the laboratory. Heilman (1984) asks 77 university students to 
evaluate the résumés of fictitious applicants and judge on a nine point scale whether these 
candidates should be interviewed for a job or not. Moreover, the subjects rated the 
applicants’ expected success in the job. The application forms were matched and only 
varied with respect to applicants’ gender and whether a reference letter by a professor 
was attached or not. While in some cases this reference letter included information of 
either high or low job relevance, in the control group such credential was omitted. Not 
surprisingly in terms of statistical discrimination, the findings indicate that job suitability 
and potential success do not differ across gender if highly job relevant information is 
provided. Otherwise, though, men fare significantly better than their female counterparts. 
In a larger scaled study with 241 college students, Heilman et al. (1988) later reproduce 
the aforementioned results and show that additional information that proves women to be 
of high ability makes gender differences in subjects’ evaluations disappear while a 
significant gap persists in the absence of such information. 
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4 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND, CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
The following section develops the theoretical framework that helps explaining the labor 
market differences across gender and ethnic groups as presented in chapter 2 and 3. A 
special focus is laid upon the distinction between different types of discrimination as the 
empirical part explicitly tries to disentangle the effects from taste-based and statistical 
discrimination. Accordingly, a conceptual model is presented that formally describes how 
different preferences and information asymmetries affect the hiring outcome. Finally, 
based on the theoretical considerations and previous empirical findings, the hypotheses to 
be tested with the data from the field experiments are derived. 
4.1 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
At the beginning of the theory section, the employee-employer interaction particularly 
during the hiring phase is considered from a principal-agent perspective where the basic 
assumptions of New Institutional Economics hold. Afterwards, economic theories that 
explain differences in (pre-) labor market outcomes of individuals and demographic 
groups are elaborated. First, human capital theory and the dual labor market hypothesis 
are referred to in order to separate any effects on labor market outcomes that stem from 
differences in workers’ and workplace characteristics from the effects that are based on 
discriminatory treatment. Second, the two seminal economic theories of labor market 
discrimination, i.e., taste-based and statistical discrimination, are presented in more detail. 
Finally, non-economic theories that may be regarded as a cause to prejudices and 
stereotypes are discussed. 
 RECRUITMENT AS DECISION UNDER UNCERTAINTY 4.1.1
Principal-agent theory provides a suitable framework that helps explaining agents’ 
behavior when confronted with decisions under uncertainty such as hiring (e.g. Ross, 
1973; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Grossman and Hart, 1983). Based on the 
fundamental assumption that information in markets and, as a consequence, contracts 
signed in these markets are incomplete, the agent (in the context of this thesis: the 
applicant) has superior information on her quality which in turn is ex ante unknown to the 
principal (here: the employer/ recruiter). The latter is thus confronted with a decision 
under uncertainty that Akerlof (1970) in his seminal paper illustrates, inter alia, by 
referring to the automobile market. Assuming that such a market entails good and bad 
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cars, but quality is unobservable to buyers, the average price sellers demand would 
overpay bad and underpay good quality. Since the costs from selling overpriced low-
quality cars, so-called “lemons”, are borne by the market, every individual seller has an 
incentive to offer poor quality. The buyer, on the other hand, constantly faces the risk of 
selecting “lemons”. As these “lemons” are worth less than the average market price, the 
buyer would only be willing to pay a price below the market average. Anticipating this, 
sellers in turn lower the offered quality. In the end, under asymmetric information, 
average quality and market size shrink until the market eventually breaks down. To avoid 
a market breakdown, economic institutions such as guarantees or brands may serve as a 
signal to the buyer that she bargains for high quality cars. 
In the labor market or, more precisely, in the hiring context, an employer (principal) faces 
the problem of adverse selection whenever he is unable to distinguish between high- and 
low-quality (i.e., more or less productive) applicants (agents). To be able to identify and 
sort out “lemons”, he may rely on certifications such as high school diplomas or university 
degrees. Likewise, an employer may prefer one demographic group over another not 
because he is prejudiced, but because group membership serves as a quality device for 
applicants that are otherwise hard to distinguish (Akerlof uses this example to show why 
minorities fare worse in entering employment). Furthermore, he can implement screening 
mechanisms in the recruitment process. Such mechanisms comprise e.g. résumé 
evaluations, (telephone and face-to-face) interviews, assessment centers, or probation 
periods and should help the employer to reduce uncertainty about applicants’ 
productivity. 
Yet, as proposed by Spence (1973), even from an agent’s perspective, it might be 
worthwhile to offer ability signals that ex ante lower asymmetric information and improve 
employers’ productivity beliefs. The basic rationale is that the production of signals 
creates costs where costs are negatively correlated with productivity. Agents select the 
amount of signals that maximize expected profits, i.e., the differences between offered 
wages and signaling costs. In order to successfully distinguish high- from low-quality 
agents, signaling costs must differ across groups in such a way that the production of 
ability signals pays off for high-, but is unprofitable for low-quality agents. Moreover, a 
sufficient number of distinguishable signals is needed such as, for example, years of 
schooling or different university degrees. Signaling theory then shows that the market 
arrives at different equilibria in which the value of signals is reproduced, i.e., confirms 
employers’ beliefs.  
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However, indices, that Spence refers to as demographic characteristics determined by 
birth (e.g. race or gender), may affect productivity beliefs as well. Whenever demographic 
groups differ with respect to their opportunity structures, that is, have different signaling 
costs, and thus invest differently in the production of signals, two distinct equilibria arise. 
The lower level equilibrium of one group as opposed to the other is self-perpetuating. 
Spence denotes this situation as a “lower level equilibrium trap” (Spence 1973: 374). In 
essence, this trap forms the ground for group differences in the returns to e.g. education 
and statistical discrimination as will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Besides screening and signaling, the principal might induce self-selection by offering a 
distinct set of contracts that induces the agent to reveal her true quality. Wage contracts, 
for instance, may vary with respect to the ratio of fixed and variable pay. A higher fraction 
of the latter may attract high ability workers assuming that workers have the same risk 
preferences and act as utility maximizers. Conversely, workers of inferior productivity 
would select themselves into contracts where pay is predominantly fixed. Again, self-
selection requires a sufficient set of contracts agents can choose from. 
To briefly conclude, information asymmetries between principals and agents carry the 
risk of adverse selection (be it in the employment context, on the product market or 
anywhere else) which may eventually cause a market breakdown. To overcome these 
market inefficiencies, on the one hand, agents may invest in the production of signals that 
credibly shows them to be of high quality. On the other hand, principals may engage in 
screening or induce self-selection on behalf of the agents. In any case, agency costs arise 
that lead to a deadweight loss if compared to a market of symmetric information. Since a 
theoretical background highlighting the core problem associated with recruitment 
decisions has now been developed, next, theories that explain differences in labor market 
outcomes (including hiring) are presented. 
 THEORIES EXPLAINING LABOR MARKET INEQUALITIES 4.1.2
As the stylized facts and previous empirical research indicate, demographic groups may 
differ with respect to all kinds of (pre-) labor market outcomes including scholastic 
achievements, unemployment and employment ratios, distributions across sectors and 
hierarchical levels, wages, promotion probabilities and quit rates, just to name a few. The 
following section presents some basic economic theories that explain these differences. 
However, these theories may be closely linked. As a result, labor market outcomes may 
reinforce each other leading to difficulties when trying to disentangle causes and 
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consequences. Horizontal and vertical segregation, for example, may push minority groups 
into low-paying jobs, thus fostering already existing wage disparities. In addition, group 
differences may already evolve based on endowments, preferences and expectations 
brought to the labor market. That is why especially more recent empirical works as shown 
in section 3.2 account for unobserved heterogeneity and include proxies for factors 
influenced by pre-market developments in their regression models.27   
4.1.2.1 PRE-MARKET INEQUALITIES 
Previous research on group differences in pre-school and school attainments relies on 
both economic and non-economic theories (Altonji and Blank, 1999). The former is mainly 
about beliefs and expectations on how the labor market rewards scholastic achievements. 
According to anticipated payoffs, parents invest differently in the schooling of their 
children shaping their endowments and preferences. This, for example, may result in 
ethnic minorities leaving school earlier than their classmates or girls focusing on other 
subjects than boys. Also, not surprisingly, these investments are often a response to 
expected labor market discrimination that lowers the playing field of those who suffer 
from discriminatory treatment. Furthermore, groups may differ in what Altonji and Blank 
(1999) refer to as comparative advantages. These differences are mainly an issue of 
gender. For instance, women are expected to work more efficiently in household 
production whereas men are assumed to perform better in physically-demanding jobs, 
both because they historically have more experience in either field. In addition, parents’ 
investments often reinforce the gender-specific experiences contributing to gender 
segregation prior to employment.28  
However, the behavior of girls putting emphasis on other subjects than boys and parents 
encouraging them to do so, cannot necessarily be explained by an economic rationale. 
Family, neighborhood, fellow pupils or society in general may have established role 
models and legal constraints that shape children’s preferences, thus leading to group 
differences in early human capital accumulation (recall the results by Fortin (2005) and 
Backes-Gellner et al. (2013)). In an environment where women are primarily in charge for 
                                                             
27  Note that in the literature either the word pre- or non-market inequality is used (see e.g. Arrow (1971) for 
the latter). Both can be considered as synonymous.   
28  See, for example, Mincer and Polachek (1974) for the factors (such as the number of children) influencing 
(gender-specific) family spending in human capital and Polachek (1981) for how early human capital 
acquisition affects occupational self-selection. 
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child-bearing and -rearing, they might not even develop a desire to acquire human capital 
and participate in the labor market. Moreover, discrimination embedded in the structure 
of the educational system and/or enforced by (pre-school) teachers may provoke pre-
market inequalities.  
No matter whether differences in intergroup educational outcomes are economically or 
non-economically motivated, in line with Spence (1973), they carry the risk of 
reinforcement. Whenever at least some members of a demographic group, for example 
blacks, are denied or restricted access to schooling, are channeled into lower quality 
schools or grow up in an environment that does not encourage them to acquire skills, 
employers start using membership, e.g. race, to infer the individuals’ productivity. As a 
consequence, these employers rationally prefer whites over blacks in the recruitment 
process or contract blacks at lower wages than their white counterparts. Anticipating 
employers’ behavior, blacks in turn underinvest in schooling and therefore confirm 
employers’ beliefs. Hence, past and current labor market experiences may reinforce 
themselves.  
Still, it is difficult to disentangle the effects from discrimination and any other factors 
causing labor market inequalities. What becomes obvious, though, is that if discrimination 
prevails, it should be regarded as a process rather than a steady state (Altonji and Blank, 
1999; Pager and Shepherd, 2008). In other words, discrimination may be experienced 
prior to initial access into the labor market, i.e., during early skill acquisition, while 
entering the labor market (focused upon in the present thesis) and thereafter (e.g. with 
respect to wages and career paths). 
4.1.2.2 HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY 
According to Becker (1962, 1993) who can be considered the founder of human capital 
theory, individuals’ skill acquisition follows a similar rationale than any other investment 
decision such as the acquisition of tangible products. Unlike these products, however, 
human capital is intangible and hard to transfer. Examples encompass investments in 
schooling or on- and off-the-job training, expenditures to maintain or improve health, the 
collection of labor market information and migration in order to take advantage of 
enhanced job opportunities. Theory suggests that human capital investments are 
rewarded by the labor market and associated with superior outcomes such as higher job 
seniority and wages (which Becker (1993) also supports empirically). Naturally, the 
positive effects vary contingent on the amount invested and the rates of return, thus 
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producing differences in characteristics workers supply to the labor market.  
Theoretically, given a utility maximizing individual, investments in human capital are 
undertaken whenever the rate of return is expected to be positive. The profitability, 
however, depends on the calculated (monetary and non-monetary) benefits as well as 
direct (e.g. tuition fees) and indirect (e.g. forgone income due to school attendance or 
participation in on- and off-the-job training) costs. Both benefits and costs are in turn 
affected by i.) the investment period, ii.) the degree of uncertainty, iii.) the mode of 
financing and iv.) the individual’s ability (Becker, 1993). The former reflects the expected 
time spent in the labor market. Postponing labor market entry reduces career duration or, 
in other words, the time investments can be amortized and future gains be realized, and 
simultaneously carries opportunity costs. As a result, the present value of the investments’ 
net effect decreases which ultimately leads to a negative rate of return. For this reason, 
individuals shift from learning to earning at a certain point in their lives, that is, they leave 
school in order to take up employment. Analogously, young workers have a higher 
incentive than older ones to invest in training activities, simply because they have more 
time to gain from the associated benefits. In the same vein, women have historically 
invested less than men in their own human capital as their overall career length in the 
labor market is expected to be lower due to e.g. child-rearing and other family duties. 
Thus, if the investment is financed by the employer (which can particularly be observed in 
case of firm-specific human capital spending), it would be economically rational to prefer 
men over women eventually resulting in the motherhood gap as reported in section 3.2.1. 
By definition, human capital investments also carry a high degree of uncertainty since they 
are based on beliefs and expectations about future gains and costs. People are uncertain 
about how long they will actually (be able to) participate in the labor force, what their true 
abilities are (this especially applies to younger persons), how the labor market rewards 
their acquired skills, whether rewards change with e.g. technological progress and 
whether labor market inefficiencies such as discrimination (unexpectedly) enter their 
investment rationale. Furthermore, the market for human capital follows regularities also 
found in other capital markets. In particular, individuals face financial constraints that 
affect their investment decision where large expenditures (e.g. visiting university) are 
more difficult to afford and internal financing results in wealthier families investing more 
than poorer ones. Lastly, ability highly correlates with the rate of return and thus affects 
the extent of human capital investments. Assuming that two individuals had the same 
earnings without any investment in human capital and faced the same costs, more capable 
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people would invest more since they can realize higher returns from their investment 
(Becker, 1993).  
Adopting Becker’s theoretical framework, Mincer (1974) develops an empirical model that 
relies on schooling and post-schooling investments as the main explanatory variables for 
annual earnings, since then referred to as the Mincer earnings equation and often used as 
the basic empirical model in the literature. The basic assumption is that not only pre-labor 
market, but lifetime human capital acquisition affects the earnings profile. By using data 
for white, urban, non-student men from the 1960 U.S. census, he empirically demonstrates 
that in order to correctly specify the relationship between human capital investments and 
earnings, estimations need to be clustered by schooling group and age cohort. Unlike 
previous studies that use age as a proxy for on-the-job training, he derives a variable that 
better reflects people’s experience and thus more accurately predicts earnings.29 
Linking Becker’s theoretical considerations with the empirical findings presented in 
chapter 3 shows that human capital theory provides an appropriate framework for 
individuals’ human capital investment decisions and helps to explain different labor 
market outcomes across groups. What has only briefly been touched up to this point is 
that the investment rationale especially during an individual’s working career is not 
necessarily subject to the individual’s decision alone, but may be influenced by an 
employer or induced by law. Knowing that women (at least temporarily) exit the labor 
market for child bearing and have on average higher absence rates than men, firms would 
ceteris paribus prefer the latter when it comes to specific training decisions. Similarly, 
legal regulations may force the employer to pay maternity leave making it more expensive 
to hire women instead of men. Yet, as will be shown below, either example relies on 
expectations over group behavior affecting firms’ investment decisions and may therefore 
well point at the prevalence of statistical discrimination. More generally, if, ceteris paribus, 
access to human capital is systematically restricted for reasons that are based on 
demographic characteristics, discrimination might be present. Alternatively, differences in 
human capital endowments might simply arise because skill requirements vary across 
labor market segments. In this case, group differences in outcome variables only appear if 
some groups are overrepresented in one segment while others have mainly selected 
themselves into another segment. This argument is further developed in the next section. 
                                                             
29  If no direct information is available, experience can be proxied by deducting the length of schooling plus six 
(the age at which children usually start going to school) from the individual’s age. 
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4.1.2.3 SEGMENTED LABOR MARKET THEORY  
Another reason for different labor market outcomes is posited by segmented labor market 
theory (also referred to as the dual labor market hypothesis) which argues that the 
observed differences originate from job- rather than worker-related characteristics (Piore, 
1979). Its theoretical foundation is the division of capital and labor. Since, in the short run, 
capital (e.g. machineries) is fixed, firms adapt their labor demand and reduce working 
hours or release some of their staff if necessary. However, in order to keep their 
production running, employers have an incentive to recruit, train and retain a sufficient 
number of workers that are capable of doing so. Inevitably, these types of workers will 
have stable and secure employment opportunities, thus constituting a firm’s core 
workforce. As a consequence, all remaining workers bear even greater employment risks 
and are more likely to be released as a response of a declining demand.30 The proportion 
of the latter is greater whenever demand is predictable in a way that allows the 
standardization of processes. Conversely, wherever the level of standardization is rather 
low, i.e., where workers perform multiple tasks that constantly need to be readjusted, 
considerable skills are required.  
In short, variations in the production process lead to distinctions among workers and 
channel them into either a capital-intensive (primary) or a labor-intensive (secondary) 
sector. The former requires specific human capital investments, thus offering career 
opportunities and underlining the importance of internal labor markets, while the latter 
produces workers that are easy to substitute. In the primary sector, workers realize 
increasing returns to schooling and are compensated for on-the-job training. In contrast, 
the secondary sector links workers’ remuneration mainly to the number of working hours 
and puts less emphasis on human capital endowments.30 Jobs in this segment can 
generally be characterized as unskilled, low paying, involving unpleasant working 
conditions and carrying considerable insecurity. For either reason, workers have an 
incentive to move from the secondary to the primary sector. 
At this point, it is important to notice that the evolution of segments per se is unrelated to 
certain industries and occupations. Highlighting the situation of foreign doctors in the U.S., 
Piore (1979), for example, demonstrates that even in high-qualified jobs ‘dualism’ may 
                                                             
30  The fact that decreasing returns to low-skilled labor mitigated the convergence in participation rates and 
wages of both women and ethnic minorities (see chapter 3) empirically supports the regularities 
postulated by the segmented labor market theory. 
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arise. However, differences in skill requirements across industries (e.g. 
overrepresentation of migrants in construction and automobile jobs in France and 
Germany) make the occurrence of ‘dualism’ in some industries more likely than in others. 
From a neo-classical perspective, labor market segmentation only evolves from 
differences in labor supply, particularly the human capital endowments workers bring to 
the labor market. However, some (groups of) workers may not be able to proceed from the 
secondary to the primary labor market because labor demand impedes any endeavors of 
doing so. A theoretical foundation for that is provided by economic theories of labor 
market discrimination elaborated in the next section. 
4.1.2.4 ECONOMIC THEORIES OF LABOR MARKET DISCRIMINATION 
While in a market characterized by imperfect information on workers’ true productivity, 
differential treatment unrelated to individuals’ actual abilities is sometimes inevitable, 
systematic discrimination against certain demographic groups is certainly not and, 
undoubtedly, represents inefficiencies in decision making. According to Aigner and Cain 
(1977: 178), “[g]roup discrimination in labor markets is evident when the average wage of 
a group is not proportional to its average productivity”. These differences may, on the one 
hand, directly originate from differential treatment or, on the other hand, result from rules 
and procedures that have a disparate impact on otherwise equally treated groups, i.e., are 
disadvantageous to the minority (Pager and Shepherd, 2008). Either way, the empirical 
findings from chapter 3 (and particularly from section 3.2.3) suggest that the prevalence 
of discrimination as a major source affecting labor market inequalities cannot be excluded. 
Unlike sociological and psychological approaches which are briefly referred to in section 
4.1.2.5, economic theories of discrimination use an economic rationale (rather than 
behavioral patterns) to explain systematic differences in the treatment of individuals and 
demographic groups. In the literature, two basic frameworks are discussed. According to 
Becker’s (1971) taste for discrimination approach, prejudices against certain demographic 
groups create disutility that enters the employer’s, coworker’s and customer’s economic 
rationale and result in inferior labor market outcomes for the disadvantaged group. In 
contrast, statistical discrimination, as described by Arrow (1971), Phelps (1972) and 
Aigner and Cain (1977), refers to perceived group differences in worker’s productivity due 
to imperfect information which translates into employers’ rationally favoring of one 
demographic group over another. In the following, both theories will be discussed in 
detail. 
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4.1.2.4.1 TASTE-BASED DISCRIMINATION 
In his seminal work, Becker (1971) proposes a theoretical framework that relates 
different labor market outcomes to “tastes for discrimination”. The basic assumption is 
that individuals have prejudices towards certain gender, ethnic background, social class, 
religion or personality attributes so that interacting with people who possess one or more 
of these attributes creates non-pecuniary costs, i.e., causes disutility. These costs are 
represented by a discrimination coefficient which enters the utility function and thus 
affects the price determination through market mechanisms. Put differently, individuals 
are willing to incur costs or forfeit income because they have a taste for discrimination and 
try to avoid getting in touch with certain demographic groups (recall, for example, the 
results presented by Szymanski (2000)). 
Becker (1971) differentiates three types of taste-based discrimination, i.e., employer, 
employee (also denoted as coworker), and customer discrimination. According to the first, 
employers not only include objective and solely productivity-related criteria in decision-
making. Instead, based on their personal tastes, they reject working with people from one 
demographic group while favoring workers from another. As a result the demand for the 
input factor discriminated against declines and so does its wage. In contrast, demand for 
non-prejudiced workers increases so that employers have to pay higher wages to the 
group of workers they prefer. This wage premium can be depicted as follows: πi (1+dcie), 
where πi is the wage rate offered by an employer i and dcie is the extent to which this 
employer discriminates, i.e., the discrimination coefficient. Since the increase in wage rates 
induces an increase in the price of labor as an input factor, aggregate production costs rise. 
The new equilibrium then generates higher costs that exceed the minimum costs of the 
previous factor combination. If tastes for discrimination are homogenous, i.e., either non-
existent at all or equal across employers, employers face the same production costs from 
discriminatory behavior. However, in a market with perfect competition, i.e., identical 
production functions across firms, heterogeneity in the discrimination coefficients benefits 
employers with weak or no discriminatory preferences. These employers are able to 
produce at lower costs and can thus outperform their competitors. As a result, prejudiced 
employers lose market share and, according to Becker (1971), are eventually driven out of 
the market (which, except the study by Weber and Zulehner (2009), empirical research 
thus far fails to demonstrate). This process continues until only the least discriminatory 
firms survive. 
As mentioned above, discrimination due to prejudices might not only originate from 
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employers. Even coworkers may have certain distastes towards other demographic 
groups that creates disutility and causes economic costs. These costs vary contingent on 
the discrimination coefficient and can be stated as follows: πj (1-dcjw), where πj is the wage 
rate of a worker j and dcjw her respective discrimination coefficient. Hence, coworkers 
might be willing to compensate their personal distastes by accepting lower wages. 
A third type of taste-based discrimination stems from distinct customer preferences. In 
order to overcome any disutility of buying from a prejudiced group of sellers, customers 
are willing to pay higher prices at sellers they do not have a prejudice against. Similarly to 
the case of employers, prices rise with an increase in the discrimination coefficient: pk 
(1+dckc), where pk is the price customer k pays for the commodity produced and dckc is the 
discrimination coefficient against the production factor, i.e., the minority worker involved 
in the production process. As a result, a taste for discrimination increases the costs of 
consumption. 
In the recruitment context, employer discrimination might be a reaction to either own 
prejudices or employee (e.g. Haile 2009, 2012, 2013) and customer prejudices (e.g. 
Neumark, 1996). Especially the latter might have interesting consequences for the hiring 
outcome. Being aware of coworkers’ or customers’ distastes, employers might reject 
individuals from minority groups not because of their own disutility, but because they 
anticipate conflicts among the workforce or a decrease in sales. Thus, it might be 
economically rational to disregard minorities during the hiring process or at least offer 
them lower wages that compensate for the costs incurred by resolving conflicts and 
foregone sales. In turn, this also demonstrates that the different sources of discrimination 
are often hard to disentangle, in particular, if only employment ratios or actual wage rates 
can be observed (see also the discussion in section 3.2.3.2). 
Apart from the employment and wage effects of discrimination, Becker (1971) discusses 
market segregation as a consequence of employers’, employees’ and customers’ distastes. 
If a sufficient proportion of either party is prejudiced while the rest is not, minorities 
interact with non-discriminators more frequently than expected by random distribution. 
Given, for example, a market where discrimination against black workers prevails, this 
may eventually create a situation in which prejudiced employers hire only white workers 
that only serve white customers. 
Subsequent research relying on Becker (1971) has theoretically shown that the extent of 
taste-based discrimination varies dependent on different model assumptions on how 
workers seek employment. In particular, models of random and directed search are 
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distinguished. These models also assume that different tastes either originate from 
employers (Lang and Lehmann, 2012), coworkers (Sasaki, 1999) or customers (Borjas and 
Bronara, 1989). In random search models (e.g. Black, 1995; Bowlus and Eckstein, 2002; 
Rosen, 1997), employers and applicants meet randomly and wages, once negotiated, can 
be understood as take-it-or-leave-it-offers. Contracts are fixed whenever a satisfying 
(utility maximizing) wage-match-quality on behalf of either party is reached. However, the 
wage-match-quality is dependent on employers’ prejudice levels. In addition, search costs 
enter applicants’ decision rationale. The idea is straightforward: in the presence of 
prejudice, equilibrium wages are lower for minority workers. At some point these workers 
are willing to accept a job offer since costs of further search activities are expected to 
exceed the benefits from superior future employment contracts. Yet, anticipating minority 
workers’ willingness to accept lower wages more rapidly than majority workers creates 
an incentive also to non-prejudiced firms to underpay minorities. Hence, the more 
prejudiced firms operate in a market, the higher is the monopsonistic power of non-
prejudiced firms and, consequently, the higher will be the majority-minority wage gap. 
The inferior treatment by non-discriminators, though, should not be considered as 
discriminatory in terms of Becker, but is simply an economically rational response to 
increased market power. 
Unlike in random search models, in directed search models (Lang et al., 2005) firms only 
determine one single wage unconditional on e.g. race (which is more realistic as 
conditioning wages on demographic characteristics violates anti-discrimination laws in 
most developed countries) and then choose the most productive worker (adjusted for any 
disutility they have). Yet, whether an employer is prejudiced or not is ex ante not obvious 
because prejudice matters only after applications have been evaluated. As certain 
preferences produce disutility that is incorporated in the productivity assessment, 
prejudiced workers might face discriminatory conditions. Assuming that workers are 
homogenous in terms of productivity, in the presence of employer prejudice, candidates 
from the majority group are always favored over those from a minority. As a result, while 
random search models help to explain the emergence of wage differences, models of 
directed search help to explain hiring differences (and are thus crucial for investigating 
discrimination in access to employment). 
From a neoclassical standpoint, Becker’s (1971) theory of taste discrimination implies that 
ultimately discrimination will disappear as competition drives discriminators out of the 
market. Two scenarios appear plausible: firstly, given a market with perfect competition 
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and a sufficient number of non-prejudiced employers, discriminators suffer from declining 
demand until bankruptcy as they produce and sell at higher prices than their non-
prejudiced competitors. Secondly, in order to remain competitive, employers simply 
abstain from prejudiced behavior and are thus able to contract workers at the same wages 
than non-discriminators. The major critique at Becker’s approach specifically addresses 
these long-term consequences. Arrow (1971) argues that discrimination may prevail even 
in the long run if information asymmetries affect productivity beliefs that differ by 
demographic groups. This is known as statistical discrimination, a concept that will now 
be discussed. 
4.1.2.4.2 STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION 
The theory of statistical discrimination as advocated by Arrow (1971) and Phelps (1972) 
claims that in a market of ex ante imperfect information on workers’ productivity, 
otherwise “liberal”, i.e., non-prejudiced, employers maximize expected utility from 
employer-employee interaction based on a priori productivity beliefs where these beliefs 
are formed based on “surrogate” information. Therefore, three basic conditions need to be 
met: First, employers should be able to distinguish two groups of workers at reasonable 
costs, for example, by easily observable characteristics such as race or gender. Second, 
workers’ exact productivity should be ex ante unknown (as it is per definition in a market 
with imperfect information). Third, employers need to have a priori beliefs on workers’ 
productivity that differ conditional on workers’ group membership. For instance, if native 
workers have proven to be of superior productivity as compared to minority employees, 
employers would believe that in case of otherwise homogenous job candidates, native 
applicants’ productivity exceeds that of minority applicants (Arrow, 1971).   
These beliefs, in turn, may evolve from i.) employers’ previous statistical experience, ii.) 
group differences in predictability of future productivity and iii.) prevailing role models. In 
case of the former, employers infer an individual’s unknown productivity from past 
experience with members of the same demographic group, where the average productivity 
of the majority group is generally assumed to exceed that of the minority group (see the 
example presented above). As a result, minority workers either suffer from inferior hiring 
outcomes or are paid lower wages. Accordingly, Altonji and Pierret (2001) show that with 
employer learning on the productivity of minority workers (in their study: blacks) over 
time, wages increase by the same growth rate as for majority employees (whites). Yet, 
using group membership as inference for productivity especially seems to be an issue at 
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the hiring stage.  
An alternative explanation for this may be what Cornell and Welch (1996) denote as 
screening discrimination. It assumes that the observability of human capital signals differs 
across groups which results in employers favoring the group about which they possess 
most information. Broad empirical evidence suggests that observability is initially better 
in case of majority workers (e.g. Lang, 1986). However, in order to evaluate whether 
screening discrimination persists during the course of the employment relationship, static 
and dynamic models are distinguished. Lundberg and Startz (1983) develop a model 
showing that groups being subject to more measurement error, i.e., noisier productivity 
signals, undertake less unobservable human capital investments but, in contrast, have an 
incentive to overinvest in observable measures such as schooling (see also Lang and 
Manove, 2011). Altonji (2005) and Bjerk (2008) later introduce a dynamic model of 
screening discrimination that further explains why hierarchical segregation as a response 
to different promotion probabilities arises. In particular, the model argues that unequal 
opportunities in access to higher occupational positions come from employers acquiring 
productivity information on majority workers more rapidly than on minority workers.  
Lastly, socio-cultural role models may create self-enforcing and persisting stereotypes 
that, in the absence of other productivity-related measures, serve as a suitable 
productivity device. Coate and Loury (1993) refer to this as rational stereotyping on behalf 
of employers. In essence, this is what has already been mentioned in section 4.1.2.1 when 
discussing pre-market differences: negative stereotypes towards minority workers result 
in lower human capital investments of these workers and, as a consequence, self-enforcing 
stereotypes. Indeed, the idea is also very similar to the lower equilibrium trap presented 
in connection with Spence’s signaling model. Again, employers’ justification stems from 
the fact that investments by one member of a group produce positive externalities for all 
other group members and vice versa. Thus, whenever human capital investments and 
productivity are imperfectly observable and average group investments differ, employers 
rationally favor members of the superiorly endowed group over those of the inferiorly 
endowed one. In the end, no matter how beliefs are formed, Arrow (1971) shows that if 
employers’ expectations of mean productivity differ across groups, in equilibrium, 
differential treatment based on demographic characteristics occurs.  
While Arrow (1971) and Phelps (1972) started to relate prior experience with members of 
a group to employers’ expected productivity of this group, the idea has been further 
developed by Aigner and Cain (1977). They refer to “second moment” statistical 
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discrimination if group differences in the precision of productivity relevant information 
occur. Employers are assumed to maximize the expected productivity discounted for risk 
where risk simply reflects the variance in workers’ actual abilities. The variance is 
supposed to be higher for employees from the minority group since, due to inferior 
knowledge, their productivity indicators (such as test scores) are considered to be less 
reliable. Higher risk, in turn, creates costs on behalf of employers which directly translates 
into lower hiring probabilities and wage offers. Workers from the disadvantaged group 
might overcome the unequal risk distribution by producing additional productivity 
signals. However, the attainment of further ability signals generates extra costs so that 
disadvantages remain. 
Theoretically, a higher variance in productivity measures could also be of benefit to the 
minority group. In a situation where the average ability of job applicants is fairly low 
compared to the market’s threshold level, employers are ceteris paribus more likely to 
hire minority workers because of a higher chance to attract someone who meets the job 
requirements (which would then be the top performers). In contrast, if employers’ 
threshold level is below the average ability of all candidates, workers from the low 
variance group (i.e., majority workers) would have an advantage as firms rather prefer a 
‘safe shot’ (Neumark, 2012). 
As a consequence of employers’ productivity inferences based on group membership, 
vacancies with high turnover and replacement costs (skilled jobs) are more likely to be 
filled with employees with higher productivity expectations and more reliable 
productivity signals. Hence, the employer is less exposed to employment risks. 
Alternatively, people from minority groups are offered lower wages that compensate for 
the risk premium the employer has to carry.31 
4.1.2.5 NON-ECONOMIC THEORIES OF LABOR MARKET DISCRIMINATION 
Even though the economic concepts of discrimination are based on employers’ prejudices 
and stereotypes towards certain groups of workers, they do not offer a suitable 
framework that helps to explain on which grounds prejudices and stereotypes evolve, nor 
do they address how people’s attitudes and beliefs can be measured. This section will 
                                                             
31 The trade-off between employment and wages given the prevalence of statistical discrimination has 
recently been established empirically by Dickinson and Oaxaca (2012). With data from a laboratory 
experiment, they show that while workers with equal mean, but higher productivity variance are 
discriminated in terms of wages, they are less likely to be unemployed, ceteris paribus. 
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therefore very briefly provide complementary insights on the causes of discrimination 
using sociological and psychological approaches. 
According to Pager and Shepherd (2008), the reasons why people develop different tastes 
and stereotypes can be categorized into individual, organizational and structural factors. 
While the former describes the factors influencing discrimination on an individual level, 
the latter two ask whether the organizational, societal and political environment reinforce 
negative attitudes and beliefs. Greenwald and Banaji (1995: 7) define attitudes as 
“favorable or unfavorable dispositions toward social objects, such as people, places, and 
policies.” In case of unfavorable dispositions, these attitudes are also referred to as 
prejudices which, as has been demonstrated, provoke tastes for discrimination. A 
stereotype, on the other hand, “is a socially shared set of beliefs about traits that are 
characteristic of members of a social category” (Greenwald and Banaji, 1995: 14). Whereas 
prejudices arise whenever a group of people, e.g. ethnic minorities or women, are 
negatively evaluated by others, stereotypes encompass judgements that may vary widely 
depending on which traits people associate with group membership. These traits may, in 
turn, simultaneously convey both positive and negative attributes. Greenwald and Banaji 
(1995) illustrate this by using, as an example, cheerleaders who are stereotyped as being 
attractive, but at the same time unintelligent. Either way, stereotypes are considered to be 
the basis of statistical discrimination as shown in the previous section. 
Prior research further distinguishes between explicit and implicit attitudes and 
stereotypes. The former are directly measured by self-reported surveys and do not 
require much explanation. The latter, however, use indirect measures that ask people on a 
seemingly unrelated issue to assess their unconscious mental associations they have 
between groups and their attributes. Alternatively, people are invited to take tests 
constructed to reveal their implicit attitudes and stereotypes. One such example is the 
implicit association test (IAT) developed by Greenwald et al. (1998). The basic idea is as 
follows: attributes such as ‘hardworking’ or ‘lazy’ are categorized into certain groups such 
as ‘white’ and ‘black’ by hitting a key on a computer. In a ‘compatible’ treatment, these 
attributes need to be allocated according to persisting stereotypes, i.e., hardworking to 
whites and lazy to blacks. In a consecutive treatment, attributes and groups need to be 
paired counterstereotypically. In the end, the response time differential between both 
treatments is calculated which then can be interpreted as the implicit association subjects 
have towards certain groups. 
Indeed, previous results documenting people’s explicit and implicit tastes and beliefs are 
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sometimes found to contradict each other (denoted as “dissociation”). People may have 
implicit attitudes and stereotypes which they would explicitly disavow. In the employment 
context, systematic patterns of implicit behavior benefitting one group over another 
would thus cause employers to unintentionally discriminate (e.g. Rooth, 2010; Booth et al., 
2012). Whereas economic theories of discrimination assign a more active role to the 
employer, i.e., assume that prejudices and stereotypes are something that is controllable 
and of which people are aware, Bertrand et al. (2005) argue that the existence of these 
cognitive factors gives rise to an alternative, non-economic explanation on why labor 
market discrimination persists. Real-world evidence on market discrimination from 
tipping New York cab drivers (Ayres et al., 2005), negotiations over sports cards (List, 
2004) and decisions whom to shoot in a video-game (Correll et al., 2002) may also stem 
from people’s implicit associations rather than explicit prejudices or beliefs. 
Another factor that influences the extent of discrimination is embedded in a firm’s 
organizational structure. Highly formalized processes in hiring, promotion and 
remuneration, for example, provide an environment where discrimination is expected to 
be rather rare. The use of objective performance measures such as sales figures when 
deciding whom to promote or on which basis to fix payment obviously narrow the playing 
field for discriminatory practices. In contrast, informal and subjective performance 
evaluations probably leave more room for a treatment unrelated to productivity. 
Somewhat related to this topic, companies where occupational attainments are closely 
related to the use of informal networks are more likely to disadvantage minority workers 
whose average network within a firm is expected to be smaller and less influential (see 
also the discussion in section 3.1.1). Furthermore, internal measures such as diversity 
initiatives and the organizational context seem to matter. The former, for example, may be 
used to actively promote equal opportunities for minority groups (Pager and Shepherd, 
2008). 
Lastly, structural factors may affect how certain groups are treated in the labor market. 
Similar to what has been discussed in section 4.1.2.1, Pager and Shepherd (2008) argue 
that historical legacy and contemporary state policies such as castes in India, the apartheid 
in South Africa and Jim Crow laws in the U.S., as well as socio-cultural gender roles for e.g. 
child-rearing responsibilities evoke different preferences across demographic groups 
when entering the labor market which in turn shape employers’ attitudes and beliefs. As a 
consequence, disadvantages accumulate (prior to entry) in the labor market and 
discrimination might be reinforced. 
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To conclude, this chapter has developed a theoretical framework that considers hiring as a 
decision under uncertainty where employers have imperfect information on workers’ 
productivity at the pre-hiring stage. Furthermore, the chapter has presented economic 
theories that help to explain different labor market outcomes. Human capital theory 
relates these differences to differences in workers’ endowments while segmented labor 
market theory attributes them to different workplace characteristics. However, controlling 
for the implications of these theories, i.e., keeping endowments and jobs constant, might 
still leave an unexplained gap. Economic theories of discrimination offer a rationale that 
sheds light on these unexplained differences and that relates inefficiencies to either tastes 
or productivity beliefs. Next, a conceptual model is developed that formally describes 
employers’ hiring decision accounting for the prevalence of taste-based and statistical 
discrimination.  
4.2 CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
From an employer’s perspective, an additional employee   is hired whenever her marginal 
productivity   ( ) exceeds her marginal costs   ( ), where the marginal productivity is 
determined by the employee’s expected future productivity and the marginal costs are 
determined by a monetary (wage) component as well as a discrimination coefficient that 
depends on employer’s prejudices against the employee’s socio-demographic 
characteristics. Hence, an employer’s treatment   whether or not to hire an additional 
applicant   can be written as follows: 
   {
                
             
 
The economic theories of discrimination claim that, all other things being equal, employers 
either evaluate the expected productivity differently across demographic groups (which is 
referred to as statistical discrimination) or encounter a disutility when hiring applicants 
with certain characteristics predetermined by birth (which is described by taste-based 
discrimination). If either taste-based or statistical discrimination prevail, differential 
treatment occurs since marginal utility determined by the employee’s productivity and 
marginal costs differ, respectively, and might result in a situation where it is economically 
rational for employers to hire an additional candidate of one demographic group, but to 
reject an applicant from the other. The following model referring to Neumark (2012) 
formalizes this differential treatment. 
Let treatment   depend on the applicant’s productivity-relevant characteristics   and a 
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dummy variable   that stands for a certain socio-demographic characteristic, e.g. gender.32 
[1]      (   )         
where   takes the value of   if the applicant is female and   if he is male. In general, either 
candidate is hired if her marginal productivity exceeds her marginal costs or, put 
differently, her expected productivity exceeds a certain threshold level that is a function of 
work requirements and wage costs. Differential treatment occurs if the applicants either 
vary in   or if    . Recall that in a controlled field setting such as the correspondence 
testing different labor market outcomes due to differences in human capital endowments 
(according to human capital theory) or occupational positions (according to segmented 
labor market theory) can be excluded since the applicants are carefully matched and only 
differ with respect to one specific attribute (here: gender). Now, given that productivity   
is the same across groups, any     describes discrimination that is purely based on an 
employer’s distaste for either group. If, for example,   is smaller than zero, women suffer 
from taste-based discrimination while the same happens to men if   is greater than zero. 
However, any preliminary conclusion with regard to discrimination à la Becker (1971) 
does not take into account that even though productivity indicators are controlled for 
within the experimental design of a correspondence study, the perceived productivity 
might differ across groups and firms. For this reason, the productivity   is split up into 
three components, i.e., the productivity-influencing factors    which can directly be 
observed by the employer, the productivity-influencing factors    which cannot 
immediately (or only at prohibitively high costs) be observed by the employer and firm-
specific factors  . Hence, [1] extends to: 
[ ]       ( (       )  )        
The focus should now shift to the analysis of  . The firm-specific effect   that reflects 
differences in firms’ threshold levels and accounts for intra-firm differences in the 
evaluation of the applicants can be disregarded given that F is normally distributed and 
statistically independent of   .33 Assumptions on the candidates’ observed and 
unobserved productivity indicators    and   , though, are crucial for the presence of 
                                                             
32  Note that for simplicity in the present context   is considered as gender, but it could also be replaced by 
any other demographic characteristic such as race or migration background.   
33 In the empirical section, the estimations are clustered on employer-level to allow for unobserved 
heterogeneity in employers’ decision-making processes and further include firm characteristics to see 
whether discrimination, if any, is robust across different types of firms.  
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statistical discrimination. Assume that 
[  ]                        (         )  and 
[  ]                   (      ). 
If               holds, the coefficient   displays discrimination, if any, which is based on 
employers’ tastes. However, satisfying this equation requires 
[  ]                       and 
[  ]      (         )   (      )  
to be fulfilled. Given [4a] is satisfied by the verifiable signals provided in applicants’ 
résumés, e.g. by school grades, employers’ expectations on the unobserved productivity-
building characteristics [4b] may still vary across gender. If the employer had full 
information, he would be able to determine [4b] for both of the candidates and, in case of 
equal preferences, hire the most productive person. Put differently, the firm would be 
indifferent between either of the candidates if both had the same productivity. However, 
the unobserved productivity of the candidates is stochastic and might differ in its mean 
and variance between the two groups.34  
Employers may use the expected average group productivity as a means of evaluating the 
unobservables (Arrow, 1971; Phelps, 1972). This might lead to a situation where 
[5]      (         )   (      )   
For instance, in male-dominated occupations employers might expect that, even though 
both candidates offer the same productivity signals, male apprentices are on average more 
capable to fulfill the requirements (because employers’ previous experience with either 
group indicates men’s higher productivity) and are thus preferred over women. If [5] 
holds, it may bias the extent of  . In case     (which stands for discrimination against 
the female candidate in the current example),  (         )   (      ) would overstate 
discrimination since employers also incorporate a higher mean productivity of males with 
respect to    in their employment decision. Thus, discrimination is unbiased and relies 
on    only if the mean unobserved productivity is expected to be equal across groups. 
However, even then the results of differential treatment against either group may be 
                                                             
34  Note that a key assumption in correspondence testing is that due to the matching process even the 
unobservable productivity factors have the same mean, i.e.,  (         )   (      ), which is the 
essential point of critique issued by Heckman and Siegelman (1993) and Heckman (1998).   
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misleading and contingent on the probability assumptions of the unobservables. 
As proposed by Aigner and Cain (1977), it may well be that both groups are considered to 
be equally productive, that is  
[6]      (             )   (                   ),  
but that the variance in the quality of unobserved productivity differs across gender. 
Assume that the employer has a certain threshold level   and only hires a candidate whose 
expected productivity exceeds these minimum requirements. Formally, 
[7]      ( (       )  )         . 
Given that the threshold level for recruiting any of the candidates is high and that the 
expected productivity  (     ) is equal for the male and female applicant, the employer 
might still prefer one group over the other even though     holds. For instance, if    is 
set at a moderate level,    has to be perceived to be high before an employer is willing to 
hire any of the candidates. Now, analogously to the example presented in section 4.1.2.4.2, 
consider that males are expected to have a higher variance in   , the employer would 
correctly conclude that this group is also more likely to produce high achievers that meet 
the hiring standards. The opposite was true if the threshold level determines a fairly low 
standard. Then, ceteris paribus, females would on average realize better hiring outcomes 
as their probability of not meeting the standard is lower.  
Both of the aforementioned approaches may lead to differential treatment which is not 
based on a disutility index, but on information asymmetries that employers try to reduce 
by making probability assumptions on unobservable productivity factors. That is why 
these concepts are referred to as statistical discrimination. Hence, 
 [8]      (         )    (       )     (                )  
gives the combined effect of taste-based and statistical discrimination if anything else 
(including other socio-economic characteristics) remain constant. This in turn provides a 
challenge to the design of correspondence studies and the analysis of their results. Even 
though both forms of discrimination are illegal and inefficient, there is a need to 
disentangle the combined effect since both forms are to be tackled by different strategies 
(see section 6.3). Econometrically, the extent of discrimination can be estimated from the 
regression 
[9]      (   )                    , 
where  (   ) denotes the hiring outcome for applicant   at firm j,    is the gender dummy 
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for applicant  ,   is a vector of firm characteristics and     is a normally distributed random 
variable. Consequently, if     , the female candidate is more likely to be hired while the 
opposite is true for     . Note that the estimation coefficient    only shows whether 
either party is being discriminated, but does not indicate the source of discrimination, i.e., 
whether it is based on employers’ distastes or differences in information asymmetries. In 
order to identify the confounding effects of differential treatment, [9] has to be extended 
to include a set of independent variables that interact with the gender dummy and either 
represent taste-based or statistical discrimination. Hence, 
[10]      (   )                                        , 
where       depicts the effect that gender and a variable (or a set of variables) indicating 
taste-based discrimination have on the hiring outcome and       is a term accounting for 
the effect of gender and a regressor considering statistical discrimination. The conceptual 
model in [10] forms the basis for the empirical model to be estimated using the data 
generated with correspondence studies on gender and ethnic discrimination in chapter 5.  
4.3 HYPOTHESES 
Before the empirical analyses are conducted, testable hypotheses are developed based on 
the theoretical considerations and existing empirical research. These hypotheses also 
distinguish between the aforementioned competing approaches of where discrimination 
might stem from. 
To begin with gender discrimination in recruitment, previous findings outside the German 
labor market have shown that female applicants are disadvantaged in male-dominated 
jobs, i.e., professions where the share of males is rather high and vice versa.35 This 
research is closely related to evidence from the German labor market suggesting that men, 
for example, are overrepresented in technical occupations no matter whether they require 
a formal degree or a completed apprenticeship. The latter mainly include jobs as blue-
collar specialists in industry. Here, future labor market scarcity is expected to be 
substantial, though hard to quantify. Nevertheless, considering previous research and the 
current situation in Germany’s labor market for jobs with a male majority, the nature of 
the job is identified as the main moderator of differential treatment. More precisely, a 
                                                             
35 Note that a correlation between the gender ratios and the extent of discrimination has not been in the 
scope of economic research so far and probably varies widely across different labor market regimes.  
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higher share of men often goes along with either physically demanding (craftsman) or 
socially stereotyped (computer programmer) jobs. This might be either the result of 
gender differences in human capital endowments required for these kind of jobs (see 
section 4.1.2.2), the prevalence of segmented labor markets (see section 4.1.2.3), a 
selection process (that in turn might stem from pre-market discrimination or the 
anticipation of lower chances with respect to future hiring outcomes (see section 4.1.2.1)), 
or discrimination in access to these jobs (see sections 4.1.2.4 and 4.1.2.5). Since the ceteris 
paribus condition is supposed to be met in correspondence studies (including the equality 
of observable human capital endowments) and any effects stemming from segmentation, 
selection and (other) pre-market differences can be neglected due to the experimental 
character of the study, this leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hjob type: The female applicant realizes fewer callbacks than her male counterpart in 
male-dominated jobs. 
Previous literature argues on the sources of gender discrimination and uses two economic 
approaches that help to explain why females suffer from a lower hiring probability in 
male-dominated jobs, that is, statistical and taste-based discrimination. The former states 
that discrimination is a rational reaction of employers based on asymmetric information 
that differs across gender. In other words, an employer is able to form more precise 
expectations about the future productivity of an applicant who is a member of a group the 
employer has been contracted and, hence, gathered previous experience with. Having 
equal productivity indicators of two applicants with different sexes would thus induce the 
recruiter to rely on additional information inferred from group membership. As this piece 
of information is more accurate in case of male applicants, females are rejected more 
frequently and gender discrimination arises. 36 
In order to reduce the importance of group membership, information asymmetries 
between employers and applicants have to be reduced. Without any unobservable 
characteristics, the employer would be able to perfectly predict the candidate’s future 
productivity based on the information provided. However, the real hiring process deviates 
from this ideal situation (see section 4.1.1). Still, the idea prevails that additional 
productivity related signals increase the reliability of employers’ productivity beliefs and 
therefore decrease the necessity to rely on group experiences as a productivity indicator. 
                                                             
36  Note that this only holds in the present situation where male-dominated jobs are considered and is 
supposed to vary contingent on the share of females employed in a specific job. 
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In the context of male-dominated jobs, this means that the extent of callback differences 
between male and female applicants is reduced which would lend support to statistical 
discrimination. Accordingly, the hypothesis states: 
Hcertificate:  The provision of additional job-specific information reduces the extent of 
discrimination against the female applicant in male-dominated jobs. 
Statistical discrimination further claims that applicants should ceteris paribus be treated 
equally whenever employers’ previous experience with either gender is the same with 
respect to quality and quantity. As previous studies indicate, this rationale holds for 
gender-neutral jobs in career entry positions where males and females on average realize 
the same employment outcomes. If, however, males are overrepresented in a particular 
labor market segment, employers can better evaluate the productivity potential of future 
applicants. Thus, anything else being equal, employers react economically rational by 
favoring men over women. Of course, the opposite is true for women in female-dominated 
jobs. As a consequence, the extent of discrimination against female applicants in male-
dominated jobs should decrease with an increasing fraction of women already working in 
this segment. Since this fraction varies in the German labor market by region, the 
respective hypothesis can be derived as follows: 
Hshare of females:  The higher the share of female applicants in male-dominated jobs in a 
specific labor market region, the lower the extent of discrimination 
against them. 
Alternative to the hypotheses presented above, gender discrimination may be affected by 
different preferences for either group. As presented in section 4.1.2.4.1, employers may be 
willing to pay higher wages or forfeit income in order to avoid any disutility arising from 
working with people that belong to the prejudiced gender. Employers may prefer one 
group over the other because of their own utility function or as a reaction to the distaste 
their employees and customers, respectively, might face. Even though these three forms 
are hard to disentangle, they all lead to worse employment outcomes for the minority 
group. However, taste-based discrimination comes at a certain price and should differ with 
the price level. In other words, if an employer is confronted with additional search costs or 
is likely not to fill a vacancy, he would rather recruit a member from the disliked group, 
say a woman, than incurring an even greater disutility by continuing the hiring process or 
leaving the position vacant. In line with this, scarcity in the regional labor market may 
serve as a proxy for this price mechanism. Whenever in the previous year more jobs were 
offered than suitable candidates were available, an employer should rather hire people 
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from the minority group, e.g. women in male-dominated jobs, than facing an even greater 
utility loss. Hence, the following hypothesis is developed: 
Hscarcity: The tighter the regional labor market in male-dominated jobs, the lower the 
extent of discrimination against the female applicant. 
In the same vein, the time interval until a position has to be filled represents a further 
constraint on behalf of the employer that signals a potential utility loss and may thus 
proxy potential costs. The more time until the job start elapses, the more search effort the 
employer has to expend and the higher is his probability of not filling the vacancy. Now, if 
two types of employers can be observed with one facing a rather long and the other one a 
rather short interval for staffing, the latter would be exposed to more economic pressure 
and, if the taste-based approach holds, is therefore expected to discriminate less, if at all. 
Along these lines, the respective hypothesis is derived: 
Htiming:  The shorter the time required for the vacancy to be filled, the lower the extent 
of discrimination against the female applicant in male-dominated jobs. 
As both, the study on gender as well as ethnic discrimination are conducted using the 
correspondence method and as both investigate discrimination in the same labor market 
segment, the development of the hypotheses referring to ethnic discrimination is very 
similar to that of the hypotheses presented above. The majority of matched-pair field 
experiments inside and outside Germany conclude that ethnic minorities (first and second 
generation Turkish immigrants in case of the German labor market) experience worse 
employment outcomes with respect to hiring probabilities (even though e.g. human capital 
endowments have been carefully controlled for). Based on these results that unequivocally 
point at ethnic discrimination in access to employment, the applicant with a Turkish 
migration background who represents the ethnic minority in the current study is expected 
to realize fewer callbacks compared to the German male candidate.   
Hminority:  The Turkish-named applicant realizes fewer callbacks than his German-
named counterpart. 
Unlike the quite homogenous findings on the general prevalence of discrimination against 
ethnic minorities, the economic explanations for differential treatment are rather 
heterogeneous with a focus on the competing approaches of statistical and taste-based 
discrimination, respectively. In line with the conception of the study on gender 
discrimination, on the one hand, the provision of additional productivity signals and, on 
the other hand, the share of foreign applicants should serve as proxies that indicate the 
  
85 
 
presence of statistical discrimination. The respective hypotheses can thus be formulated 
as follows:      
Hcertificate: The provision of additional job-specific information reduces the extent of 
discrimination against the Turkish-named applicant. 
Hshare of foreigners:  The higher the share of foreign applicants in a specific labor market 
region, the lower the extent of discrimination against the Turkish-
named candidate. 
Again, employers, coworkers and customers, respectively, may also have different 
preferences for, e.g., native Germans and German-born Turks. Different preferences 
ceteris paribus map into different utility functions for working with or being served by 
either group and, as a result, produce hiring differentials. The economic pressure due to 
labor market scarcity, for instance, puts these tastes into a perspective and creates a 
tradeoff between two options, i.e., hiring a member of the prejudiced group or facing 
further staffing costs. Thus, taste-based discrimination persists whenever the extent of 
differential treatment between the majority and minority group decreases as a reaction to 
either an increase of labor market scarcity or a decrease of the time until the vacancy has 
to be filled. Referring to the case of ethnic discrimination then yields:   
Hscarcity: The tighter the regional labor market, the lower the extent of discrimination 
against the Turkish-named candidate. 
Htiming:  The shorter the time required for the vacancy to be filled, the lower the extent 
of discrimination against the Turkish-named applicant. 
Overall, the hypotheses developed above address the underlying research questions of 
this thesis. On the one hand, they focus on the prevalence of gender and ethnic 
discrimination in a certain segment of the German labor market (‘Hjob type’ and ‘Hminority’). On 
the other hand, they postulate potential effects that allow identifying the factors 
influencing differential treatment (‘Hcertificate’, ‘Hshare of females/foreigners’, ‘Htiming’ and ‘Hscarcity’). 
  
86 
 
5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
The empirical section presents the results from both the correspondence study on gender 
and the one on ethnic discrimination in the German labor market. Since the experimental 
design is the same for both investigations, it is described in detail first (5.1). After that, the 
results of the gender (5.2) and ethnicity (5.3) study are presented and discussed 
separately before the consequences of methodological variations on the results of such 
field experiments are addressed (5.4).    
5.1 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURE 
As already mentioned in chapter 3, the experimental design of a correspondence study 
needs to account for local labor market characteristics and application standards and thus 
differs among countries, job types and seniority levels. Besides, the study should allow a 
reproduction of the results by implementing the same framework in future research. 
Therefore, in the following, a thorough presentation of the design and the procedure 
adapted in both field experiments is provided.     
 JOB MARKET FOR APPRENTICES 5.1.1
The correspondence studies conducted for the present thesis refer to the job market for 
apprentices. Its suitability for matched-pair testing, importance for the German labor 
market and latest developments will be outlined in the following sections. 
5.1.1.1 SUITABILITY FOR CORRESPONDENCE TESTING 
Investigating hiring discrimination in Germany requires a proper selection of the 
experimental framework. More precisely, the jobs focused upon using correspondence 
testing have to fulfill three main criteria. First, demand for labor must be sufficiently high 
so that an appropriate number of callbacks can be expected. Second, contract type and 
occupations have to be of particular importance for employers as well as for employees. 
Third, data on applicants’ employment history must be kept to a minimum. The more 
information on e.g. prior labor market experience, unemployment spells and family breaks 
is provided, the higher is the risk of running into problems of an unobserved 
heterogeneity bias. In addition, supplemental information generally requires the 
attachment of additional credentials which in turn increases the likelihood that employers 
get suspicious of the deceptive nature of the correspondence method.  
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A labor market field that meets all these criteria and literally seems to be designed for 
correspondence testing is the labor market for apprenticeships. In the context of the dual 
training system in Germany, people learn a certified profession according to certain 
curricula during a period of 2.5 to 3.5 years. During this time, the apprentices partly visit 
vocational school and partly work for the training company they are employed in. 
Apprenticeships are also quite homogenous with respect to several other factors. The 
training programs start yearly, usually in August and September. However, job offers are 
published the entire year. While some employers recruit almost a year in advance (in the 
following referred to as ‘early recruiters’), others offer their positions rather late (and are 
accordingly denoted as ‘late recruiters’). Remuneration of the apprentices is typically 
settled by collective bargaining agreements and does not vary across apprentices applying 
for the same job.37 The figure below illustrates the process that takes place before the 
apprenticeship contract is settled. 
Figure 5-1:  Application and Selection Process 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
Even though employers do not have a legal obligation to train apprentices, in 2011, 52.6 
percent engaged in training activities (BIBB, 2012b).38 Research investigating firms’ 
decisions of whether or not to offer apprenticeship training usually distinguishes between 
investment and production strategies (e.g. Niederalt, 2005; Dionisius et al., 2009; 
Mohrenweiser and Zwick, 2009; Backes-Gellner and Mohrenweiser, 2010). The former 
considers apprenticeships as a means to circumvent asymmetric productivity information, 
to reduce hiring costs and to increase profits by paying the apprentices below their 
marginal product after the training period has ended. Consequently, these types of 
employers are more likely to extend their apprentices’ contracts. On the other hand, firms 
following a production strategy use apprentices as cheap labor and do generally not offer 
                                                             
37 Occupational variations in apprentices’ pay, though, are common, but do not require further discussions as 
applicants are matched. Wages also differ slightly by region (e.g. East-West disparities) as they correspond 
to the local living standards. Yet, these differences are negligible. For information on the legal framework 
of apprenticeship contracts, see the Vocational Training Act (BBiG). 
38  The ratio of companies offering vocational training increases with firm size. Firms employing more than 
200 people are found to have the highest training ratio (BIBB, 2012b). 
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permanent contracts after completion of the apprenticeships.39 
According to the cost-benefit survey by the Federal Institute of Vocational Education and 
Training (BIBB) from 2007 where employers (N=2,986) self-reported the economic 
rationale behind their training decision, firms on average incurred net costs of around 
3,600 Euros per apprentice and year (BIBB, 2009a).40 However, these costs decrease over 
time and are eventually recovered by savings for not having to recruit qualified staff from 
the labor market and by the fact that former apprentices initially perform better than 
external recruits due to the specific human capital acquired. Moreover, employers 
mention the positive labor market signal that is sent out by the provision of vocational 
training as another reason for why they offer apprenticeships (see e.g. Backes-Gellner and 
Tuor Sartore (2010) for the signaling effect of apprenticeships). Employers’ responses 
thus indicate that training is predominantly used to select qualified staff, decrease the 
probability of adverse selection, ensure future labor supply and build up reputation in the 
labor market which all go along with the aforementioned investment rather than a 
production strategy (BIBB, 2009a). Based on their productivity expectations gathered 
during the apprenticeship, employers have the possibility to offer a permanent contract at 
the end of the training period. Thus, from an applicant’s perspective, being hired as an 
apprentice means having a foot in the door to future employment.41  
From an individual level as well as a macroeconomic point of view, the labor market for 
apprenticeships matters: experts all over the world consider the dual system in Germany 
as a key ingredient for an ongoing supply of well qualified employees and specialized staff 
which in turn forms the ground for a fairly robust labor market in times of the 
international debt crisis. That is also why, in 2004, the German government together with 
employer representatives decided on an agreement (the so-called “Nationaler Pakt für 
Ausbildung und Fachkräftenachwuchs in Deutschland”) which ensures that every 
                                                             
39  In line with employers’ motives, Wenzelmann (2012) finds different allocations of productive and non-
productive work tasks assigned to apprentices, which seem to depend on firms’ training strategies and 
apprentices’ educational endowments. 
40  Analyses of employers’ net costs indicate that medium-sized employers (50-499 employees) have 
significantly lower net costs per apprentice than small firms (10-49 employees) and that net costs are 
higher in the West compared to the East. Net costs, on the other hand, are not affected by job type 
(industry versus office jobs) and number of apprentices in a firm (BIBB, 2009a). 
41  The Confederation of German Trade Unions (DGB) has been calling for inclusion of subsequent 
employment guarantees in apprenticeship contracts. Results from the 2007 survey further show that the 
ratio of firms extending the work contract (on average 57%) is highest in manufacturing (69%), in Eastern 
states (63%) and in large firms (89%) (BIBB, 2009a). For an empirical analysis investigating which 
employer characteristics affect the probability that an apprentice is offered a permanent contract after 
completion of the apprenticeship, see Bellmann and Hartung (2010). 
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applicant who is willing and capable to take up an apprenticeship receives an opportunity 
to do so (BA, 2005, 2007, 2010c).42  
However, similar to the regular labor market, the market for apprenticeships is 
characterized by a certain degree of regional, occupational or educational mismatch 
causing apprenticeship positions to remain vacant. In the apprenticeship year 2010/2011, 
34.8 percent of all training firms were not able to staff any or some of their vacancies 
offered. According to the BIBB (2012a), 67.8 percent of these firms note that applicants 
did not meet the company’s educational requirements. This is the reason why they 
sometimes withdrew their job offers. Another 26.2 percent simply did not receive enough 
applications. Among the employers with unfilled vacancies, firms from Eastern Germany, 
rural areas and regions with a low degree of tertiarization as well as small-sized 
employers are overrepresented. Undoubtedly, these differences partly reflect difficulties 
in how to reach employers’ locations (e.g. the availability and quality of public 
transportation is likely to be better in urban compared to rural areas so that apprentices 
find it more difficult to commute if employers are located outside metropolitan areas) and 
applicants’ reservations against certain jobs and branches. Lastly, employers reported that 
12.5 percent of the apprentices selected resigned before the apprenticeship started. In 
addition, about one fourth (23 percent) of all apprenticeship contracts were canceled 
during the training period (BIBB, 2009b, DIHK, 2011, BIBB, 2012b).43 Both, unoccupied 
vacancies and early termination of employment relations create costs the employer tries 
to minimize. This, in turn, outlines the importance of proper apprentice recruitment and 
selection procedures.   
In 2010, on average around 55 percent of an age cohort started an apprenticeship for the 
first time. However, this share significantly varied across gender (66.1 percent of all 
German males started an apprenticeship as opposed to 49.0 percent of German females) 
and nationality (57.8 of German graduates compared to only 29.5 percent of graduates 
with foreign nationality signed an apprenticeship contract) (BIBB, 2012b). Table 5-1 gives 
an overview of the characteristics and job choices of the applicants for an apprenticeship 
in the reporting periods 2009/2010 until 2011/2012. According to these figures, every 
year roughly 550,000 people applied for an apprenticeship. These numbers depend on the 
                                                             
42 In 2010, this agreement was extended for the second time and to date lasts until 2014 (BA, 2010c). 
43  See BIBB (2009b) for differences between training firms with and without unfilled vacancies as well as 
reasons for the dissolution of contracts during the training period. 
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business cycle, the share of people going to university and the fact that a recent school 
reform doubled the share of school graduates in some states (BIBB, 2012b). Among these 
applicants, roughly 45 percent were females and between 11.0 and 11.6 percent were 
non-Germans. The largest proportion of foreigners was represented by Turks who 
accounted for almost 50 percent of the people from abroad. With respect to applicants’ age 
and their educational endowment, table 5-1 shows that more than 40 percent finished 
middle school and around 65 percent were younger than 20 years at the time of their 
application. Around 60 percent of the apprenticeships addressed service apprenticeships 
while approximately 37 percent were dedicated to jobs demanding technical tasks. 
Table 5-1:  Characteristics and Job Choices of Applicants for Apprenticeships by Reporting Period 
  Fraction in % Fraction in % Fraction in % 
  
2009/20101) 
(N=552,168) 
2010/20111) 
(N=538,245) 
2011/20122) 
(N=559,877) 
Females 45.4 44.9 44.9 
Foreigners 11.0 11.2 11.6 
(Turks) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5) 
Aged under 20 64.1 65.2 65.9 
Middle school 41.5 42.4 42.5 
Technical apprenticeships 37.4 37.0 36.9 
Service apprenticeships 59.5 60.2 57.8 
Notes: Technical and service apprenticeships are classified according to the job classification of the BA from 
19881) and 20102), respectively. A reporting period lasts from October 1st of the previous until September 30th 
of the following year. 
Source: BA (1988, 2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2012b). 
Descriptive statistics of applicant characteristics across these two job types clearly 
highlight gender differences (see table 5-2). Male applicants dominate technical 
apprenticeships (approximately 85 percent) while service apprenticeships have a majority 
of female job candidates (63.5 percent). With respect to the share of foreigners and middle 
school graduates, however, only minor differences among the job types can be identified. 
Table 5-2: Characteristics of Applicants for Apprenticeships by Job Type for the Reporting Period 
2010/2011 
 
Fraction in % Fraction in % Fraction in % 
  
All  
apprenticeships 
(N=538,245) 
Technical 
apprenticeships 
(N=199,063) 
Service 
apprenticeships 
(N=323,756) 
Females 44.9 14.8 63.5 
Foreigners 11.2 10.0 12.4 
Middle school 42.4 40.9 43.6 
Notes: Difference to 100 due to omitting apprenticeships from the agricultural and mining sector. 
Source: BA (2011). 
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Apart from the fact that apprenticeships are meaningful to both employers and 
apprentices, they are quite suitable for the correspondence testing since they address 
entry-level jobs. This implies that the majority of people who apply for an apprenticeship 
are career starters who have recently graduated from or are in their last year at school. As 
a consequence, only a limited employment history needs to be designed and the amount of 
credentials can be kept to a minimum. With respect to gender differences this also implies 
that the expected costs of maternity leave do not enter employers’ decision rationale and 
can therefore be neglected. 
5.1.1.2 SCOPE OF APPRENTICESHIPS IN PRESENT STUDIES 
Both the gender and ethnicity study focus on technical apprenticeships. In particular, six 
rather technical training professions that belonged to the 50 most frequently chosen 
apprenticeships in 2010 are addressed, i.e., industrial mechanic (German: 
Industriemechaniker/-in), mechatronic fitter (Mechatroniker/-in), milling machine 
operator (Zerspanungsmechaniker/-in), mechanic in plastics and rubber processing 
(Verfahrensmechaniker/-in für Kunststoff- und Kautschuktechnik), electronic technician 
(Betriebselektroniker/-in) and warehouse logistics operator (Fachkraft für Lagerlogistik). 
In case of the investigation on gender discrimination, this range of jobs is extended by 
apprenticeships as geriatric nurse (Altenpfleger/-in), industrial clerk 
(Industriekaufmann/-frau) and management assistant for office communication 
(Kaufmann/-frau für Bürokommunikation) which, from the apprentices’ perspective, 
belong to the 20 most favored jobs in the same year (BIBB, 2010b).44 Comparing full-time 
employees working in the jobs considered for subsequent investigations reveals huge 
variations in the fraction of females. These variations justify a classification into male- and 
female-dominated jobs. The former include technical occupations where the share of 
females varies between 0.8 and 26.3 percent while the latter comprise service jobs with a 
share of women above 70 percent.45 With respect to the distribution of foreigners across 
occupations, no obvious differences emerge. A closer look at the share of certified 
employees, though, reveals substantial differences across jobs with a range between 50 
                                                             
44 Overall, 348 certified apprenticeship professions were listed in 2010. This number remained constant over 
the last decade (BIBB, 2012b). 
45 The data for full-time employees are supported by the figures for new apprenticeships. In the years 2009 
until 2011, the fraction of women starting an apprenticeship in service professions was roughly between 
60 and 80%. In male-dominated jobs, however, only between 4.4 and 11.5% of the new hires were female 
(BIBB 2010a, 2011a, 2012b). 
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and 90 percent (see figures 5-2, 5-3 and 5-4). 
Figure 5-2: Full-Time Employees in Selected Jobs by Gender 
 
Notes: For industrial clerks and management assistants for office communication no disaggregated data are 
available. Proportions denote an unweighted average of the years 2005, 2007 and 2009. 
Source: Own illustration based on BA (2012d, 2012e, 2012f, 2012g, 2012h, 2012i, 2012j, 2012k). 
Figure 5-3:  Full-Time Employees in Selected Jobs by Citizenship 
 
Notes: For industrial clerks and management assistants for office communication no disaggregated data are 
available. Foreigners denote all non-Germans. Proportions denote an unweighted average of the years 2005, 
2007 and 2009.  
Source: Own illustration based on BA (2012d, 2012e, 2012f, 2012g, 2012h, 2012i, 2012j, 2012k). 
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Figure 5-4:  Full-Time Employees in Selected Jobs by Certification 
 
Notes: For industrial clerks and management assistants for office communication no disaggregated data are 
available. Certification refers to all people who have successfully finished an apprenticeship. Proportions 
denote an unweighted average of the years 2005, 2007 and 2009.  
Source: Own illustration based on BA (2012d, 2012e, 2012f, 2012g, 2012h, 2012i, 2012j, 2012k). 
 VACANCIES 5.1.2
In this section, the access to and the requirements of job offers addressed by the 
applicants within the correspondence studies are presented. The vacancies for the 
apprenticeships were taken from the job platform of the German Federal Employment 
Agency. Weitzel et al. (2011a, 2011b) show that approximately 77 percent of all employers 
place their employment advertisements online.46 Applications referred to apprenticeships 
starting in 2011 and 2012, respectively, and were sent out at three different points in time, 
i.e., 
 May 2011 for apprenticeships starting in August or September 2011,  
 September 2011 for apprenticeships starting in August or September 2012 and  
 May 2012 for apprenticeships starting in August or September 2012. 
Due to the fact that different application periods were referred to, the study allows a 
comparison over time and addresses both firms that recruit rather early and offer new 
positions almost one year in advance (i.e., early recruiters) and firms that publish their job 
offers on a short notice and start selecting their applicants two to three months prior to 
                                                             
46 A report by the BIBB (2011b) further outlines that the BA is the dominating recruiting channel among 
training companies. For a more detailed overview of recruitment channels, methods and strategies, see 
BIBB (2009b, 2011b). 
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the start of the apprenticeships (i.e., late recruiters).  
The potential workplaces were located all over Germany both in the public and private 
sector.47 In order to facilitate administration and keep costs to a minimum, job offers were 
only answered when the employer accepted email applications. This way of getting into 
touch with employers has been growing in popularity within the last decade and is more 
and more favored by both firms and applicants. Apart from that, email applications are 
accepted independent of firm size, sector and location (Weitzel et al., 2011a, 2011b). 
Apart from job, time and contact restrictions, the advertisements had to require no prior 
work experience and no more than ten years of schooling (which implies that applicants 
were graduates from lower or middle school). Firms further encouraged the applicants to 
voluntarily provide additional credentials of internships, for instance. School certificates, 
on the other hand, were required and would have substantially reduced the response rate 
if left out. In addition to these formal requirements, most employers consider the 
applicant’s passion for the respective profession as well as soft skills such as the ability to 
work in teams, having a high degree of intrinsic motivation and work accuracy as a 
necessary condition to apply for the job.      
 MATCHING PROCESS 5.1.3
Each application consisted of a CV, a cover letter and the last three school certificates. The 
CVs were matched according to age, the socio-economic area of residence, schooling, 
language skills and leisure time activities and only differed with respect to gender and 
ethnic background, respectively. Cover letters stated the candidates’ motivation, skills and 
abilities for the job. Depending on the application period, the candidates were aged 15 or 
16 and came from cities in the states of Lower Saxony (Brunswick, Hanover, Hildesheim), 
Hesse (Kassel) and North Rhine-Westphalia (Paderborn), respectively. The candidates 
were all German-born and stated German as their mother tongue as well as a good 
command in English. In addition, the résumés signaled the same IT skills which were 
altered depending on whether a white- or a blue-collar apprenticeship was addressed. 
Leisure time activities highlighted gender neutral sports such as handball and running and 
indicated a passion for hobbies that had a link to the corresponding profession such as, for 
                                                             
47  Since the majority of apprentices still live with their families and most firms require applicants living in the 
company’s neighborhood, the candidates stated that they were about to move with their family close to the 
location of the respective workplace. No statement about the relocation would have reduced the number of 
positive callbacks substantially and/or would have resulted in many inquiries on behalf of the employers. 
  
95 
 
example, the membership in the voluntary fire brigade for technical apprenticeships.  
With respect to schooling, the applicants mentioned that they were currently in their last 
year of middle school. School certificates showed above-average grades in subjects that 
were considered as meaningful in the job offers such as math, technics and physics in 
technical occupations. A randomly chosen number of applications sent out in the second 
and third application period (i.e., in September 2011 and May 2012) also included 
information on a certified school internship in the respective industry. In Germany’s lower 
and middle schools such internships are obligatory one year prior to graduation and 
usually last two to three weeks. Students use this opportunity to gather first practical 
experience. As mentioned above, in applications for apprenticeships, employers do 
generally not require such information. However, providing a certified internship might 
serve as an additional productivity device. Whenever attached, certificates on internships 
stated favorable information on candidates’ working behavior and effort. They further 
outlined the intern’s positive work attitude as well as his/her strong interest and intrinsic 
motivation. Due to the random allocation, certificates were provided by none, either or 
both of the candidates. This variation permits an isolation of the effect an additional signal 
has on the hiring outcome. In order to avoid any legal issues, the certificates were of 
fictitious schools and companies.48 
To allow an unambiguous identification of employers’ responses, all job candidates 
received individualized contact details: an email address, a cell phone number and a postal 
address. Phone calls were answered by voicemail which kindly asked the caller to leave a 
note with name and contact information. Postal mails were redirected to the researcher’s 
address. In order to rule out any suspicion on behalf of the employers, pairs of applications 
were sent out with one to two days in between. In addition, the résumés, cover letters and 
certified internships slightly differed concerning layout and wording. Overall, three 
different designs of applications were prepared. By randomly altering the application 
forms across candidates and jobs, any bias due to differences in framing and dispatching 
orders could be controlled for.49  
                                                             
48 Note that firms’ responses did not indicate any suspicion due to fictitious certificates. Section 5.4 explicitly 
discusses any potential suspicion bias of the correspondence method and tests methodological variations. 
49  Examples of résumés and cover letters can be found in section B in the appendix. 
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 NAMES AND PROFILE PICTURES 5.1.4
The correspondence method relies on applicants that only differ with respect to one 
feature. Here, differential treatment due to gender and ethnic differences is investigated. It 
is crucial to the study that these characteristics can unequivocally be identified by reading 
the applications. The identification of applicants’ gender and ethnic origin is usually done 
by changing names and profile pictures (at least in case of gender studies and only where 
the attachment of profile pictures is common practice as is the case in Germany).  
In both studies, the male candidate without a migration background is considered as the 
reference category and is given the name Jan Lange and Lukas Schmidt, respectively. The 
first names both belong to the 20 most frequently chosen first names in Germany at the 
beginning of the 1990s and the surnames can also be found among the 20 most common 
ones in Germany. Accordingly, the names of the female candidate, Anna Schneider and 
Laura Müller, are determined.50 Like in prior correspondence studies on ethnic 
discrimination, names also serve as an indicator for ethnic background. Since the ethnicity 
study explicitly focuses on German born males who belong to the second or third 
generation of formerly immigrated Turks, the candidates’ names are among the most 
common Turkish names in Germany, Kenan Yilmaz and Onur Öztürk.51 
Applications also include profile pictures which all have a similar format and style 
concerning background colors, coiffures and facial expressions. The photos are 
characterized by a light background, candidates show a friendly smile, have a similar dress 
and the same hair color. In case of the matched pairs in the ethnicity study, the photos 
were also randomly varied across candidates to exclude any potential beauty bias. All in 
all, two different male and female profile pictures were used and controlled for in the 
multivariate analyses.  
                                                             
50  For the selection of German-sounding first names, see http://www.beliebte-vornamen.de; for the selection 
of German-sounding last names, see http://www.bedeutung-von-namen.de/top50-nachnamen-
deutschland. 
51 For the selection of Turkish-sounding first names, see http://www.baby-vornamen.de/Sprache_und_ 
Herkunft/tuerkische_Vornamen.php; for the selection of Turkish-sounding last names, see http://www. 
herkunft-name.de/namensherkunft-familienname/nachnamen-international/tuerkische-nachnamen.htm. 
When choosing the names, those that are attached to prejudices or stereotypes were tried to be avoided. 
Name effects are tested by a subsample (see respectively tables C-3, C-4, C-10, and C-11 in the appendix), 
but are not found to be significant and meaningful for the results of the present studies. For a more 
elaborate empirical investigation of name effects, see e.g. Fryer and Levitt (2004). 
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 APPLICATION PROCESS AND RESPONSE DOCUMENTATION 5.1.5
Two applications (the German male as the reference category together with either the 
female or the ethnic minority candidate) were sent out in response to each job offer.52 
Cover letters, CVs and certificates were matched automatically using serial letters. As 
mentioned before, designs and emailing orders were randomly varied before the 
applications were dispatched. Across all application periods, firms were addressed only 
once although some offered different apprenticeships at the same time. 
Employers’ responses were then carefully reported for the consecutive three (in case of 
the applications sent out in May 2011 and May 2012) and nine months (for applications 
sent out in September 2011), respectively. The records included the date and the type of 
response (see below), as well as sex, name and position of the person responding 
(whenever possible) and were then complemented by information about the job offers 
such as job as well as firm characteristics. The firms replied via email, postal mail or 
phone. The answers can be classified into five different categories: either the applicant (i) 
did not receive any response, (ii) got an acknowledgement, (iii) was requested to provide 
additional information, (iv) was rejected or (v) was signaled interest on behalf of the 
employer which is subsequently referred to as a ‘callback’.  
A reminder was sent out to those companies that had not replied at all after three weeks. 
Acknowledgements mostly stated that the firm would check the documents and make a 
statement after having reviewed all incoming applications. Thus, some acknowledgements 
were followed by a response, i.e., either a rejection or a callback, on behalf of the employer. 
However, some firms never called back again and were therefore regarded as a case of no 
response. Rejections remained unanswered by the candidates whereas callbacks were 
politely withdrawn (with the note that the candidate already found another 
apprenticeship) within 48 hours to avoid any further inconvenience and costs to the 
companies. Callbacks, for instance, took the form `we would like to get to know more 
about you in a personal interview´ or `please call back so that we can arrange a job 
interview’. Overall, they are defined as either an invitation to a selection interview, a 
telephone interview, an assessment center or an offer for an internship. In the next 
section, the results from the gender study will be presented, analyzed and discussed. 
                                                             
52  In the remainder of the thesis, the female (Turkish-named) candidates are always considered and referred 
to as the minority group. 
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5.2 CORRESPONDENCE STUDY ON GENDER DISCRIMINATION 
In what follows the correspondence study on gender discrimination in the labor market 
for apprenticeships in Germany is dealt with. First, the dataset (5.2.1) and descriptive 
results are presented (5.2.2). The subsequent section outlines the econometric method 
and conducts analyses on the employment outcomes for all job candidates (5.2.3). After 
that, the hypotheses developed in section 4.3 are tested and, finally, discussed (5.2.4). The 
discussion includes interpretations of the results and relates them to economic theories of 
discrimination as well as to previous findings on gender discrimination.      
 DATA 5.2.1
This section, on the one hand, presents the dataset generated by the field experiment and 
used for the empirical analyses (5.2.1.1) and, on the other hand, compares company 
characteristics of the dataset with those from the entire body of training companies in 
Germany (5.2.1.2). 
5.2.1.1 THE DATASET FROM THE FIELD EXPERIMENT  
Overall, 664 job offers were addressed which, due to the matched-pair setting, resulted in 
1,328 individual applications. Since in case of 8 employers, dispatching errors were 
reported, the corresponding 16 applications were excluded from further analyses.  
The main outcome variables show that in 81.6 percent of all applications, firms informed 
the candidates of whether or not they were invited. In other words, 1,070 times the 
applicants either received a rejection or a callback (subsequently denoted as a ‘response’). 
Among these, 37.9 percent of all applications were answered by a callback. Whenever 
employers responded, it took them on average 23.8 working days with some answering 
immediately while the maximum waiting time was 178 working days. Employers used all 
three possible options to get in touch with the applicants. However, email responses 
dominated (65.3 percent).  
Among the remaining 656 firms addressed, 52.7 percent were located in the South of 
Germany, 17.5 percent in Eastern Germany and 29.7 percent in the remaining states.53 The 
                                                             
53 The difference to 100% is due to rounding errors. The South of Germany includes the states of Bavaria, 
Baden-Wuerttemberg, Hesse, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Saarland. Eastern Germany covers the states of 
Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony‐Anhalt, and Thuringia. Hence, the 
remaining states are Bremen, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, North Rhine‐Westphalia, and Schleswig‐Holstein. 
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majority of companies (76.7 percent) belonged to the industry and construction sector 
while 23.3 percent are in other sectors such as trade, services and public administration. 
The highest fraction of firms in the sample, around 51.5 percent, was of medium size, i.e., 
employed between 50 and 500 workers at the time of the study. The rest were either small 
companies with less than 50 employees (33.2 percent) or large companies with more than 
500 employees (15.2 percent).  
Applications were sent out at three different points in time. The first application period in 
May 2011 contained 246 (37.5 percent) distinct firms, the second period in September 
2011 included 262 (39.8 percent) firms and the third period in May 2012 addressed 149 
(22.7 percent) different employers. Thus, late recruiters as defined in section 5.1.1.1 made 
up 60.2 percent of the entire sample. While small firms accounted for the highest share 
among late recruiters (45.6 percent), they represented the lowest portion among the job 
offers already published in September (14.6 percent). In contrast, medium and large 
companies were overrepresented among early recruiters compared to the fraction they 
made up in May 2011 and 2012 (see table 5-3). 
Table 5-3:  Firm Size by Application Period 
  
Late 
(N=395) 
Early 
(N=261) 
Total 
Small 45.57% 14.56% 33.23% 
  (180) (38) (218) 
Medium 45.06% 61.30% 51.52% 
  (178) (160) (338) 
Large 9.37% 24.14% 15.24% 
  (37) (63) (100) 
Notes: The table reports late and early recruiters by firm size in 
percent. Absolute numbers are in parentheses. 
Source: Own dataset.54 
The majority of apprenticeships the candidates applied for were technical occupations 
such as industrial mechanics. Recalling that men predominantly fill these kinds of jobs, 
they can be classified as male-dominated. Accordingly, those apprenticeships that have a 
higher fraction of women are considered as female-dominated. The latter represent 17.7 
percent in the sample and were only referred to during the application period in May 2012 
in order to be able to test for job stereotyping (‘Hjob type’). The job offers also indicated the 
                                                             
54  If not stated differently, the sources of all subsequent tables and figures are the datasets generated during 
the course of the correspondence studies.  
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number of apprenticeship positions the employers offered as well as the number of 
positions that were still available. The firms assigned up to 15 apprenticeships where on 
average 1.7 positions had not yet been filled at the time of application. In more than half of 
the cases (53.2 percent) the person responsible for the applications was female.    
Even though the correspondence testing matches the candidates on relevant 
characteristics, names, profile pictures and contact data need to differ in order to avoid 
suspicion and to be able to unequivocally record companies’ responses. However, name 
and beauty effects may bias the results on gender discrimination. Therefore, within a 
subsample two distinct male and female names as well as photos were chosen and 
incorporated. That is why about 5 percent of all applications contained alternative names 
(Lukas Schmidt and Laura Müller, respectively) and profile pictures (photo A and photo B, 
respectively). Apart from that, the places of residence were altered which allows 
controlling for the distance between applicants’ current address and employers’ 
workplace. On average, this distance was 286 kilometers where the range varied between 
0 (residence and workplace are in the same city) and 556 kilometers. The random 
variation of additional certificates resulted in a fraction of 39.1 percent in which the 
candidates provided a credential on a school internship. In 273 cases no additional 
certificates were provided, in 130 cases both applicants attached a credential and in 123 
(130) cases only the male (female) candidate handed in a complementary signal. 
The information collected from companies’ responses and their job offers was enriched by 
labor market data from the BA.55 Since the workplace of every employer was known, 
detailed statistics on the regional labor market could be matched with firms. Thus, both 
the ‘Hscarcity’ and the ‘Hshare of females’ hypotheses can be tested. With respect to the former, the 
variable ‘vacancies/total jobs t-1’ is constructed by dividing the number of unstaffed 
apprenticeship positions by the number of registered positions in the previous year. This 
ratio represents the degree of labor market scarcity employers had to face in the 
preceding application period and is restricted to the range between 0 and 1. Figure 5-5 
shows the frequency distribution of the non-standardized scarcity measure. 
Compared to current labor market data, the scarcity measure in t-1 proves to be superior 
                                                             
55 The data contain information on the number of registered and unstaffed apprenticeship positions as well 
as on the number of registered and unemployed applicants. Even though registration for both employers 
and applicants is not obligatory, the BA (2012l) reports a high coverage that is especially dependent on the 
situation in the job market. If the demand for apprenticeship positions increases relative to supply, 
applicants are more likely to register, and vice versa. 
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because it takes into account that employers only know ex post whether the quality and 
quantity of the applications received were sufficient to fill the vacancies. The mean ratio in 
this sample was 0.047 and ranged from 0.004 to 0.146. On average 4.7 percent of all 
apprenticeship jobs in the previous year could not be staffed. 
Figure 5-5:  Frequency Distribution of Non-Standardized Vacancies/Total Jobs t-1 
 
The share of female applicants in t-1 as another ratio collected from the data of the BA 
proxies employers’ past experience with female applicants. Creating a regional female-
total-applicant ratio and matching it with employer data yielded an average of 0.236 in the 
current sample. However, this ratio varied considerably depending on the nature of the 
job. While in male-dominated jobs on average 15.2 percent of all applicants were female, 
the share of female applicants averaged 62.4 percent in female-dominated jobs. Figure 5-6 
shows the frequency distribution of the non-standardized ‘share of females’ measure 
separated by job type.56 Table 5-4 provides an overview of the descriptive statistics for the 
entire dataset. 
Figure 5-6:  Frequency Distribution of Non-Standardized Share of Females t-1 Separated by Job Type 
 
                                                             
56 Note that for the empirical analyses both variables reflecting labor market conditions are standardized. 
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Table 5-4:  Descriptive Statistics of the Correspondence Study on Gender Discrimination 
Variable Operationalization # of Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES   
     
Response 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the applicant 
receives a response (either invitation or 
rejection) by the employer, 0 otherwise 
1312 0.816 - 0 1 
Callback 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the applicant 
receives a callback (e.g. invitation) by the 
employer, 0 otherwise 
1312 0.379 - 0 1 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
     
Response information   
     
Response time 
Response time of employers in working 
days 
1070 23.83 27.90 0 178 
Type of response 
      
 
Email 
Dummy: Equals 1 if employer responded 
by email, 0 otherwise 
1070 0.653 - 0 1 
 
Postal mail 
Dummy: Equals 1 if employer responded 
by postal mail, 0 otherwise 
1070 0.196 - 0 1 
 
Phone 
Dummy: Equals 1 if employer responded 
by phone, 0 otherwise 
1070 0.150 - 0 1 
Applicant information   
     
Female 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the applicant is 
female, 0 otherwise 
1312 0.500 - 0 1 
Name 
      
 
Jan Lange 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the applicant is 
named ‘Jan Lange’, 0 otherwise 
1312 0.447 - 0 1 
 
Lukas Schmidt 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the applicant is 
named ‘Lukas Schmidt’, 0 otherwise 
1312 0.053 - 0 1 
 
Anna Schneider 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the applicant is 
named ‘Anna Schneider’, 0 otherwise 
1312 0.447 - 0 1 
 
Laura Müller 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the applicant is 
named ‘Laura Müller’, 0 otherwise 
1312 0.053 - 0 1 
Photo 
      
 
Male photo A 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the applicant is male 
and has photo A, 0 otherwise 
1312 0.446 - 0 1 
 
Male photo B 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the applicant is male 
and has photo B, 0 otherwise 
1312 0.054 - 0 1 
 
Female photo A 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the applicant is 
female and has photo A, 0 otherwise 
1312 0.444 - 0 1 
 
Female photo B 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the applicant is 
female and has photo B, 0 otherwise 
1312 0.056 - 0 1 
Design 
      
 
Design A 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the application has 
design A, 0 otherwise 
1312 0.370 - 0 1 
 
Design B 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the application has 
design B, 0 otherwise 
1312 0.370 - 0 1 
 
Design C 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the application has 
design C, 0 otherwise 
1312 0.260 - 0 1 
Rank 
      
 
Rank 1 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the application was 
sent out first, 0 otherwise 
1312 0.500 - 0 1 
 
Rank 2 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the application was 
sent out second, 0 otherwise 
1312 0.500 - 0 1 
        
Certificate 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the applicant 
provides an additional certificate, 0 
otherwise 
1312 0.391 - 0 1 
Distance 
Linear distance between applicant's 
home and location of employer (in km) 
1312 285.74 123.66 0 556 
Information on jobs and application period 
     
Application period 
      
 
May 2011 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the application was 
sent out in May 2011, 0 otherwise 
1312 0.375 - 0 1 
 
Sep 2011 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the application was 
sent out in September 2011, 0 otherwise 
1312 0.398 - 0 1 
 
May 2012 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the application was 
sent out in May 2012, 0 otherwise 
1312 0.227 - 0 1 
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Job 
       
 
Electronics technician 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the candidate applies 
as an electronics technician, 0 otherwise 
1312 0.105 - 0 1 
 
Geriatric nurse 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the candidate applies 
as a geriatric nurse, 0 otherwise 
1312 0.037 - 0 1 
 
Industrial clerk 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the candidate applies 
as an industrial clerk, 0 otherwise 
1312 0.066 - 0 1 
 
Industrial mechanic 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the candidate applies 
as an industrial mechanic, 0 otherwise 
1312 0.264 - 0 1 
 
Management assistant 
for office 
communication 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the candidate applies 
as a management assistant for office 
communication, 0 otherwise 
1312 0.075 - 0 1 
 
Mechanic in plastics 
and rubber processing 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the candidate applies 
as a mechanic in plastics and rubber 
processing, 0 otherwise 
1312 0.143 - 0 1 
 
Mechatronics fitter 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the candidate applies 
as a mechatronics fitter, 0 otherwise 
1312 0.155 - 0 1 
 
Milling machine 
operator 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the candidate applies 
as a milling machine operator, 0 
otherwise 
1312 0.105 - 0 1 
 
Warehouse logistics 
operator 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the candidate applies 
as a warehouse logistics operator, 0 
otherwise 
1312 0.050 - 0 1 
        
Female-dominated job 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the majority in the 
respective apprenticeship is female, 0 
otherwise (i.e., the majority is male) 
1312 0.177 - 0 1 
Firm characteristics   
     
Size 
      
 
Small 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the employer has 
less than 50 employees, 0 otherwise 
1312 0.332 - 0 1 
 
Medium 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the employer has 
between 50 and 500 employees, 0 
otherwise 
1312 0.515 - 0 1 
 
Large 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the employer has 
more than 500 employees, 0 otherwise 
1312 0.152 - 0 1 
Location 
      
 
Other 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the employer is not 
located in the South or East of Germany, 
0 otherwise 
1312 0.297 - 0 1 
 
South 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the employer is 
located in the South of Germany, 0 
otherwise 
1312 0.527 - 0 1 
 
East 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the employer is 
located in Eastern Germany, 0 otherwise 
1312 0.175 - 0 1 
        
Industry 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the employer 
operates in the industry sector, 0 
otherwise (i.e., service sector)  
1312 0.767 - 0 1 
Late recruiter 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the employer 
recruits in May, 0 otherwise (i.e., 
September) 
1312 0.602 - 0 1 
Female responsible 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the person 
responsible for recruiting as mentioned 
in the job offer is female, 0 otherwise 
1312 0.532 - 0 1 
Open positions 
Number of open positions for an 
apprenticeship as indicated by the 
employer's job offer 
1312 1.68 1.59 1 15 
Labor market data   
     
Vacancies/total jobs t-1 
Ratio of vacancies and total 
apprenticeships in the previous year (i.e., 
in the reporting period 2009/2010 and 
2010/2011, respectively) and in the 
corresponding employment agency 
region of the employer 
1312 0.047 0.029 0.004 0.146 
Share of females t-1 
Share of female applicants in the 
previous year (i.e., in the reporting 
period 2009/2010 and 2010/2011, 
respectively) and in the corresponding 
employment agency region of the 
employer 
1312 0.236 0.182 0.110 0.740 
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5.2.1.2 COMPARISON WITH THE OVERALL POPULATION OF TRAINING COMPANIES 
A comparison of firm characteristics in the present sample and the overall population of 
employers having registered their apprenticeship position at the BA in 2010/2011 is 
displayed in table 5-5. The figures reveal that small firms are underrepresented while 
medium-sized firms make up a higher share in the field experiment than in the actual 
population of training companies. A possible explanation is that the majority of small firms 
still rely on postal applications because they are less likely to use the Internet and have a 
relatively low number of incoming applications which keeps the administrative 
requirements for the hiring procedures within a reasonable range. 
Table 5-5:  Firm Characteristics in Field Experiment and Entire Population of Training Companies 
 
Field  
experiment 
Entire population  
of training companies 
Size 
  
 Small 33.23% 45.97% 
 Medium 51.52% 36.39% 
 Large 15.24% 17.64% 
Location 
  
 South 52.74% 45.32% 
 East 17.53% 17.60% 
 Other 29.73% 37.02% 
Notes: Data on firm size as of 2010. Data on location as a weighted average of 
2010/2011 and 2011/2012.  
Source: BA (2010a, 2011, 2012b), BIBB (2010a). 
Apart from differences in firm size, employers from the South are slightly overrepresented 
in the present sample whereas those located in the northern and western states make up a 
lower share compared to the entire population. This might be due to the fact that 
particularly in the South of Germany where labor market competition for talent is 
particularly fierce, firms offer their vacancies via various channels and for a longer period 
of time which in turn increases the probability of appearing in the current sample. 
Whether or not the representativeness of the dataset influences the outcome on gender 
discrimination will be discussed in section 5.2.4. 
 DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS 5.2.2
According to Heckman and Siegelman (1993: 198), not any differential treatment on firm 
level can be regarded as discrimination, but “discrimination exists whenever two testers in 
a matched pair are treated differently in the aggregate or on average.” The results of the 
field experiment on apprenticeship applications suggest that these average differences 
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exist. 
Table 5-6:  Firms’ Detailed Responses by Gender 
  
Male 
(N=656) 
Female 
(N=656) 
Total 
(N=1,312) 
Difference 
No response 19.51% 17.38% 18.45% 2.13 pps 
  (128) (114) (242) (14) 
Rejection 40.24% 47.10% 43.67% -6.86 pps** 
  (264) (309) (573) (45) 
Callback 40.24% 35.52% 37.88% 4.72 pps* 
  (264) (233) (497) (31) 
Notes: The table reports detailed responses by gender as a fraction of overall 
applications in percent. Absolute numbers are in parentheses. * denotes 10% 
significance level and ** denotes 5% significance level of a chi-squared test (H0: The 
male and female candidates are equally likely to receive a callback/a rejection at any 
matched-pair application). 
Table 5-6 shows a detailed overview of employers’ responses by gender for the whole 
dataset. Overall, 497 applications resulted in a callback by employers. Comparing callbacks 
by gender shows that the male candidate was invited 264 times (40.24 percent) whereas 
the female candidate received 233 positive responses (35.52 percent). Moreover, the male 
(female) applicant was rejected in 264 (309) cases while, accordingly, 128 (114) 
applications remained unanswered. Due to the nature of the correspondence method, 
these results indicate that the male candidate has a 4.72 percentage points higher 
probability of being called back than the female applicant. Conducting a chi-squared test 
shows that these gender differences in callbacks are statistically significant at the 10 
percent level. It thus seems that hiring discrimination by gender exists. 
Table 5-7:  Firms’ Callbacks Conditional on Job Type 
  Male Female Difference 
Male-dominated 40.93% 34.44% 6.49 pps** 
 
(221/540) (186/540) 
 
Female-dominated 37.07% 40.52% -3.45 pps 
 
(43/116) (47/116)  
Notes: The table reports callbacks by gender as a fraction of applications in 
male- and female-dominated jobs, respectively, in percent. Absolute numbers 
of callbacks and applications are in parentheses. ** denotes 5% significance 
level of a chi-squared test (H0: The male and female candidates are equally 
likely to receive a callback at any matched-pair application). 
Looking more closely at where the differences in callbacks might stem from reveals that 
job type seems to be a moderator. Although female-dominated jobs were only considered 
in a rather small subsample, it becomes obvious that the lower callback rate of the female 
applicant is limited to male-dominated jobs. Table 5-7 highlights that the male candidate 
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has a 6.49 percentage points higher probability of being invited. This difference is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. With respect to female-dominated jobs, 
however, the female applicant’s disadvantage disappears. 
Table 5-8:  Firms’ Callbacks Conditional on the Provision of an Additional Certificate 
  Male Female Difference 
No certificate 37.47% 33.84% 3.63 pps 
 
(151/403) (134/396) 
 
Certificate 44.66% 38.08% 6.58 pps 
 
(113/253) (99/260)  
Difference 7.19 pps* 4.24 pps  
Notes: The table reports callbacks by gender as a fraction of applications with 
and without an additional certificate in percent. Absolute numbers of 
callbacks and applications are in parentheses. * denotes 10% significance 
level of a chi-squared test (H0: Applications with and without an additional 
certificate are equally likely to receive a callback).  
Furthermore, the inclusion of a certified school internship seems to influence the 
candidates’ callback rates (see table 5-8). If a credential is attached, the share of 
invitations to both the male and the female applicant increases. While the male candidate 
benefits by 7.19 percentage points, his female counterpart only realizes a 4.24 percentage 
points increase in positive responses with only the former difference being statistically 
significant at conventional levels. 
Table 5-9:  Firms’ Callbacks Conditional on Application Period 
  Male Female Difference 
Late recruiters 38.99% 33.16% 5.83 pps* 
 
(154/395) (131/395) 
 
Early recruiters 42.15% 39.08% 3.07 pps 
 
(110/261) (102/261)  
Notes: The table reports callbacks by gender as a fraction of applications to 
late and early recruiters in percent. Absolute numbers of callbacks and 
applications are in parentheses. * denotes 10% significance level of a chi-
squared test (H0: The male and female candidates are equally likely to 
receive a callback at any matched-pair application). 
With regard to the different application periods, it becomes obvious that differential 
treatment is somewhat higher if the sample is restricted to late recruiters (see table 5-9). 
A chi-squared test of equal callback distributions across gender indicates that the 
difference of 5.83 percentage points is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. In 
contrast, the callback rates for the male and female candidate do not significantly differ for 
applications dispatched to early recruiters. 
Focusing on differential treatment at firm level, four scenarios can be observed, i.e., (i) 
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mutual rejection or no response, (ii) invitations to both of the candidates or a callback to 
either the (iii) majority or (iv) minority group member. Table 5-10 compares employers’ 
responses between the male and the female applicant conditional on job type (male- 
versus female-dominated), the provision of a certified internship, firm characteristics and 
labor market scarcity (split at its mean). Column (1) displays the number of employers 
referred to in each stratum. Columns (2) and (3) distinguish between employers that did 
not respond to or rejected both candidates and employers that invited at least one of them. 
Columns (4)–(6) separate the observations of column (3) into those cases where both 
candidates received a positive response (4) and those where either the male (5) or the 
female candidate (6) was favored. The callback rates for both the male and female 
applicant are presented in columns (7) and (8). Deducting column (8) from column (7) 
finally yields the difference in overall callback rates (9).57 
Table 5-10:  Firms’ Responses of Correspondence Testing by Gender, Job Type, Certificate, Firm 
Characteristics and Labor Market Data 
 
Firms' responses Callback rates 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
No. of paired  
applications 
Rejection/ 
no 
response 
At least one 
callback 
Both 
Only 
male 
Only 
female 
Male 
(4+5)/(1) 
Female 
(4+6)/(1) 
Difference 
(7)-(8) 
All firms 52.29 47.71 58.79 25.56 15.65 
0.402 0.355 
0.047* 
(p=0.078) (656) (343) (313) (184) (80) (49) 
         Job type 
Male-dominated job 52.78 47.22 59.61 27.06 13.33 
0.409 0.344 
0.065** 
(p=0.028) (540) (285) (255) (152) (69) (34) 
Female-dominated job 50.00 50.00 55.17 18.97 25.86 
0.371 0.405 
-0.034 
(p=0.590) (116) (58) (58) (32) (11) (15) 
         Additional certificate 
None provides 
additional certificate 
54.58 45.42 54.84 30.65 14.52 
0.388 0.315 
0.073* 
(p=0.073) 
(273) (149) (124) (68) (38) (18) 
Both provide 
additional certificate 
48.46 51.54 64.18 28.36 7.46 
0.477 0.369 
0.108* 
(p=0.079) 
(130) (63) (67) (43) (19) (5) 
                                                             
57 As already discussed in section 3.1.2.2, some of the literature relies on the restricted sample (where mutual 
rejections and cases of no response, i.e., all observations as of column (2), are considered as non-
observations) because it inter alia drops those job offers where the position has already been filled and no 
assessment on the candidates’ applications has taken place. If there was a substantial number of these 
cases, regression results would probably underestimate the extent of discrimination, if any. In order to 
overcome any potential bias some researchers take into account both the full and the restricted sample. In 
subsequent econometric analyses, including the restricted sample always increases the magnitude of the 
coefficients and their significance level, but does not provide further insights on gender discrimination. 
Also, excluding the cases where employers note that the position has already been filled does not change 
much in the results. In fact, taking into account the full sample for the calculation of any gender effects is 
the more conservative way (for a thorough discussion, see Riach and Rich (2002)). Results using the 
restricted sample only are available from the author upon request. 
  
108 
 
Only male provides 
additional certificate 
51.22 48.78 65.00 20.00 15.00 
0.415 0.390 
0.024 
(p=0.697) 
(123) (63) (60) (39) (12) (9) 
Only female 
provides additional 
certificate 
52.31 47.69 54.84 17.74 27.42 
0.346 0.392 
-0.046 
(p=0.441) 
(130) (68) (62) (34) (11) (17) 
                  Timing 
Late recruiter 53.16 46.84 54.05 29.19 16.76 
0.390 0.332 
0.058* 
(p=0.088) (395) (210) (185) (100) (54) (31) 
Early recruiter 50.96 49.04 65.63 20.31 14.06 
0.421 0.391 
0.031 
(p=0.476) (261) (133) (128) (84) (26) (18) 
         Firm Size 
Small (<50) 57.80 42.20 50.00 27.17 22.83 
0.326 0.307 
0.018 
(p=0.680) (218) (126) (92) (46) (25) (21) 
Medium (50-500) 49.11 50.89 61.05 26.74 12.21 
0.447 0.373 
0.074* 
(p=0.051) (338) (166) (172) (105) (46) (21) 
Large (>500) 51.00 49.00 67.35 18.37 14.29 
0.420 0.400 
0.020 
(p=0.774) (100) (51) (49) (33) (9) (7) 
         Location 
South 56.07 43.93 59.21 25.66 15.13 
0.373 0.327 
0.046 
(p=0.202) (346) (194) (152) (90) (39) (23) 
East 47.83 52.17 66.67 18.33 15.00 
0.443 0.426 
0.017 
(p=0.790) (115) (55) (60) (40) (11) (9) 
Other 48.21 51.79 53.47 29.70 16.83 
0.431 0.364 
0.067 
(p=0.179) (195) (94) (101) (54) (30) (17) 
         Sector 
Services 46.41 53.59 54.88 26.83 18.29 
0.438 0.392 
0.046 
(p=0.417) (153) (71) (82) (45) (22) (15) 
Industry 54.08 45.92 60.17 25.11 14.72 
0.392 0.344 
0.048 
(p=0.117) (503) (272) (231) (139) (58) (34) 
         Person responsible for recruiting 
Male 54.18 45.82 56.20 26.28 17.52 
0.378 0.338 
0.040 
(p=0.306) (299) (162) (137) (77) (36) (24) 
Female 50.59 49.41 62.50 24.40 13.10 
0.429 0.374 
0.056 
(p=0.137) (340) (172) (168) (105) (41) (22) 
 
Vacancies/total jobs t-1 (Mean=0.047) 
Above mean 56.25 43.75 59.66 18.49 21.85 
0.342 0.357 
-0.015 
(p=0.718) (272) (153) (119) (71) (22) (26) 
Below mean 49.48 50.52 58.25 29.90 11.86 
0.445 0.354 
0.091*** 
(p=0.010) (384) (190) (194) (113) (58) (23) 
Notes: This table shows the distribution of firms’ responses. Absolute numbers are in parentheses. Column 
(1) displays the number of employers in each stratum. Column (2) reports the fraction of firms that gave none 
of the candidates a callback, so the remainder in column (3) called back at least one applicant. Firms that gave 
both candidates a positive answer, column (4), are considered as equal treatment, while the rest preferred 
either the male or the female candidate (columns (5) and (6)). Columns (7) and (8) contain the callback rate 
for the male and female applicant, respectively, while column (9) computes the difference in callback rates 
between the two candidate groups. ‘Person responsible for recruiting’ excludes those employers that did not 
name a recruiter in their job offers. In column (9), p-values of a chi-squared test that the male and female 
candidates are equally likely to receive a callback at any matched-pair application are in parentheses. * 
denotes 10% significance level. ** denotes 5% significance level. *** denotes 1% significance level. 
Table 5-10 shows that approximately 48 percent (313 of 656) of the firms invited at least 
one candidate. While both candidates were invited by 184 employers, there was 
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differential treatment in 129 companies. Among these observations, the female applicant 
was favored in 15.65 percent (49) whereas her male counterpart was invited in 25.56 
percent (80) of the cases. While the application of the male candidate was successful in 
40.2 percent, the overall callback rate for the female applicant was 35.5 percent only. This 
yields a difference of 4.7 percentage points which is statistically significant at the 10 
percent level. Put differently, men are 13 percent (=0.402/0.355) more likely to receive a 
callback than their female counterparts.58 
Differential treatment turns out to be most prominent in male-dominated jobs where the 
callback differences add up to 6.5 percentage points and is statistically significant at the 5 
percent level.59 Focusing on the provision of a certified internship shows that 
discrimination remains statistically significant only when either none or both of the 
candidates provide an extra credential. If either of the candidates has done an internship, 
differential treatment fully disappears. This is particularly surprising if only the male 
candidate provides a certificate. Here, the differences in callback rates would have been 
expected to be even larger. In contrast, the reverse (though non-significant) gap in 
callback differentials indicates that the female candidate seems to benefit if only she offers 
a certified internship. A detailed discussion on the role of certificates will be postponed to 
the next section. 
Referring to firm characteristics, descriptive statistics reveal that differential treatment is 
particularly influenced by the timing of employers. While gender discrimination does not 
exist in case of early recruiters, companies that staff their positions rather late seem to 
discriminate the female candidate who was 17 percent less likely to receive an invitation 
to a job interview. Apart from that, discrimination is statistically significant at the 10 
percent level only for medium-sized companies.  
Callback differentials also vary if the sample is divided at the mean of the ‘vacancies/total 
jobs’ ratio. Whenever labor market scarcity is above the mean, gender discrimination 
seems to disappear. On the other hand, if the situation on the job market from an 
employer’s perspective is rather relaxed, the female candidate is 26 percent less likely (on 
                                                             
58 In terms of the aforementioned net discrimination rate, i.e., the fraction of callbacks to the male applicant 
minus the fraction of callbacks to the female candidate as a share of overall callbacks to at least one of the 
applicants, the callback difference is 9.90% (
     
   
    ). 
59 Pairwise comparisons of callbacks separate for male- and female-dominated jobs can be requested from 
the author. 
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a 1 percent significance level) to be called back.60 
Overall, descriptive results at group and firm level suggest that gender discrimination is 
affected by the job type, the provision of additional productivity signals, the application 
period and regional labor market scarcity. In order to assess any confounding effects and 
to test the aforementioned hypotheses on the sources of differential treatment, that is 
statistical and taste-based discrimination, econometric analyses are required. 
Before that, however, more indirect ways of differential treatment are discussed. In fact, 
employers might process the applications differently conditional on group membership 
resulting in, for example, more cases of no response and longer callback or rejection times 
for the applicants of one group as opposed to the candidates of the other. Such behavior 
describes what Fibbi et al. (2006) call “equal but different treatment”. Informing one 
candidate on his/her rejection and simultaneously not responding to the other one would 
be a first means of discrimination. Even though the actual hiring outcome could eventually 
be the same, i.e., both would turn up in column (2) of table 5-10, a case of no reply might 
further discourage the candidates and make them hope for a positive answer where in fact 
they will not receive any at all. The results of the present study, however, do not point at 
any gender differences with respect to the no response rate. Both candidates face 
statistically the same proportion of firms’ responses, i.e., number of cases in which the 
companies either rejected or invited the applicants (see table 5-11). Applications of the 
male candidate remained unanswered slightly more often than those of his female 
counterpart. This seems quite odd in view of the fact that he was able to realize 
significantly more callbacks. However, the difference is insignificant so that further 
considerations of firms’ response behavior as a source for gender differences can be 
neglected.61 
                                                             
60  Note that a comparison of callbacks separated by the share of female applicants (with a threshold at the 
mean) produces identical results as the division by job types (and is therefore not reported). This, of 
course, is somewhat plausible by definition as male-dominated (female-dominated) jobs have a relatively 
low (high) share of female applicants. 
61 Additional multivariate regressions investigating firms’ response behavior indicate that the probability of 
receiving a response is independent of gender (see table C-2 in the appendix). 
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Table 5-11:  Firms’ Responses by Gender 
  Male Female Total Difference 
No response 19.51% 17.38% 18.45% 2.13 pps 
  (128) (114) (242) (14) 
Response 80.49% 82.62% 81.55% -2.13 pps 
  (528) (542) (1070) (14) 
Notes: The table reports employers’ responses by gender as a fraction of overall 
applications in percent. Absolute numbers are in parentheses. 
In the same vein, equal but different treatment may occur within a positive scenario. 
Whenever an applicant is invited only after his/her counterpart has declined an invitation, 
it seems that he/she is the employer’s second best option.62 Table 5-12 considers all cases 
of mutual callbacks and shows that in respectively 14 and 19 percent of all callbacks, 
applicants are informed only after rejection on behalf of the matched counterpart. Again, it 
was rather the female than the male candidate who was slightly favored. In 35 (26) cases, 
the male (female) applicant received a callback after the counterpart declined the firm’s 
interest. Nevertheless, the differences are not statistically signficant. 
Table 5-12:  Firms' Callbacks only after the Counterpart Has Declined an Invitation 
Callbacks… 
Fraction 
(Absolute number) 
… to both candidates 
100.00% 
(184) 
… to the male candidate only after the female 
candidate has declined an invitation 
19.02% 
(35) 
… to the female candidate only after the male 
candidate has declined an invitation 
14.13% 
(26) 
Notes: The table reports cases of equal but different treatment by gender as a 
fraction of mutual callbacks. Absolute numbers are in parentheses. 
Even though there are no systematic gender differences with respect to cases of ‘second 
best options’ as described above, the likelihood that a candidate voluntarily resigns 
increases with more time elapsing until the callback or rejection is announced. Thus, 
systematic differences with respect to average callback and rejection times, respectively, 
might be an additional indicator for differential treatment by gender. Table 5-13 displays 
the callback and rejection times, respectively, by gender and firm size. On average, firms 
                                                             
62 Duguet et al. (2012) show both theoretically and empirically that accounting for the response order allows 
for a more detailed understanding of whether discrimination can be considered as “weak” or “strong”.    
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invite (reject) the candidates after 17.5 (29.4) working days. While no significant 
differences for the male and female applicants are revealed, there is variation across firms. 
Small companies react faster than medium-sized and large employers. This finding is not 
surprising since the latter on average have more apprenticeship positions to staff and in 
turn probably face a higher number of incoming applications that have to be administered. 
Moreover, decision processes tend to last longer as they involve more decision makers. 
Table 5-13:  Average Callback and Rejection Times in Working Days by Gender 
 
Callback 
 
Rejection 
  Male Female Average 
 
Male Female Average 
All 17.6 17.3 17.5 
 
29.5 29.2 29.4 
Small 14.4 14.8 14.6 
 
23.2 22.6 22.9 
Medium 18.4 18.6 18.5 
 
30.9 30.9 30.9 
Large 20.5 17.4 18.9 
 
37.0 36.5 36.7 
 ECONOMETRIC ANALYSES 5.2.3
In this section the estimation technique used for the empirical analyses is described 
(5.2.3.1), an empirical model is derived (5.2.3.2) and probit regressions are estimated to 
test the hypotheses developed in section 4.3 (5.2.3.3). 
5.2.3.1 ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE 
In the field experiments on both gender and ethnic discrimination, differential treatment 
occurs whenever the male (German-named) or the female (Turkish-named) applicant on 
average receives fewer callbacks from firms. The firm’s callback is a binary outcome 
variable that equals 1 if the applicant receives a callback and is 0 otherwise. 
Analyzing binary outcome variables requires a modification of the classical linear 
regression technique that pays attention to the fact that for an observation   only two 
outcomes exist, i.e., an event (such as a callback) can either occur (    ) or not 
occur (    ). As for estimations with a continuous dependent variable, the probability 
  (    ) can be modeled as a linear combination of    independent variables. Thus,  
  (  |    )        ∑           
 
 ,  
where    represents the intercept with the y-axis,    denotes regression coefficient   of 
independent variable   and    is a random error term with  (  )   . Due to its functional 
form, this relationship is also referred to as the linear probability model (LPM). The LPM 
allows    to take values between    and  . However, the probability of an event to 
occur by definition needs to fall in the range between 0 and 1 for all values of the 
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parameters    and the   . Moreover, the probabilities   (    ) and   (    ) have to 
add up to 1 which does clearly not hold for the LPM. In other words, a linear relationship 
between a dependent dummy variable and a set of independent variables like in the LPM 
violates crucial probability assumptions. As a consequence, a nonlinear functional form is 
required that satisfies these assumptions and thus enables the researcher to draw 
plausible inferences on the probability     Here, econometricians rely on either the logistic 
or the standard normal cumulative distribution function (cdf). The former are referred to 
as logit and the latter as probit models. Both are superior to the LPM since they produce 
probability outcomes that are in accordance with the assumptions mentioned above 
(Gujarati and Porter, 2009).   
Probit and logit regressions yield similar results since calculations of marginal effects and 
discrete changes are conducted analogously. In fact, the major difference is the underlying 
distribution which leads to slightly different solutions at the tails (see figure 5-7).  
Figure 5-7:  Cumulative Distribution and Density Functions of Probit and Logit Models 
 
Probit and logit coefficients are not directly comparable. The reason is that the standard 
normal and logistic distributions have the same mean value of zero, but different 
variances. While the former has a variance of 1, the variance of the latter is 
  
 
        
Thus, multiplying the coefficients from a probit regression with 1.814 results in the logit 
coefficients. However, both models lead to identical conclusions and may therefore be 
used interchangeably (Liao, 1994). In this dissertation only probit models are estimated. 
Logistic regression results are available from the author upon request.   
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5.2.3.1.1 FORMAL DERIVATION OF THE PROBIT MODEL 
As mentioned above, in probit models       (  ), where    represents the standard 
normal cdf   (  )  ∫   ( )   
  
  
 with standard normal density   (  )  
 
√  
  
  
 
  and    is 
an unknown (latent) variable that denotes a utility index of observation  . This utility 
index, which goes back to the rational choice theory developed by McFadden (1974), is 
determined by a linear combination of the independent variables    and a stochastic term 
   that is a normally distributed random variable (as opposed to the logistic regression 
where the error term    is a standard logistic random variable). Hence,    is calculated as 
follows: 
      ∑           
 
 .  
It is further assumed that if    exceeds a critical or threshold level   
 ,      will occur. 
Accordingly,  
   {
                
     
             
  
Thus, 
    (    |    )   (     
 ). 
Rearranging this equation given the normality assumption yields:  
     (   ∑        
 
 )    (  ).63  
Hence, the probability  (     
 ) can be computed from the standard normal cdf   (  ). 
Put in illustrative terms, the probability    is represented by the area under the standard 
normal cdf    that lies between    and    and the area under the density curve   , 
respectively, and is thus increasing in    (see figure 5-8) (Gujarati and Porter, 2009; 
Wooldridge, 2009). 
Like previous derivations show, the latent variable    connects the linear combination of 
independent variables with the normal cdf and therefore serves as a ‘linking function’. In 
line with the name of the regression technique,    is called a ‘probit’. Since 
 (    |    ) violates the linearity assumption required for the use of Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS), the parameters in probit (as well as in logit) regressions are estimated by 
the Maximum-Likelihood (ML) method which produces the most consistent and efficient 
                                                             
63 Note that    can be disregarded due to the normality assumption and its independence of   . 
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estimators.64 
Figure 5-8:  Illustration of the Probability Pi below the Normal Cumulative Distribution and Density 
Function 
 
5.2.3.1.2 PROBIT COEFFICIENTS AND MARGINAL EFFECTS 
In binary regression models, the primary goal is to identify and explain the effects of a set 
of independent variables    on the outcome probability   (    ). In the present context, 
particularly the effect of gender and any confounding factors on the callback probability of 
the applicants is evaluated. Due to the nonlinear nature of the standard normal cdf, the 
probit coefficients    only allow for drawing inferences on the direction and level of 
significance of an independent variable    on the probability   , but do not permit a 
plausible interpretation with respect to their magnitude. Furthermore, probit coefficients 
cannot be compared within and across estimation models as long as the empirical units 
and the set of regressors vary. For this reason, the partial effect of    on the response 
probability has to be derived. If the independent variable is continuous, the marginal 
effect, i.e., the effect of an infinitesimal change in   , is obtained as follows: 
    
 [ (    )]
 [   ]
      (  )    
Given that    is a strictly increasing cdf,   (  )    (see figure 5-8) and thus     always 
has the same sign as   . Unlike in linear regressions, the marginal effect of    differs 
depending on   (  ), i.e., all other values of    and their parameters   . The largest effect 
occurs if     . Hence,   ( )  
 
√  
  
  
 
      as illustrated in figure 5-8. According to the 
standard normal cdf, this results in a predicted probability  ̂ (    ) of 0.5. Consequently, 
                                                             
64  For a discussion of the assumptions and the procedure of the ML method, see for example Aldrich and 
Nelson (1984).  
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any      produces smaller (absolute) marginal effects compared to     . In fact, the 
marginal effects decrease if    approaches    where   (  ) approaches 0 and 1, 
respectively. For ease of interpretation, researchers calculate the partial effect at the 
average of all other explanatory variables by plugging in their means in   . In case of 
categorical independent variables, however, the mean is often replaced by the mode as 
this makes interpretations less tedious. The partial effect of a categorical independent 
variable, e.g., the effect of being a woman (          ) versus being a man (    ) on 
the outcome probability, is ceteris paribus calculated as a discrete change:     
  (     )    (     ) (Gujarati and Porter, 2009; Wooldridge, 2009).  
Moreover, the intuition of linear regression models also needs to be adapted for probit 
estimations if interaction terms are included. Ai and Norton (2003) show that the full 
interaction effect is not just the marginal effect of the interaction between two 
independent variables, but the cross-partial derivative of the predicted probabilities 
 ̂ (    )  This implies that (i) the interaction effect could be nonzero even if the average 
marginal effect is equal to zero, (ii) the significance level of the interaction effect varies 
depending on the predicted probabilities and (iii) the magnitude and direction of the 
interaction effect are conditional on the values of other covariates. 
5.2.3.1.3 GOODNESS OF FIT MEASURES 
Apart from the estimation technique and interpretation of the coefficients, the goodness of 
fit (GoF) measures in probit models also differ from those in linear regression models. The 
most prominent ones used for model comparisons are presented below (Aldrich and 
Nelson, 1984; Wooldridge, 2009; Backhaus et al., 2011). 
Likelihood-ratio (LR) test: This measure tests the hypothesis that all coefficients except 
for the intercept are zero and is calculated as: 
          (       ), 
where     is the log-likelihood of the null (intercept) model and     is the log-likelihood of 
the fitted model. The computed LR chi-squared is compared with the critical value of the 
chi-squared distribution at significance level   with     degrees of freedom. Referring to 
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linear regression models, the LR test is comparable to the overall F statistic.65 
Pseudo R²: Apart from the LR test, various pseudo R² measures that are somewhat 
related to each other can be calculated. For convenience, only McFaddens-R² is reported in 
the analysis. The rationale is similar to the coefficient of determination in OLS estimations. 
If the fit diminishes, the pseudo R² approaches 0 and if the fit improves, it approaches 1. 
McFaddens-R² is probably the most frequently used GoF measure for models with 
categorical dependent variables such as probit and logit models. Similar to the LR test, it 
computes the log-likelihood of the fitted and null (intercept) model and relates them to 
each other:  
         
    (
   
   
).  
Thus, if the estimated model has no explanatory power, it follows that the ratio (
   
   
)    
and the                 
   . In contrast to the LR test which indicates the overall 
significance of the estimation model, McFadden’s R² is a measure that maps the estimation 
quality of the independent variables employed in the model and thus enables the 
researcher to compare the fit of different regression models. In contrast to linear 
regression models, however, the pseudo R² measure is usually fairly low. In fact, values of 
0.2 ≤ Pseudo R² ≤ 0.4 can already be considered as a reasonable model fit (Urban, 1993). 
5.2.3.2 EMPIRICAL MODEL 
In the subsequent regressions, the response and callback dummy is modeled as a set of 
independent variables that include a dummy for gender, a vector of various firm 
characteristics, variables reflecting the situation on the regional labor market, a dummy 
that accounts for the provision of an additional certificate, a dummy for the type of job and 
a set of control variables. Since the empirical model puts its emphasis on the effect of 
gender on the callback probability    (   ), where      if the candidate receives a 
callback, the regression model needs to be based on a probabilistic distribution. Here, 
probit regression analysis is used which follows the standard normal cdf.  
Next, the full empirical model is presented. However, the empirical estimations include 
                                                             
65  Note that if standard errors are clustered (as will be the case in subsequent analyses (see footnote 33)) a 
Wald test rather than a LR test is performed. The Wald test and LR test, however, are shown to be 
asymptotically equivalent and usually yield similar conclusions (Engle, 2007). For a formal description of 
the Wald test, see Wooldridge (2010).    
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various model specifications as sensitivity checks and to document the robustness of the 
results. In particular, interaction effects that should test the aforementioned hypotheses 
on the factors influencing differential treatment, if any, are incorporated in the regression 
models. Overall, 
  (        )                                       ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗                         
                                                          
                           ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗       
where    is a constant,    denotes the regression coefficient   of regressor  ,    depicts a 
normally distributed error term of applicant   and the independent variables are as 
described in table 5-4. The vector of firm characteristics includes information on firm size, 
location, industry, whether the employer is a late recruiter and a dummy for the sex of the 
recruiter. The variables proxying the labor market situation, i.e., the share of females in t-1 
and vacancies/total jobs in t-1, are standardized so that  (  )    and  (  )   . Further 
controls include a dummy for the apprenticeship year, the number of open positions, the 
distance to the workplace, as well as dummies for the dispatching order and the template 
(design) of the application. 
5.2.3.3 PROBIT REGRESSIONS AND HYPOTHESES TESTING 
First, the empirical analysis investigates the relationship between job type and callback 
probability by gender. Therefore, the data from the three application periods are pooled 
which results in an overall sample of 1,312 observations. Table 5-14 reports average 
marginal effects on the probability of receiving a callback. Model (I) only includes the 
female dummy, model (II) additionally includes firm characteristics, model (III) adds 
standardized labor market variables, model (IV) also incorporates a dummy for the job 
type and model (V) further controls for an interaction term that equals one if the female 
candidate applies for a female-dominated job. All models account for potential joint effects 
originating from the control variables. Additional photo and name effects have been tested 
but appeared insignificant as demonstrated by tables C-3 and C-4 in the appendix. They 
are thus excluded from further regression analyses. 
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Table 5-14:  Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Callback Dummy and Test of Job Type 
Hypothesis 
The results indicate that the female applicant has a 5 percentage points lower callback 
probability than the male candidate. This effect is robust and statistically significant at the 
1 percent level for the models (I) to (IV). Model (V) reveals slightly different results. In line 
with the ‘Hjob type’ hypothesis, the interaction term indicates that the likelihood of an 
invitation significantly increases by 10.5 percentage points if the female applicant 
addresses female-dominated jobs. As a consequence, the magnitude of the coefficient of 
Callback (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
Female -0.050*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.070*** 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
Medium  0.108*** 0.108*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 
 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Large  0.079 0.079 0.077 0.077 
 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) 
South  -0.052 -0.043 -0.043 -0.040 
 
 (0.054) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
East  0.059 0.065 0.066 0.066 
 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.057) (0.058) 
Industry  -0.067 -0.068 -0.069 -0.069 
 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
Late recruiter  -0.013 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
 (0.058) (0.083) (0.084) (0.084) 
Female responsible  0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 
 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Share of females t-1   -0.004 -0.015 -0.016 
 
  (0.031) (0.117) (0.117) 
Vacancies/total jobs t-1   -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Certificate    0.026 0.024 
 
   (0.032) (0.032) 
Female-dominated job    0.032 -0.018 
 
   (0.315) (0.309) 
Female x      0.105** 
Female-dominated job     (0.051) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 
Pseudo R² 0.010 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.022 
Log likelihood -861.957 -852.607 -852.331 -852.064 -851.026 
Wald chi-squared 17.315 29.007 29.341 30.279 35.429 
P-value 0.015 0.010 0.022 0.035 0.012 
Notes: Each model reports average marginal effects of a probit regression on the callback dummy (Y=1: 
employer calls back the job applicant). Marginal effects are calculated at the mean of all independent variables 
and denote an infinitesimal change in case of continuous variables and a discrete change in case of dummy 
variables. Standard errors clustered on firm level are in parentheses. Regressions consider the entire sample.  
* denotes 10% significance level. ** denotes 5% significance level. *** denotes 1% significance level. 
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the female dummy (denoting female’s callback probability in male-dominated jobs) 
increases (-0.070). The inclusion of the interaction term further allows for drawing 
inferences on how the male candidate performs in female-dominated jobs. Yet, the results 
do not reveal differential treatment of men contingent on job type as the point estimate of 
the ‘female-dominated job’ dummy depicting men’s callback probability net of female 
effects turns out to be insignificant. 
Due to the fact that the underlying probability function in probit regression models is 
nonlinear, the effect size of the independent variables may vary as a function of all other 
independent variables included in the model. In table 5-14, average marginal effects are 
calculated at the mean of all other regressors. In order to represent a standard applicant 
addressing a standard employer, the discrete independent variables are alternatively fixed 
at their mode instead of their mean (see table C-5 in the appendix). This change produces 
minor differences in the magnitude of the effects, but neither influences their direction 
(sign) nor their significance level. Nevertheless, when only looking at marginal effects in 
case of interaction terms, misleading conclusions may be derived (see 5.2.3.1.2). Thus, the 
entire cross derivative (correct interaction effects) of the ‘female x female-dominated job’ 
interaction is calculated and displayed. Figure 5-9 outlines that the effect is positive and 
statistically significant independent of the predicted probabilities of the observations in 
the sample. 
Figure 5-9:  Interaction Effect between Female and Female-Dominated Job Dummy 
 
Restricting the sample may be useful for analyzing whether the results are sensitive to 
employers not responding at all or by those having already completed their recruitment 
process. Especially in case of the latter, findings on differential treatment are likely to be 
biased since both applicants are rejected even though no actual evaluation on behalf of the 
recruiters has taken place. Thus, no statement on whether discrimination would have 
occurred can be made. Yet, both the effect of the female dummy and the interaction term 
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remain robust if the sample is restricted to those employers that responded to (N=1,152) 
or called back (N=626) at least one of the candidates.66 Thus, overall, ‘Hjob type’ stating that 
the female applicant is being discriminated in male-dominated jobs cannot be rejected. 
Concerning the GoF measures of the regression models, the p-values indicate that all 
specifications predict the callback probability significantly better than the intercept model 
which estimates the outcome by pure chance. Nevertheless, even for probit analyses the 
pseudo R² are rather low varying between 0.01 and 0.022. This is due to the nature of the 
correspondence study which limits the difference between two applicants to one single 
attribute (such as gender) where all other things such as schooling and labor market 
experience are kept constant during the application process. As a consequence, the 
variance in independent variables is quite low. In a nutshell, experimental control comes 
at the expense of estimation quality in terms of model fit. The regression results and 
conclusions derived with regard to the hypotheses, however, do not seem to be affected as 
appears from alternative estimation methods, different model specifications and various 
robustness checks. 
In order to evaluate the source of discrimination and to test the hypotheses on statistical 
(‘Hcertificate’ and ‘Hshare of females’, respectively) as well as taste-based discrimination (‘Htiming’ 
and ‘Hscarcity’, respectively), the sample is subsequently restricted to occupations employing 
a male majority which reduces the number of observations to 1,080. Table 5-15 depicts 
average marginal effects of regressions on the callback dummy. In particular, the joint and 
interaction effects of the independent variables are presented. Model (I) reports the single 
effects of gender, a certificate dummy, the share of female applicants in the previous year, 
a dummy for late recruiters as well as the ratio between vacancies and total jobs in the 
previous year. Models (IIa) to (IId) include an interaction term between the female 
dummy and either of these variables and model (III) takes into account all single and 
interaction effects. All other regressors are considered in the analysis, but not reported. 
The effects displayed below remain robust independent of the inclusion of additional 
controls (see table C-6 in the appendix). 
  
                                                             
66 Results for the restricted samples are available from the author upon request.  
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Table 5-15:  Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Callback Dummy and Hypotheses Testing 
Callback (I) (IIa) (IIb) (IIc) (IId) (III) 
Female -0.067*** -0.062** -0.067*** -0.029 -0.067*** 0.043 
 
(0.020) (0.028) (0.019) (0.027) (0.020) (0.062) 
Certificate 0.025 0.033 0.026 0.025 0.024 0.078 
 
(0.036) (0.046) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.056) 
Female x Certificate 
 
-0.016 
   
-0.100 
  
(0.057) 
   
(0.078) 
Share of females t-1 -0.021 -0.021 -0.047** -0.021 -0.021 -0.049** 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) 
Female x  
  
0.052** 
  
0.055** 
Share of females t-1 
  
(0.022) 
  
(0.022) 
Late recruiter -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 0.017 -0.021 0.052 
 
(0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.091) (0.088) (0.095) 
Female x  
   
-0.072* 
 
-0.134** 
Late recruiter 
   
(0.038) 
 
(0.059) 
Vacancies/total jobs t-1 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.016 -0.012 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
Female x  
    
0.037** 0.030 
Vacancies/total jobs t-1 
    
(0.018) (0.018) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 
Pseudo R² 0.026 0.026 0.028 0.027 0.027 0.031 
Log likelihood -696.980 -696.948 -695.456 -696.244 -696.198 -693.120 
Wald chi-squared 31.831 32.142 42.605 32.828 35.728 49.631 
P-value 0.016 0.021 0.001 0.018 0.008 0.000 
Notes: Each model reports average marginal effects of a probit regression on the callback dummy (Y=1: 
employer calls back the job applicant). Marginal effects are calculated at the mean of all independent variables 
and denote an infinitesimal change in case of continuous variables and a discrete change in case of dummy 
variables. Standard errors clustered on firm level are in parentheses. Regressions consider only male-dominated 
jobs. * denotes 10% significance level. ** denotes 5% significance level. *** denotes 1% significance level. 
Without any interaction, the callback probability of the female candidate is on average 6.7 
percentage points lower compared to the male applicant (see model (I)). The effect size 
goes along with the results in model (V) of table 5-14 which reports a 7.0 percentage 
points lower chance of receiving an invitation for women if the effect from an interaction 
between the female dummy and female-dominated jobs is controlled for. The third column 
(model (IIa)) includes an interaction that denotes the hypothesized beneficial effect of the 
female applicant providing an additional productivity signal. However, the interaction is 
not statistically significant holding all other independent variables constant at their mean. 
The insignificant interaction remains the same independent of the predicted probability 
(see figure C-1 in the appendix). Hence, as already indicated by table 5-8, the additional 
certificate does not reduce gender discrimination and ‘Hcertificate’ can be rejected.  
Next, model (IIb) explicitly investigates whether the callback probability for women is 
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influenced by the share of female applicants in the previous year. According to the ‘Hshare of 
females’ hypothesis, employers should treat women more favorably the more they have 
previously been in contact with them. Indeed, the regression results support this 
assumption. The probability of a callback to the female applicant is on average 5.2 
percentage points higher and statistically significant at the 5 percent level if the share of 
female applicants increases by one standard deviation. The statistical significance holds 
for all predicted probabilities across the sample (see figure C-2 in the appendix). In 
contrast, the callback probability for the male candidate decreases by almost 5 percentage 
points (as can be shown by the point estimate of the variable ‘share of females t-1’). These 
findings lend support to the idea that an informational deficit reduces the minority 
(female) group’s callback rate. In contrast, increasing experience obviously raises 
women’s callback probability. Yet, the overall gender effect does not change, i.e., the 
female candidate is significantly disadvantaged independent of employers’ previous 
experience. 
Model (IIc) reveals somewhat surprising results. In contrast to ‘Htiming’, late recruiters do 
not react to time pressure by inviting both male and female job candidates equally often. 
While the female applicant on average suffers from a 7.2 percentage points lower callback 
rate when sending out applications to employers in May (2011 and 2012), the female 
dummy denoting differences in callback probabilities at early recruiters turns out to be 
statistically insignificant (p=0.290). This finding particularly contradicts ‘Htiming’ according 
to which firms being confronted with potential losses from not filling a vacancy are 
expected to discriminate less, if at all. The results turn out to be quite robust contingent on 
different predicted probabilities (see figure C-3 in the appendix).  
Model (IId) provides additional insights on how the recruiting behavior of firms develops 
with a change in the supply of suitable apprentices (‘Hscarcity’). The interaction term states 
that the callback probability for the female candidate increases by 3.7 percentage points if 
labor market scarcity (denoted by the ratio between vacancies and total jobs in t-1) 
increases by one standard deviation. This relationship turns out to be statistically 
significant (at the 5 percent level) across the entire probability distribution (see figure C-4 
in the appendix). Again, however, the coefficient of the female dummy remains unchanged 
indicating that the effects from labor market scarcity do not eliminate discrimination. 
Referring to the robustness of the interaction terms, the last column (model III) reflects 
the joint effect of all interactions. The results support the ‘Hshare of females’ hypothesis. Both 
the point estimate (share of females t-1) and the interaction (female x share of females t-1) 
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do not differ with respect to their effect size and significance level compared to model 
(IIb). Focusing on the interaction between the female dummy and late recruiters reveals 
that the coefficient from model (IIc) becomes even more negative. Females who address 
job offers from late recruiters have a 13.4 percentage points lower probability of being 
called back. ‘Hscarcity’, however, cannot fully be supported as the interaction coefficient 
becomes insignificant (though p=0.105).  
Apart from the findings on differential treatment, not many effects from the probit 
estimates turn out to be statistically significant except for the ones of the firm size 
dummies. Table 5-14 reveals that applications arriving at medium-sized companies have 
on average an 11 percentage points higher success probability compared to the reference 
group, i.e., firms with less than 50 employees. A closer look reveals that these results are 
particularly affected by a higher fraction of small recruiters that do not respond to any of 
the candidates indicating that these firms have less formalized recruiting procedures. 
Since the firm size effect only proves to be significant for the entire sample, but becomes 
insignificant as soon as the sample is restricted to male-dominated occupations (results 
not displayed, but available upon request), further discussions should be extended 
towards the more interesting question on whether any firm characteristics interact with 
the female dummy and thus affect gender discrimination. 
Table 5-16 displays average marginal effects of a probit regression with these interactions. 
Model (I) includes all observations while model (II) is restricted to male-dominated jobs. 
The direct effects of the variables interacted are included, but not reported for the sake of 
brevity. The results support the findings presented above. While all other interactions turn 
out to be statistically insignificant, female applicants have a lower callback probability 
when applying for male-dominated jobs at late recruiters. Apart from that, neither firm 
size, location and industry nor recruiters’ sex significantly interact with the female 
dummy.67 
 
                                                             
67 As the internal recruitment process is like a black box to the researcher, i.e., there is no possibility to find 
out whether the application is forwarded to the department in which the candidate is employed or directly 
decided upon in the HR department, any hypothesized relations between candidates’ callbacks and 
recruiters’ sex are speculative. Particularly in large firms the applications often address an HR official but 
are forwarded to the foreman or training officer who then makes the actual employment decision. Any 
effects of recruiter characteristics are thus likely to be biased and only have weak, if any, explanatory 
power. Previous research analyzing the effect of recruiters’ sex identified whether the person responsible 
for hiring was a man or woman either due to personal audits or phone calls (see e.g. Carlsson, 2011).   
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Table 5-16:  Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Callback Dummy and Interaction of Female 
Dummy and Firm Characteristics 
Callback (I) (II) 
Female x Medium -0.060 -0.062 
 
(0.043) (0.047) 
Female x Large -0.014 0.001 
 
(0.057) (0.062) 
Female x South 0.016 0.033 
 
(0.045) (0.049) 
Female x East 0.054 0.054 
 
(0.056) (0.065) 
Female x Industry -0.007 0.098 
 
(0.047) (0.065) 
Female x Female responsible -0.015 -0.001 
 
(0.036) (0.039) 
Female x Late recruiter -0.054 -0.077** 
 
(0.037) (0.037) 
Controls Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 1,312 1,080 
Pseudo R² 0.022 0.029 
Log likelihood -851.143 -695.062 
Wald chi-squared 36.366 39.850 
P-value 0.066 0.022 
Notes: Each model reports average marginal effects of a probit regression on the 
callback dummy (Y=1: employer calls back the job applicant). Marginal effects are 
calculated at the mean of all independent variables. Standard errors clustered on 
firm level are in parentheses. Model (I) considers the full sample, model (II) is 
restricted to male-dominated jobs. Controls include all point estimates of the 
variables interacted. * denotes 10% significance level. ** denotes 5% significance 
level. *** denotes 1% significance level. 
Thus far, the analyses have revealed three main findings. First, gender discrimination 
clearly depends on the job type. Second, the concepts of taste-based and statistical 
discrimination as proxied in the regression models cannot fully explain why women suffer 
from lower callback rates in male-dominated jobs. And third, firms’ recruiting behavior 
affects discriminatory treatment, though in the opposite direction to what has been 
expected. Either of these results certainly requires a closer inspection. 
 DISCUSSION 5.2.4
Next, the regression results reported above are discussed separately accounting for the 
potential sources of gender hiring discrimination.  
5.2.4.1 JOB STEREOTYPING AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION 
Regression estimates from table 5-14 confirm that job stereotyping exists and 
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disadvantages female applicants when applying for male-dominated apprenticeships. The 
difference in callback rates varies between 7 and 11 percentage points and thus oscillates 
around the lower end of what has been found in other matched-pair studies reporting 
callback differences between 5 and 35 percentage points (see table A-1 in the appendix; 
note also that some of these studies do not find statistically significant callback differences 
by sex). One reason why the extent of discrimination is rather low can be identified when 
looking at the labor market situation of the jobs addressed. Choosing technical 
occupations where current and future labor demand is expected to be high, on the one 
hand, increases the probability to observe a sufficient number of mutual and one-sided 
rejections and callbacks allowing the researcher to carry out statistical tests. On the other 
hand, the extent of discrimination may be affected by the job referred to, in particular 
when employers respond to scarcity. Thus, assuming that the matched-pair applicants 
only address jobs where competition for talent is intense (relaxed), the magnitude of 
differential treatment is expected to be lower (higher) as compared to other occupations. 
Yet, without a control group, i.e., correspondence tests using the same pair of applicants in 
less demanded jobs, no final judgment can be made whether the callback difference is 
influenced by the job offers referred to or any other impact factors. In case of the former, 
the line of argument is closely related to the theory of taste discrimination which will be 
addressed in section 5.2.4.3 (even though not job type, but regional labor supply is used to 
find out more about employers’ preferences). 
In contrast to the present study, previous research also yields significantly fewer callbacks 
for males in female-dominated occupations where the differences fall in a range between 3 
and 44 percentage points. The reasons why these results cannot be reproduced in this 
field experiment are quite obvious. As the main purpose was to investigate the sources of 
discrimination in clearly male-dominated professions, varying the job type only served as 
a control limiting the number of observations to a minimum. Hence, gender equality in 
callbacks might predominately stem from the relatively low share of female-dominated 
jobs addressed in the experiment (roughly 18%). Moreover, the selected jobs have two 
more peculiarities. First, the market for industrial clerks is not as gender segregated as 
other labor market segments. In fact, the difference between the share of men and women 
working in this field is relatively low compared to e.g. the industrial mechanic profession 
(see section 5.1.1.2). Thus, the classification as being female-stereotyped can well be 
contested. In fact, denoting this type of job as ‘gender-neutral’ or ‘gender-integrated’ might 
be more suitable. Second, the demand for apprentices in Germany’s health care sector 
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currently exceeds the demand in any other industry. This in turn may have led to gender 
‘callback equality’. Indeed, callback rates for either candidate were above 60 percent (62.5 
percent for the male and 66.7 percent for the female candidate) and thus significantly 
higher than in all other occupations addressed (see table C-7 in the appendix for a detailed 
overview of callbacks by type of apprenticeship). Conclusions with regard to (the absence 
of) discriminatory treatment of men in female-dominated jobs should therefore be drawn 
only carefully. 
With regard to theory, the confirmation of ‘Hjob type’ could somewhat be regarded as an 
indicator of statistical discrimination. Classifying jobs as either male- or female-
stereotyped simply stems from segregated labor markets and an overrepresentation of 
either gender in some occupations. Segregation in turn produces differences in employers’ 
accumulated experience where productivity information is expected to be superior or 
more precise for majority workers. Consequently, employers would have an economic 
rationale to favor men over women and vice versa. However, neither previous evidence 
(Booth and Leigh, 2010), nor the data from this study directly support this relationship. 
That is, the share of women working in different male-dominated occupations does not 
correlate with callback differences. 
5.2.4.2 GROUP EXPERIENCE AND THE ROLE OF ADDITIONAL SIGNALS 
The results from model (IIb) in table 5-15 suggest that employers discriminate somewhat 
less with an increasing proportion of female candidates in the previous application period. 
Apparently, as postulated, increasing experience with women, denoted as the share of 
female applicants for technical apprenticeships in the previous year and respective labor 
market region, allows employers to evaluate their quality more precisely. In turn, they 
invite women equally often as their male counterparts. A closer look, however, challenges 
this interpretation. Even though the effect of the interaction term is positive and 
statistically significant, discrimination against women as proxied by the (negative) point 
estimate of the female dummy does not disappear. The increasing likelihood of women 
being called back comes at the costs of men whose callback probability declines with a 
rising female applicant ratio, but does not compensate the gender callback gap. 
Still, the main findings turn out to be robust. This is particularly highlighted if the sample 
is split at the mean of the standardized ‘share of females t-1’ variable, i.e., zero (see table 
5-17). For the above mean sample (model (I)), the gender coefficient turns out to be 
insignificant (so does the whole model), whereas for the below mean sample (model (II)), 
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the difference in callback rates is statistically significant at the 1 percent level and 
amounts to 10.3 percentage points. Hence, ‘Hshare of females’ as a test for statistical 
discrimination finds weak support, although it may well be assumed that it does not 
explain the entire gender gap in hiring.  
Table 5-17: Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Callback Dummy with Sample Split at the 
Mean Share of Females t-1 
Callback (I) (II) 
Female -0.024 -0.103*** 
 
(0.033) (0.026) 
Certificate Yes Yes 
Late recruiter Yes Yes 
Vacancies/total jobs t-1 Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 448 632 
Pseudo R² 0.045 0.052 
Log likelihood -279.321 -400.662 
Wald chi-squared 18.733 41.334 
P-value 0.283 0.000 
Notes: Each model reports average marginal effects of a probit regression on 
the callback dummy (Y=1: employer calls back the job applicant). Marginal 
effects are calculated at the means of all independent variables and denote an 
infinitesimal change in case of continuous variables and a discrete change in 
case of dummy variables. Standard errors clustered on firm level are in 
parentheses. Model (I) considers all observations where the standardized 
share of females in t-1 is above the average, i.e., zero, model (II) reports 
results for all applications in areas below the average. Either model includes 
only male-dominated jobs. * denotes 10% significance level. ** denotes 5% 
significance level. *** denotes 1% significance level. 
As an alternative indicator of statistical discrimination, additional certificates on job-
related internships have been attached to the applications. Yet, unlike in e.g. Heilman et al. 
(1988), the provision of these credentials does not influence gender differences in 
callbacks. Neither does the effect of the female dummy change, nor does the female-
certificate interaction turn out to have a statistically significant impact on callback 
probabilities (see model (IIa) in table 5-15). However, the rejection of ‘Hcertificate’ does not 
necessarily speak against the prevalence of statistical discrimination. Two alternative 
explanations are equally plausible.  
On the one hand, employers might consider the provision of a certified internship as a 
weak productivity signal compared to school credentials and thus assign them only a 
minor role when assessing applicants’ future productivity. As a result, callbacks to both 
male and female applicants do not significantly increase and affect gender differences. On 
the other hand, attaching an additional certificate may put one group at an advantage, but 
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disadvantage the other. This would produce two scenarios: either the gap in callbacks 
increases between groups because additional information strengthens the market position 
of the established group, i.e., the male candidate benefits while the female does not, or the 
group difference in callbacks declines because the reduction of information asymmetries 
benefits the minority group. Descriptive statistics suggest that the provision of additional 
productivity information significantly increases the callback probability for the male 
applicant (p=0.067), but leaves callbacks to the female candidate unaffected (p=0.267) 
(see table 5-8). The beneficial effect for men also holds if the sample is restricted to male-
dominated jobs (not displayed, but available upon request). Consequently, the hiring gap 
rather widens than decreases. This is in line with research by Neumark (1999) and 
Pinkston (2003) who show that employers’ perception of credentials may differ by gender 
where majority candidates benefit relative to minority candidates at the beginning of the 
employer-employee relationship. However, multivariate analyses do not corroborate 
these results. As model (IIa) in table 5-15 indicates, signaling professional expertise in 
technical occupations leaves the callback difference unaffected in either way. 
5.2.4.3 LABOR MARKET SCARCITY AND RECRUITER EFFECTS 
Thus far, statistical discrimination has been shown to explain some of the findings from 
the correspondence test. Nevertheless, as demonstrated above, the study also finds 
evidence for taste-based discrimination. A tighter labor market in the previous year works 
in favor of women and induces an increase in callback rates (see model (IId) in table 
5-15).68 Yet, this increase does not affect the male-female callback gap which remains 
stable at around 6.7 percentage points. A sample split at the mean of the ‘vacancies/total 
jobs t-1’ variable and a probit regression on callbacks (controlling, inter alia, for recruiter 
type) yields no differential treatment if the standardized scarcity ratio exceeds zero (see 
model (I) of table 5-18), but an 11.6 percentage points callback difference in disfavor of 
women (on a 1 percent significance level) if it is below zero (see model (II)). Put 
differently, discrimination is restricted to employers that face little if any labor market 
scarcity and can thus ‘afford’ neglecting minority group candidates. On the other hand, 
firms that are confronted with fierce competition for suitable apprentices would incur 
higher costs for not recruiting women due to e.g. additional search activities and 
productivity losses. They therefore respond rationally by employing women. This in turn 
                                                             
68 Note that alternative scarcity measures have also been tested, but were found not to be significant. 
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is consistent with Becker’s taste for discrimination approach (Becker, 1971).  
Table 5-18: Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Callback Dummy with Sample Split at the 
Mean Vacancies/Total Jobs t-1 
Callback (I) (II) 
Female 0.002 -0.116*** 
 
(0.033) (0.026) 
Certificate Yes Yes 
Late recruiter Yes Yes 
Females/total applicants t-1 Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 446 634 
Pseudo R² 0.044 0.047 
Log likelihood -277.282 -404.814 
Wald chi-squared 16.211 39.858 
P-value 0.438 0.001 
Notes: Each model reports average marginal effects of a probit regression on 
the callback dummy (Y=1: employer calls back the job applicant). Marginal 
effects are calculated at the means of all independent variables and denote an 
infinitesimal change in case of continuous variables and a discrete change in 
case of dummy variables. Standard errors clustered on firm level are in 
parentheses. Model (I) considers all observations where the standardized 
vacancies/total jobs variable is above the average, i.e., zero, model (II) reports 
results for all applications in areas below the average. Either model includes 
only male-dominated jobs. * denotes 10% significance level. ** denotes 5% 
significance level. *** denotes 1% significance level. 
Another interesting finding on taste discrimination has recently been published by Kuhn 
and Shen (2013). They show that gender-targeted job advertisements decrease with skill 
requirements. They interpret this as a sign for taste discrimination since the supply of 
more qualified labor is scarce and thus distastes become more costly. Fortunately, the job 
offers used for the present field experiment also include information on job requirements. 
Two different types of employers could be identified where about one half requires at 
least a degree from middle school (N=556) while the other half accepts a school degree 
lower than middle school (N=524). When splitting the sample by school degree, however, 
the results do not differ from each other, i.e., the female candidate is significantly 
discriminated independent of skill level (results available upon request). Thus, in the 
present context, employers either do not face labor-supply differences by school degree or 
do not respond to supply differences by inviting the minority candidate equally often than 
her majority counterpart. The absence of the postulated effect, though, may also stem from 
a different operationalization of labor market discrimination. While Kuhn and Shen (2013) 
investigate the statements of employers by observing gender-targeted wording in job 
offers, the present study assesses how employers actually react. As has been shown in 
chapter 3, stated and revealed preferences may indeed differ with regard to employment 
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outcomes.   
Referring to the three types of preference-based discrimination, i.e., employer, coworker 
and customer discrimination, the data do unfortunately not provide enough information to 
separate the effects inherent in any of these concepts. However, anecdotal evidence from 
firms’ responses particularly points in two directions suggesting that employer and 
coworker discrimination might play a meaningful role. The former type can be exemplified 
by an email that, even though apparently written to foster internal decision making, was 
accidently forwarded to the female applicant. In this email, the potential supervisor states 
that from his point of view the female candidate looks too young and dainty for the job. 
Here, the gender and profile picture serve as a pre-selection device that is clearly linked to 
employers’ prejudices. But the mechanisms in the hiring process might also indicate 
coworker discrimination. In another case where an employer involuntarily attached 
internal email correspondence, it was disclosed that the recruiters expect coworker 
discrimination against the female candidate. In particular, they doubted that a young 
woman would be able to handle the occasionally very rough tone in a work environment 
where male colleagues dominate. Interestingly, the female applicant was still invited 
which, of course, does not exclude that other employers rejected her for exactly the same 
reason. The persistence of customer discrimination as a third component, e.g. shown by 
Neumark (1996), can be disregarded in the present context. Firstly, technical apprentices 
do usually not get in contact with firms’ customers and, secondly, discrimination does not 
significantly vary across firms that operate in the industry and service sector, respectively 
(see insignificant female-industry interaction in table 5-16).  
Another response outlines the whole dilemma when attempting to distinguish between 
different forms of taste-based discrimination. One employer offered a position as an 
industrial clerk rather than as a warehouse logistics operator to the female applicant while 
the same employer invited the male candidate for the job that he originally applied for. 
The email sent to the female applicant included favorable statements on the fit of her 
profile and the company’s products and customers. Yet, it indirectly recommended that 
administrative tasks might suit her better than technical ones (which is also referred to as 
“job channeling” in the literature). This could imply at least two considerations. On the one 
hand, the recruiter might have anticipated coworker discrimination in the respective 
department and thus looked for alternative options or, on the other hand, firms’ 
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representatives could have used this argument as a means of covering their own personal 
distaste.69 Either way, the interpretations of firms’ responses refer to single observations 
and can, of course, not be generalized. In fact, more research is required that leads to a 
better understanding of how these three components affect the hiring decision. For the 
purpose of this thesis (though not for policy implications in general), further 
differentiations are disregarded as they yield the same hiring outcome in the end. 
Table 5-19: Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Callback Dummy with Sample Split by 
Recruiter Type 
Callback (Ia) (Ib) (IIa) (IIb) 
Female -0.031 -0.048 -0.097*** -0.100*** 
 
(0.025) (0.031) (0.027) (0.028) 
Certificate No Yes No Yes 
Females/total applicants t-1 No Yes No Yes 
Vacancies/total jobs t-1 No Yes No Yes 
Firm characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
No. of obs. 522 522 558 558 
Pseudo R² 0.001 0.092 0.008 0.031 
Log likelihood -352.315 -319.982 -358.209 -349.849 
Wald chi-squared 1.456 36.445 12.764 21.785 
P-value 0.228 0.002 0.000 0.150 
Notes: Each model reports average marginal effects of a probit regression on the callback dummy 
(Y=1: employer calls back the job applicant). Marginal effects are calculated at the means of all 
independent variables and denote an infinitesimal change in case of continuous variables and a 
discrete change in case of dummy variables. Standard errors clustered on firm level are in 
parentheses. Models (Ia) and (Ib) consider early recruiter sample, models (IIa) and (IIb) late 
recruiter sample. Either model includes only male-dominated jobs. * denotes 10% significance 
level. ** denotes 5% significance level. *** denotes 1% significance level. 
Apart from statistical and preference-based discrimination, the regression estimates have 
revealed that firms’ response behavior towards women varies systematically by recruiter 
type where gender discrimination in male-dominated jobs is restricted to late recruiters 
as demonstrated by model (IIc) in table 5-15. While the ‘female-late recruiter interaction 
term turns out to be statistically significant and negative, the female coefficient becomes 
insignificant. To circumvent problems resulting from interaction effects in probit models 
and to check the robustness of the recruiter effect, the probit regression on the callback 
dummy is conducted separately for late and early recruiters. Results of the latter are 
displayed in models (Ia) and (Ib) of table 5-19, results of the former can be found in 
models (IIa) and (IIb). While the female candidate is not treated differently in the early-
                                                             
69  In fact, in the present case, the employer did not invite the female applicant to a job interview while her 
male counterpart received a callback.   
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recruiter sample, she has a 9.7 to 10.0 percentage points lower callback probability when 
applying at late recruiters. Either effect persists independent of controls (though the 
inclusion of controls apparently affects the model fit). Hence, quite surprisingly, the results 
of both the regression model with interaction effect as well as the robustness checks with 
sample split by recruiter type suggest exactly the opposite to what has been hypothesized 
in ‘Htiming’. Recruiter type does not reflect the need to hire apprentices and thus offers clear 
evidence for taste discrimination, but may signal management quality. 
Table 5-20: Marginal Effects from Probit Regression on Late Recruiter Dummy 
Late recruiter (I) 
Medium -0.24*** 
 
(0.05) 
Large -0.31*** 
 
(0.07) 
South 0.12** 
 
(0.06) 
East 0.37*** 
 
(0.06) 
Industry -0.16** 
 
(0.07) 
Female responsible -0.08* 
 
(0.05) 
Share female applicants t-1 0.01 
 
(0.03) 
Vacancies/total jobs t-1 -0.10*** 
 
(0.03) 
Open positions -0.03 
 
(0.02) 
No. of obs. 1,080 
Pseudo R² 0.137 
Log likelihood -645.623 
Wald chi-squared 90.558 
P-value 0.000 
Notes: Table reports average marginal effects of a probit 
regression on the late recruiter dummy (Y=1: firm offers 
vacancy in May). Standard errors clustered on firm level are 
in parentheses. Results are restricted to male-dominated 
jobs. * denotes 10% significance level. ** denotes 5% 
significance level. *** denotes 1% significance level. 
Table 5-20 reveals systematic differences between late and early recruiters with respect 
to firm and labor market characteristics. It denotes average marginal effects from the 
probability    (   ) of being a late recruiter versus    (   ) of being an early recruiter. 
Probit regression estimates show that late recruiters (i) are more likely to be small, (ii) are 
overrepresented in the East and the South of Germany, (iii) operate in the service sector 
and (iv) more often have a female responsible for the recruitment of apprentices. 
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Moreover, late recruiters find themselves in areas where the situation in the labor market 
is rather relaxed, while early recruiters face a higher degree of labor market scarcity.70 
More precisely, a one standard deviation increase in labor market scarcity 
(vacancies/total jobs t-1) significantly (at the 1 percent level) reduces the probability that 
the employer is a late recruiter by 10 percentage points. This relationship may also 
explain why the significant ‘female x vacancies/total jobs t-1’ interaction disappears if the 
female dummy is additionally interacted with recruiter type (see model (III) of table 5-15). 
Previous analyses have already demonstrated that (even if) accounting for labor market 
conditions and other firm characteristics, the recruiter effect persists. Consequently, the 
question arises why late and early recruiters treat the female candidate differently. 
Several explanations seem equally plausible. The first deals with management quality. 
Late recruiters may employ less professional recruitment processes that systematically 
disadvantage minority workers. The data compiled provide a possibility to proxy and thus 
to empirically test the lack of managerial expertise. 
Table 5-21 reports average marginal effects of a probit regression on (i) the response 
dummy and (ii) a dummy for the employer’s reaction after being reminded by the job 
candidate given (i). Both dependent variables should serve as an indicator on how reliable 
and organized firms’ recruiting processes are. The results do not reveal significant 
differences by recruiter type concerning the response probability, but show systematic 
variations with respect to the reminder dummy. The probability that late recruiters 
answer only after having been reminded by the applicant is 15.8 percentage points higher 
than in case of early recruiters. This, indeed, can be considered as evidence for (poor) 
management quality affecting gender inequality in recruiting decisions. Relating these 
findings to the large-scaled survey data on management practices presented by Bloom and 
van Reenen (2007) and Bloom et al. (2012) indicates that firm size moderates the effects. 
They find that the average management score with respect to how human capital is 
attracted, managed and retained increases with company size. These quality indicators, in 
turn, are shown to have a positive and significant effect on firm performance. As the 
recruiter type in the present studies correlates with firm size, the argumentation outlined 
above finds support in the Bloom and van Reenen data. 
                                                             
70 Note that the regression coefficients hardly change if the entire sample rather than the sample with male-
dominated jobs only is considered.  
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Table 5-21: Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Response and Reaction to Reminder Dummy 
 
(Response) (Reaction to reminder) 
Late recruiter 0.001 0.158*** 
 
(0.032) (0.039) 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 1,080 877 
Pseudo R² 0.040 0.071 
Log likelihood -501.160 -468.946 
Wald chi-squared 27.796 48.075 
P-value 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Table reports average marginal effects of a probit regression on the response (Y=1: 
applicant receives a response on behalf of the employer) and reacting to reminder (Y=1: 
firm responds only after being reminded given that a firm responds at all) dummy, 
respectively. Standard errors clustered on firm level are in parentheses. Results are 
restricted to male-dominated jobs. * denotes 10% significance level. ** denotes 5% 
significance level. *** denotes 1% significance level. 
Secondly, late recruiters may simply fail to find adequate staff even though their job offers 
had been published a long time ago.71 On the one hand, the threshold level for potential 
apprentices could be too high. This idea turns out to be rather unlikely as the majority of 
jobs only mention quite moderate scholastic requirements (see above). Also, the overall 
callback rates do not differ between applications sent out in May and September.72 
Alternatively, employers’ reputation could differ between late and early recruiters. It may 
well be that the former do not find adequate staff as a sanction of the labor market to 
discriminating behavior in the past. Being a late recruiter would then be the result of a 
negative selection effect. Unfortunately, no panel data are available to test this 
assumption.  
Third, late recruiters may treat the male and female applicant differently as a result of 
statistical discrimination. As they are under pressure to find apprentices in time, they 
select members of the majority group in order to minimize the probability of inviting an 
unsuitable person. Moreover, what is generally referred to as “rough sorting” might be 
involved (see e.g. Carlsson and Rooth, 2008). In the context of male-dominated jobs, 
gender might serve as a (first) screening device without looking more closely at the 
information provided by the applications which again would result in the minority 
candidate being rejected to a larger extent. In contrast, early recruiters have enough time 
                                                             
71 Unfortunately, the length of time the vacancy had already been published could not be recorded.  
72  Note that the applicant pool may differ across application periods. Assuming that the better qualified 
candidates are more likely to apply for a job at early recruiters, the quality of the applicant pool would be 
lower in the late recruiter sample. As applicants’ quality remained constant for the entire experiment, this 
on average should have led to a lower callback rate for the applications sent out in September. However, no 
support for significant callback differences can be found in the data. 
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and probably a multilevel hiring process to carefully select the candidates with the best fit 
implying that they give men and women equal opportunities. This can be supported by 
comparing waiting periods conditional on recruiter type. While late recruiters on average 
give a callback (rejection) after 9.7 (18.9) working days, early recruiters need 27.3 (45.6) 
working days to make a decision.73 
Overall, the results discussed in this section suggest that taste and statistical 
discrimination in conjunction with a recruiter effect are responsible for gender 
discrimination in the labor market for apprenticeships. 
5.2.4.4 THE ROLE OF SOCIETAL ATTITUDES 
The discussion about where a taste for discrimination might stem from has revealed that 
societal attitudes may affect employers’ response behavior towards minorities. Previous 
research has shown that, for example, the treatment of women varies conditional on how 
people in different regions vote on gender issues (Fortin, 2005; Backes-Gellner et al., 
2013). If the majority votes in favor of policies promoting gender equality, employers are 
found not to discriminate. Conversely, in regions where the public opinion challenges 
affirmative action fostering gender-equal employment outcomes, employers seem to adapt 
regional tastes in their hiring and pay practices. Whereas former studies use natural 
experiments originating from national referendums or the results of social surveys, no 
such information is available for Germany.  
However, what might reflect regional attitudes on the role of men and women in the labor 
market is the share of votes different parties receive in general elections. While some 
parties like the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Socialist Union (CSU) 
are considered to be more conservative with a traditional understanding of the role of 
men and women in society (which, very simplified, reflects the ‘breadwinner’ versus 
‘housekeeper’ discussion), others, like the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Green Party 
(Die Grünen) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP), represent a more liberal way 
promoting women’s labor market participation. Following these assumptions, the 
                                                             
73 Including applicants’ waiting period in the regression model does not qualitatively affect the results 
(estimations not displayed but available upon request). Furthermore, interacting the waiting period with 
the female dummy does not reveal any gender differences with respect to response times. However, the 
waiting period turns out to have a U-shaped relationship on callback probabilities if the sample is 
restricted to late recruiters whereas the relationship is linear if only the early recruiter sample is 
considered. These results somewhat support the assumption that recruitment processes differ by recruiter 
type. 
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probability that the female candidate is discriminated in male-dominated jobs should 
increase with the proportion of votes accumulated by the CDU/CSU and decrease with a 
rise in popularity of SPD, Die Grünen and FDP. To empirically investigate this relationship, 
the regional results from the last federal elections in 2009 are matched with employer 
data.  
Table 5-22: Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Callback Dummy and Interaction of Female 
Dummy and Share of CDU/CSU Votes 
Callback (Ia) (Ib) (IIa) (IIb) 
Female -0.214* -0.220* -0.076*** -0.080*** 
 (0.122) (0.124) (0.028) (0.029) 
Share CDU/CSU votes -0.007** -0.003 -0.005* -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Female x  0.004 0.004   
Share CDU/CSU votes (0.004) (0.004)   
Female x   0.023 0.027 
Share CDU/CSU votes above average  (0.043) (0.044) 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
No. of obs. 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 
Pseudo R² 0.007 0.026 0.006 0.026 
Log likelihood -710.847 -696.561 -711.136 -696.824 
Wald chi-squared 16.678 34.327 14.810 32.520 
P-value 0.001 0.017 0.002 0.027 
Notes: Table reports average marginal effects of a probit regression on the callback dummy (Y=1: employer 
calls back the job applicant). Marginal effects are calculated at the mean of all independent variables and 
denote an infinitesimal change in case of continuous variables and a discrete change in case of dummy 
variables. Standard errors clustered on firm level are in parentheses. Samples are restricted to male-
dominated jobs. * denotes 10% significance level. ** denotes 5% significance level. *** denotes 1% significance 
level. 
In federal elections voters have two votes, the first going towards the regional 
representative and the second determining the number of seats in the German Federal 
Parliament. The sample average of the first (second) CDU/CSU vote is 40.9 percent (34.8 
percent). Table 5-22 reports average marginal effects of a probit regression on the 
callback dummy where models (Ia) and (Ib) include an interaction of the female dummy 
and the share of second CDU/CSU votes while models (IIa) and (IIb) add an interaction 
between the female and above-average CDU/CSU dummy. All models are restricted to 
male-dominated jobs and either include (models (Ia) and (IIa)) or exclude (models (Ib) 
and (IIb)) control variables. Comparing the regression estimates, however, does not 
support the hypothesized effect, i.e., the coefficient of the female dummy turns out to be 
negative and significantly different from zero independent of the inclusion of an 
interaction effect. In other words, the results do not suggest a correlation between voting 
behavior and the extent of discrimination towards women. Using alternative measures 
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such as the proportion of CDU/CSU first votes or electoral results of other parties 
(expecting a reverse effect) do not help explaining why gender differences in hiring can be 
observed.  
This might have two reasons. On the one hand, voting behavior may not be an adequate 
proxy for societal attitudes, especially because the profiles and programs of the major 
parties in Germany are hard to disentangle, so are their gender role models. This, in turn, 
makes assumptions on the electorate and their attitudes concerning gender equality in the 
labor market very speculative. On the other hand, employers might not adapt regional 
attitudes when forming personal tastes. 
5.3 CORRESPONDENCE STUDY ON ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION 
This section presents the results of the correspondence testing for ethnic discrimination. 
The structure is very similar to the gender study presented above. In section 5.3.1, the 
dataset is described, sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 present descriptive and empirical results and 
section 5.3.4 concludes with a discussion of the findings.   
 DATA 5.3.1
Analogously to the presentation of the results on gender hiring discrimination, the dataset 
is described (5.3.1.1) before the characteristics of the employers addressed in the field 
experiment are compared with those from the entire body of training companies in 
Germany (5.3.1.2). 
5.3.1.1 THE DATASET FROM THE FIELD EXPERIMENT 
All in all, 1,246 applications were sent out to 623 different employers of which 15 were 
disregarded due to dispatching errors. The remaining 1,216 applications produced a 
response rate of 79.1 percent and a callback rate of 37.2 percent. The firms on average 
responded within 25 working days where the preferred way of responding was by email 
(63.4 percent). Concerning company characteristics, the majority of firms were medium-
sized (53.8 percent), located in the South of Germany (56.6 percent) and operating in the 
manufacturing sector (90 percent). Across the sample, 57.1 percent of all firms were 
referred to in May 2011 or 2012 and are therefore classified as late recruiters. Similar to 
the gender study, small firms are clearly underrepresented among early recruiters (14.6 
percent) while the opposite holds true for medium- and large-sized companies (see table 
5-23). On average, employers offered 1.71 open positions while, again, this number 
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correlates with firm size. According to the job advertisements, around half of the people 
dealing with the applications were female. 
Table 5-23: Firm Size by Application Period 
  
Late 
(N=347) 
Early 
(N=261) 
Total 
Small 41.21% 14.56% 29.77% 
  (143) (38) (181) 
Medium 48.13% 61.30% 53.78% 
  (167) (160) (327) 
Large 10.66% 24.14% 16.45% 
  (37) (63) (100) 
Notes: The table reports late and early recruiters as a fraction 
of firm size in percent. Absolute numbers are in parentheses. 
As any confounding effects between the callback rate and the ethnic background should be 
excluded, names, profile pictures, template designs, dispatching orders and places of 
origin were altered. The latter was controlled for including the distance between the 
workplace and the applicant’s home (286 kilometers on average). Moreover, the last 
application period in May 2012 included alternative names (‘Lukas Schmidt’ for the 
German-named and ‘Onur Öztürk’ for the Turkish-named candidate). Apart from that, 37.5 
percent of all candidates were equipped with an additional certificate documenting an 
internship in a technical occupation.  
Figure 5-10: Frequency Distribution of Non-Standardized Vacancies/Total Jobs t-1 
 
Data on labor market scarcity and the share of foreign applicants in the previous year 
were taken from the reports of the BA and matched with employers’ respective labor 
market region. Analogous to the study on gender discrimination, scarcity is reflected by a 
ratio that divides the number of vacancies by the number of total apprenticeships 
reported. On average, 4.6 percent of the jobs remained unstaffed with the ratio varying 
between 0.4 to 13.9 percent. Figure 5-10 illustrates the non-standardized vacancies/total 
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jobs t-1 variable as a frequency distribution. 
Figure 5-11: Frequency Distribution of Non-Standardized Share of Foreigners t-1 
 
The share of foreigners in t-1 proxies the fraction of applicants with non-German 
citizenship in the pool and thus reflects employers’ likelihood of getting in touch with job 
candidates from minority groups. Since neither detailed information on the number of 
applicants with a migration background, nor on those with a Turkish migration 
background was available, this ratio serves as a proxy for employers’ previous experience 
with other than German ethnicities. The fraction of foreigners averaged 11 percent in the 
entire sample, but varied between 0 and as much as 34 percent. An illustration of its non-
standardized frequency distribution is provided in figure 5-11. 
For the regression analyses, both measures reflecting the labor market situation are 
standardized in order to control for potential outlier effects and to facilitate the 
interpretation of the estimation coefficients. After all, table 5-24 provides an overview of 
the descriptives of the ethnicity study. 
Table 5-24:  Descriptive Statistics of the Correspondence Study on Ethnic Discrimination 
Variable Operationalization # of Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES  
Response 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the applicant receives a 
response (either invitation or rejection) by the 
employer, 0 otherwise 
1216 0.791 - 0 1 
Callback 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the applicant receives a 
callback (e.g. invitation) by the employer, 0 
otherwise 
1216 0.372 - 0 1 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES           
Response information 
Response time Response time of employers in working days 962 25.33 30.04 0 179 
Type of response 
      
 
Email 
Dummy: Equals 1 if employer responded by email, 
0 otherwise 
962 0.634 - 0 1 
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Postal mail 
Dummy: Equals 1 if employer responded by postal 
mail, 0 otherwise 
962 0.223 - 0 1 
 
Phone 
Dummy: Equals 1 if employer responded by 
phone, 0 otherwise 
962 0.142 - 0 1 
Applicant information  
Turkish name 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the applicant has a Turkish-
sounding name, 0 otherwise 
1216 0.500 - 0 1 
Name 
      
 
Jan Lange 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the applicant is named ‘Jan 
Lange’, 0 otherwise 
1216 0.457 - 0 1 
 
Lukas Schmidt 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the applicant is named ‘Lukas 
Schmidt’, 0 otherwise 
1216 0.043 - 0 1 
 
Kenan Yilmaz 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the applicant is named ‘Kenan 
Yilmaz’, 0 otherwise 
1216 0.461 - 0 1 
 
Onur Öztürk 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the applicant is named ‘Onur 
Öztürk’, 0 otherwise 
1216 0.039 - 0 1 
Photo 
      
 
Photo A 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the applicant provides photo 
A, 0 otherwise 
1216 0.500 - 0 1 
 
Photo B 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the applicant provides photo 
B, 0 otherwise 
1216 0.500 - 0 1 
Design 
      
 
Design A 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the application has design A, 0 
otherwise 
1216 0.361 - 0 1 
 
Design B 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the application has design B, 0 
otherwise 
1216 0.376 - 0 1 
 
Design C 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the application has design C, 0 
otherwise 
1216 0.263 - 0 1 
Rank 
      
 
Rank 1 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the application was sent out 
first, 0 otherwise 
1216 0.500 - 0 1 
 
Rank 2 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the application was sent out 
second, 0 otherwise 
1216 0.500 - 0 1 
Certificate 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the applicant provides an 
additional certificate, 0 otherwise 
1216 0.375 - 0 1 
Distance 
Linear distance between applicant's home and 
location of employer (in km) 
1216 286.25 116.87 22 553 
Information on jobs and application period           
Application period 
     
 
May 2011 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the application was sent out 
in May 2011, 0 otherwise 
1216 0.405 - 0 1 
 
Sep 2011 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the application was sent out 
in September 2011, 0 otherwise 
1216 0.429 - 0 1 
 
May 2012 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the application was sent out 
in May 2012, 0 otherwise 
1216 0.166 - 0 1 
Job 
 
Electronics 
technician 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the candidate applies as an 
electronics technician, 0 otherwise 
1216 0.150 - 0 1 
 
Industrial 
mechanic 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the candidate applies as an 
industrial mechanic, 0 otherwise 
1216 0.313 - 0 1 
 
Mechanic in 
plastics and 
rubber 
processing 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the candidate applies as a 
mechanic in plastics and rubber processing, 0 
otherwise 
1216 0.178 - 0 1 
 
Mechatronics 
fitter 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the candidate applies as a 
mechatronics fitter, 0 otherwise 
1216 0.211 - 0 1 
 
Milling 
machine 
operator 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the candidate applies as a 
milling machine operator, 0 otherwise 
1216 0.150 - 0 1 
Firm characteristics  
Size 
      
 
Small 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the employer has less than 50 
employees, 0 otherwise 
1216 0.298 - 0 1 
 
Medium 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the employer has between 50 
and 500 employees, 0 otherwise 
1216 0.538 - 0 1 
 
Large 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the employer has more than 
500 employees, 0 otherwise 
1216 0.164 - 0 1 
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Location 
      
 
Other 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the employer is not located in 
the South or East of Germany, 0 otherwise 
1216 0.262 - 0 1 
 
South 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the employer is located in the 
South of Germany, 0 otherwise 
1216 0.566 - 0 1 
 
East 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the employer is located in 
Eastern Germany, 0 otherwise 
1216 0.173 - 0 1 
Industry 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the employer operates in the 
industry sector, 0 otherwise (i.e., service sector)  
1216 0.900 - 0 1 
Late recruiter 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the employer recruits in May, 
0 otherwise (i.e., September) 
1216 0.571 - 0 1 
Female 
responsible 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the person responsible for 
recruiting as mentioned in the job offer is female, 
0 otherwise 
1216 0.508 - 0 1 
Open positions 
Number of open positions for an apprenticeship 
as indicated by the employer's job offer 
1216 1.71 1.59 1 15 
Labor market data  
Vacancies/total 
jobs t-1 
Ratio of vacancies and total apprenticeships in the 
previous year (i.e., in the reporting period 
2009/2010 and 2010/2011, respectively) and in 
the corresponding Employment Agency region of 
the employer 
1216 0.046 0.027 0.004 0.139 
Share of foreigners 
t-1 
Share of foreign applicants in the previous year 
(i.e., in the reporting period 2009/2010 and 
2010/2011, respectively) and in the 
corresponding Employment Agency region of the 
employer 
1216 0.110 0.076 0.000 0.340 
5.3.1.2 COMPARISON WITH THE OVERALL POPULATION OF TRAINING COMPANIES  
This section puts the dataset from the field experiment into perspective with the entire 
population of training companies in Germany. Table 5-25 shows that small employers are 
underrepresented relative to medium-sized firms. The reason for that may be the more 
frequent use of the job platform of the BA as a recruiting channel by the latter. Concerning 
companies’ location, firms from the South of Germany are overrepresented in the sample. 
This may directly be linked to regional labor market constraints. As employers from the 
South experience fiercer competition for suitable apprentices, they probably use a multi-
channel strategy (including the job platform of the BA) to publish their job offers and face 
longer staffing periods which both increasing the probability of being part of the sample.  
Even though firm characteristics slightly differ between the current sample and the overall 
population, this should neither affect the generalizability of the results nor does it indicate 
firm selection. The latter would be an issue if firms advertising their jobs via the BA 
systematically differed from other companies.  
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Table 5-25:  Firm Characteristics in Field Experiment and Entire Population of Training Companies 
 
Field  
experiment 
Entire population  
of training companies 
Size 
  
 Small 29.77% 45.97% 
 Medium 53.78% 36.39% 
 Large 16.45% 17.64% 
Location 
  
 South 56.58% 45.32% 
 East 17.27% 17.60% 
 Other 26.15% 37.02% 
Notes: Data on firm size as of 2010; data on location as a weighted 
average of 2010/2011 and 2011/2012.  
Source: BA (2010a, 2011, 2012b), BIBB (2010a). 
 DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS 5.3.2
Regarding the hiring outcome, descriptive results indicate a preferential treatment of the 
applicant with the German-sounding name. Table 5-26 shows that while the German-
named candidate received 257 callbacks (42.27 percent of all applications), the Turkish-
named applicant was invited in 195 (32.07 percent) of all cases. This yields a difference of 
10.20 percentage points which is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Recalling 
that the correspondence method implements the ceteris paribus condition with respect to 
all other applicant characteristics, these findings indicate discrimination against the 
Turkish-named candidate. 
Table 5-26: Firms’ Detailed Responses by Name 
  
German name 
(N=608) 
Turkish name 
(N=608) 
Total Difference 
No response 19.57% 22.20% 20.89% -2.63 pps 
  (119) (135) (254) (16) 
Rejection 38.16% 45.72% 41.94% -7.56 pps** 
  (232) (278) (510) (46) 
Callback 42.27% 32.07% 37.17% 10.20 pps*** 
  (257) (195) (452) (62) 
Notes: The table reports detailed responses by name as a fraction of overall applications in percent. 
Absolute numbers are in parentheses. ** denotes 5% significance level and *** denotes 1% 
significance level of a chi-squared test (H0: The German- and Turkish-named candidates are equally 
likely to receive a callback/a rejection at any matched-pair application). 
Focusing on the importance of an additional certificate for the hiring outcome, the results 
indicate that both candidates equally benefit with an increase in callbacks of 8.16 
percentage points and 8.33 percentage points (both statistically significant at the 5 
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percent level), respectively. Consequently, the extent of differential treatment remains 
constant and statistically significant (see table 5-27). 
Table 5-27:  Firms’ Callbacks Conditional on the Provision of an Additional Certificate 
  German name Turkish name Difference 
No certificate 39.21% 28.95% 10.26 pps*** 
 
(149/380) (110/380)  
Certificate 47.37% 37.28% 10.09 pps** 
 
(108/228) (85/228)  
Difference 8.16 pps** 8.33 pps**  
Notes: The table reports callbacks by name as a fraction of applications with and without an 
additional certificate in percent. Absolute numbers of callbacks and applications are in 
parentheses. ** denotes 5% and *** denotes 1% significance level of a chi-squared test (H0: The 
German- and Turkish-named candidates are equally likely to receive a callback at any matched-
pair application (in rows) and H0: Applications with and without an additional certificate are 
equally likely to receive a callback (in columns), respectively).  
Considering the different application periods and dividing the sample into late and early 
recruiters further reveals that discrimination seems to be somewhat higher if applications 
were dispatched in ‘late’ application periods (12.39 percentage points compared to 7.28 
percentage points). However, in both cases the Turkish-named candidate received 
significantly fewer callbacks than the German-named counterpart (see table 5-28). 
Table 5-28: Firms’ Callbacks Conditional on Application Period 
  German name Turkish name Difference 
Late recruiters 42.36% 29.97% 12.39 pps*** 
 
(147/347) (104/147)  
Early recruiters 42.15% 34.87% 7.28 pps* 
 
(110/261) (91/261)  
Notes: The table reports callbacks by name as a fraction of applications to late and early 
recruiters in percent. Absolute numbers of callbacks and applications are in parentheses. * 
denotes 10% and *** denotes 1% significance level of a chi-squared test (H0: The German- and 
Turkish-named candidates are equally likely to receive a callback at any matched-pair 
application). 
Table 5-29 displays the pairwise treatments by name, certificate, firm characteristics and 
labor market data rather than the aggregate outcomes. In column (1) the number of paired 
applications for each subsample is displayed. Column (2) shows the number of firms that 
neither replied nor rejected both of the applicants, leaving those employers that invited at 
least one of the candidates in column (3). The next three columns divide the firm-level 
observations from column (3) into cases of both-sided callbacks (column 4) and callbacks 
to either the German-named (column 5) or the Turkish-named applicant (column 6). 
Columns (7) and (8) calculate the callback rates, i.e., the share of callbacks among the total 
number of applications, for either candidate. Subtracting column (8) from column (7) 
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yields the percentage points difference in callbacks (column (9)). Whether this difference 
is statistically different from zero is then tested by a standard chi-squared significance test 
(H0: Callbacks to résumés with the German and Turkish name are equally distributed at 
any matched-pair application). 
Table 5-29: Firms’ Responses of Correspondence Testing by Name, Certificate, Firm Characteristics 
and Labor Market Data 
 
Firms' responses Callback rates 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
No. of paired  
applications 
Rejection/ 
no 
response 
At least 
one 
callback 
Both 
Only 
German 
name 
Only 
Turkish 
name 
German 
name 
(4+5)/(1) 
Turkish 
name 
(4+6)/(1) 
Difference 
(7)-(8) 
All firms 55.26 44.74 66.18 28.31 5.51 
0.423 0.321 
0.102** 
(p=0.000) (608) (336) (272) (180) (77) (15) 
 
Additional certificate 
None provides 
additional 
certificate 
60.30 39.70 67.92 28.30 3.77 
0.382 0.285 
0.097** 
(p=0.017) 
(267) (161) (106) (72) (30) (4) 
Both provide 
additional 
certificate 
47.83 52.17 65.00 33.33 1.67 
0.513 0.348 
0.165** 
(p=0.011) 
(115) (55) (60) (39) (20) (1) 
Only German-named 
candidate provides 
additional certificate 
53.10 46.90 56.60 35.85 7.55 
0.434 0.301 
0.133** 
(p=0.038) 
(113) (60) (53) (30) (19) (4) 
Only Turkish-named 
candidate provides 
additional certificate 
53.10 46.90 73.58 15.09 11.32 
0.416 0.398 
0.018 
(p=0.787) 
(113) (60) (53) (39) (8) (6) 
         Timing 
Late recruiter 55.62 44.38 62.99 32.47 4.55 
0.424 0.300 
0.124*** 
(p=0.001) (347) (193) (154) (97) (50) (7) 
Early recruiter 54.79 45.21 70.34 22.88 6.78 
0.421 0.349 
0.073* 
(p=0.087) (261) (143) (118) (83) (27) (8) 
         Firm Size 
Small (<50) 60.77 39.23 59.15 36.62 4.23 
0.376 0.249 
0.127*** 
(p=0.009) (181) (110) (71) (42) (26) (3) 
Medium (50-
500) 
53.21 46.79 66.67 28.76 4.58 
0.446 0.333 
0.113*** 
(p=0.003) 
(327) (174) (153) (102) (44) (7) 
Large (>500) 52.00 48.00 75.00 14.58 10.42 
0.430 0.410 
0.020 
(p=0.774) (100) (52) (48) (36) (7) (5) 
         Location 
South 58.43 41.57 60.14 31.47 8.39 
0.381 0.285 
0.096*** 
(p=0.008) (344) (201) (143) (86) (45) (12) 
East 51.43 48.57 76.47 21.57 1.96 
0.476 0.381 
0.095 
(p=0.163) (105) (54) (51) (39) (11) (1) 
Other 50.94 49.06 70.51 26.92 2.56 
0.478 0.358 
0.119** 
(p=0.031) (159) (81) (78) (55) (21) (2) 
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Sector 
Services 40.98 59.02 80.56 16.67 2.78 
0.574 0.492 
0.082 
(p=0.364) (61) (25) (36) (29) (6) (1) 
Industry 56.86 43.14 63.98 30.08 5.93 
0.406 0.302 
0.104*** 
(p=0.000) (547) (311) (236) (151) (71) (14) 
         Person responsible for recruiting 
Male 58.28 41.72 57.85 40.50 1.65 
0.410 0.248 
0.162*** 
(p=0.000) (290) (169) (121) (70) (49) (2) 
Female 51.17 48.83 73.29 18.49 8.22 
0.448 0.398 
0.050 
(p=0.214) (299) (153) (146) (107) (27) (12) 
         Share of foreigners t-1 (Mean=0.110) 
Above mean 55.00 45.00 58.12 33.33 8.55 
0.412 0.300 
0.112*** 
(p=0.009) (260) (143) (117) (68) (39) (10) 
Below mean 55.46 44.54 72.26 24.52 3.23 
0.431 0.336 
0.095** 
(p=0.011) (348) (193) (155) (112) (38) (5) 
         Vacancies/total jobs t-1 (Mean=0.046) 
Above mean 61.98 38.02 66.30 25.00 8.70 
0.347 0.285 
0.062 
(p=0.140) (242) (150) (92) (61) (23) (8) 
Below mean 50.82 49.18 66.11 30.00 3.89 
0.473 0.344 
0.128*** 
(p=0.000) (366) (186) (180) (119) (54) (7) 
Notes: This table shows the distribution of firms’ responses. Absolute numbers are in parentheses. Column (1) 
displays the number of employers in each stratum. Column (2) reports the fraction of firms that gave none of 
the candidates a callback, so the remainder in column (3) called back at least one applicant. Firms that gave 
both candidates a positive answer, column (4), are considered as equal treatment, while the rest preferred 
either the German- or Turkish-named candidate (columns (5) and (6)). Columns (7) and (8) contain the 
callback rate for the German- and Turkish-named applicant, respectively, while column (9) computes the 
difference in callback rates between the two candidate groups. Person responsible for recruiting excludes 
those employers that did not name a recruiter in their job offers. In column (9), p-values of a chi-squared test 
that the German- and Turkish-named candidates are equally likely to receive a callback at any matched-pair 
application are in parentheses. * denotes 10% significance level. ** denotes 5% significance level. *** denotes 
1% significance level. 
In line with the descriptive results displayed above, table 5-29 shows that across the 
entire sample differential treatment occurred in 92 cases in which the majority candidate 
benefited the most (77 times). Dividing the overall callbacks of the German-named 
applicant by the overall callbacks of his Turkish-named counterpart gives a success ratio 
of 1.32 (=0.423/0.321). In other words, the minority candidate is 32 percent less likely to 
receive a callback. Testing the hypothesis that callbacks are equally distributed across 
groups reveals that the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 5 percent level. Given that 
the candidates are carefully matched, these findings can directly be interpreted as 
discrimination. However, the extent of discriminatory treatment obviously varies across 
different subsamples. In particular, the distribution of callbacks does not statistically differ 
by name in case that (i) only the Turkish-named candidate hands in an additional 
credential, (ii) the employer is of large size, (iii) the firm is located in the East of Germany, 
(iv) the company operates in the service sector, (v) the recruiter is female and (vi) the 
scarcity measure is above its mean. On the other hand, discrimination is most prominent if 
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(vii) both applicants provide an extra credential (difference: 16.5 percentage points), (viii) 
the employer is a late recruiter (12.4 percentage points), (ix) the company has less than 50 
employees (12.7 percentage points), (x) the person responsible for recruiting is male (16.2 
percentage points) and (xi) the labor market situation is relatively relaxed (12.8 
percentage points). 
Before turning to the multivariate analyses, more subtle forms of differential treatment 
are considered. Table 5-30 reports firms’ responses by name. A gap in companies’ 
response behavior would give a first impression of discriminatory treatment. Even if the 
counterpart was rejected (which would result in the same overall employment outcome), 
not replying at all would discourage the applicant from sending out further applications. 
Regarding the descriptive results, no such differences can be found in the current sample. 
More precisely, the null hypothesis that firms’ responses are equally distributed across 
names cannot be rejected.  
Table 5-30: Firms’ Responses by Name 
 
German name Turkish name Total Difference 
No response 19.57% 22.20% 20.89% -2.63 pp. 
 
(119) (135) (254) (16) 
Response 80.43% 77.80% 79.11% 2.63 pps 
 
(489) (473) (962) (16) 
Notes: The table reports employers’ responses by name as a fraction of overall applications in 
percent. Absolute numbers are in parentheses. 
However, probit regressions on the response dummy with standard errors clustered on 
firm level suggest that the response probability is negatively correlated with the Turkish 
name dummy. The point estimate shows a 2.8 to 2.9 percentage points difference that is 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level and robust to various model specifications 
(see table C-8 in the appendix). On the one hand, this might be a first indicator of callback 
differences. On the other hand, though, it may leave the gap in callback rates unaffected as 
the majority candidate might still receive a rejection instead. Either way, the fact that 
firms’ response behavior at least partly accounts for different invitation probabilities 
across the two demographic groups cannot completely ruled out. 
In the same vein as the response behavior, cases in which one candidate receives a 
callback only after the other candidate has rejected the invitation can be considered 
another form of the so called “equal but different treatment”. This phenomenon can be 
found in about one quarter of all cases of mutual callbacks, but benefits both applicant 
groups equally (see table 5-31).  
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Table 5-31:  Firms' Callbacks only after the Counterpart Has Declined an Invitation 
Callbacks… 
Fraction 
(Absolute number) 
… to both candidates 
100.00% 
(180) 
… to the German-named candidate only after the 
Turkish-named candidate has declined an invitation 
14.44% 
(26) 
… to the Turkish-named candidate only after the 
German-named candidate has declined an invitation 
12.22% 
(22) 
Notes: The table reports cases of equal but different treatment by name as a fraction of mutual 
callbacks. Absolute numbers are in parentheses. 
Moreover, table 5-32 reports average reaction times, i.e., the time until the candidate 
either receives a callback or a rejection by the employer. The reason for a variation in 
reaction times might be twofold: companies either gather applications to be able to select 
from a larger pool of job candidates or they simply postpone their decision on purpose 
hoping that inadequate applicants withdraw. However, mean comparison tests of callback 
and rejection times do not reveal significant differences by group. In case of the former, it 
took the companies on average 18.3 days until the candidates were informed whereas 
rejections were sent out after 31.5 days. Longer callback times for medium and large 
corporations can be attributed to the fact that more recruiters are involved in the decision 
process, that more vacancies have to be filled and that the number of incoming 
applications is larger than in companies with less than 50 employees. Furthermore, the 
fraction of medium and large firms is higher among early recruiters (see table 5-23) which 
generally dedicate more time to decision making. 
Table 5-32: Average Callback and Rejection Times in Working Days by Name 
 
Callback 
 
Rejection 
 
German 
name 
Turkish 
name 
Average 
 
German 
name 
Turkish 
name 
Average 
All 17.9 18.6 18.3 
 
30.6 32.4 31.5 
Small 14.0 11.0 12.5 
 
23.3 25.2 24.3 
Medium 19.0 21.1 20.0 
 
31.7 34.7 33.2 
Large 20.7 20.4 20.6 
 
37.6 36.0 36.8 
 
In order to provide further evidence for the reasons of ethnic discrimination, various 
probit estimations are conducted to disentangle the effects that originate from differences 
in the provision of certificates as well as firm and labor market characteristics. 
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 ECONOMETRIC ANALYSES 5.3.3
The following section presents the empirical model (5.3.3.1) which is used for the 
subsequently performed econometric analyses (5.3.3.2).  
5.3.3.1 EMPIRICAL MODEL 
As the dependent variable (the callback dummy) is binary, the linearity assumption of the 
OLS method would be violated. Consequently, an alternative estimation technique based 
on a probabilistic distribution function is required. Probit regressions have, inter alia, 
proven to account for the nonlinear relationship between the covariates and the outcome 
variable and produce plausible results. Transforming the estimation coefficients into 
marginal effects further facilitates the interpretation of these results. The baseline model 
estimated below looks as follows: 
  (        )  
                                         ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗   
                                                         
                            ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗       
where    is a constant,    denotes the regression coefficient   of regressor   and    
represents a normally distributed error term of applicant  . The name and the certificate 
dummy as well as company, job and framework controls serve as further independent 
variables (see table 5-24). Firm characteristics include size, location, industry and 
recruiter type. The vector of control variables includes the year the apprenticeship starts, 
the number of open positions, the distance between the applicant’s home and the 
workplace, as well as dummies for dispatching order and résumé design.  
5.3.3.2 PROBIT REGRESSIONS AND HYPOTHESES TESTING 
Table 5-33 reports average marginal effects from a probit regression on the callback 
dummy together with their standard errors clustered on firm level. Model (I) only displays 
the effect of the Turkish name dummy, model (II) additionally accounts for firm 
characteristics, model (III) adds standardized labor market variables and model (IV) 
incorporates the certificate dummy. All models include the set of control variables as 
described above and use the entire sample, i.e., all 1,216 observations.  
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Table 5-33: Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Callback Dummy 
Callback (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Turkish name -0.108*** -0.110*** -0.110*** -0.109*** 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Medium  0.077* 0.076* 0.073 
 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) 
Large  0.086 0.084 0.079 
 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.067) 
South  -0.045 -0.032 -0.032 
 
 (0.058) (0.059) (0.059) 
East  0.019 0.036 0.032 
 
 (0.060) (0.065) (0.065) 
Industry  -0.162** -0.168*** -0.173*** 
 
 (0.063) (0.064) (0.064) 
Late recruiter  0.078 0.084 0.091* 
 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
Female responsible  0.082** 0.082** 0.083** 
 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Share of foreigners t-1   0.002 0.001 
 
  (0.022) (0.022) 
Vacancies/total jobs t-1   -0.025 -0.025 
 
  (0.022) (0.022) 
Certificate    0.077** 
 
   (0.034) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216 
Pseudo R² 0.023 0.044 0.045 0.048 
Log likelihood -783.842 -767.369 -766.136 -764.143 
Wald chi-squared 58.024 76.345 78.194 81.306 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Each model reports average marginal effects of a probit regression on the callback dummy (Y=1: 
employer calls back the job applicant). Marginal effects are calculated at the mean of all independent variables 
and denote an infinitesimal change in case of continuous variables and a discrete change in case of dummy 
variables. Standard errors clustered on firm level are in parentheses. Regressions consider the entire sample.  
* denotes 10% significance level. ** denotes 5% significance level. *** denotes 1% significance level. 
Regression results of the name dummy support the overall findings from section 5.3.2 and 
lend support to ‘Hminority’. The applicant with the Turkish-sounding name has a 10.8-11.0 
percentage points lower callback probability compared to his German-named counterpart. 
This effect is statistically significant at the 1 percent level and robust across all model 
specifications. Moreover, the influence of the name dummy remains almost unaffected if 
calculated at the mode rather than the mean of all other categorical covariates (see table 
C-9 in the appendix), that is, for a standard applicant at a standard employer the 
coefficients vary between -0.108 and -0.116. Tables C-10 and C-11 in the appendix further 
demonstrate that the effect of the Turkish name dummy is independent of any confounds 
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that are based on different names and photos. The coefficients of the alternative name 
(‘Jan Lange’ versus ‘Lukas Schmidt’ and ‘Kenan Yilmaz’ versus ‘Onur Öztürk’) and photo 
(‘Photo A’ versus ‘Photo B’) dummies turn out to be insignificant for either demographic 
group. Lower callbacks can thus only be attributed to the candidate’s ethnicity. 
Concerning firm characteristics, regression results show weak evidence for medium-sized 
employers recruiting the job candidates significantly more often in comparison to small-
sized firms. The reason for that might be that small firms have less formalized decision 
processes and therefore tend to recruit people who have been recommended by 
coworkers or who have already worked for the company (e.g. during a school internships 
or summer vacation). In addition, table 5-33 reveals that applications sent out to firms 
operating in the manufacturing sector on average yield 17 percentage points lower 
callbacks. Across the model specifications, this effect is statistically significant at the 1 and 
5 percent level, respectively, and might account for the fact that graduates interested in 
technical apprenticeships rather focus on the industry sector which increases the number 
of applications and, consequently, competition among applicants. Alternatively, firms in 
the service sector might simply invite a higher fraction from their pool of applicants in 
order to screen their service orientation in a face-to-face interview. If that were the case, 
hiring probabilities across both sectors would converge over all stages of the recruitment 
process which, unfortunately, cannot be investigated with data from this study. Moreover, 
if a woman is responsible for recruiting, the overall callback probability increases by 8 
percentage points. This effect is robust, but does not allow a causal interpretation since 
the researcher cannot observe whether other recruiters were involved in the decision-
making processes. Finally, the inclusion of the certificate dummy in model (IV) highlights 
the beneficial effect of the provision of additional productivity relevant information. If an 
additional credential is attached, employers respond with a 7.7 percentage points higher 
callback rate that is statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level.  
With respect to the GoF measures, all model specifications predict the outcome variable 
better than the intercept model. However, similar to the study on gender discrimination, 
the pseudo R² is rather low which can be attributed to the ceteris paribus condition of the 
correspondence method, i.e., the fact that apart from firm and labor market characteristics 
only applicants’ names as a proxy for ethnic background differ. 
Even though the findings from above provide evidence that ethnic discrimination in 
technical occupations seems to persist, no conclusions on the sources of differential 
treatment can be derived. Therefore, table 5-34 investigates whether the name dummy 
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interacts with the covariates as mentioned in the hypotheses section. The model 
specifications yield average marginal effects at the mean of all other independent 
variables. Model (I) only includes point estimates, models (IIa) to (IId) interact the Turkish 
name dummy with either covariate and model (III) additionally tests the joint effects. The 
full regression table with and without control variables can be found in the appendix 
(table C-12).     
Table 5-34: Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Callback Dummy and Hypotheses Testing 
Callback (I) (IIa) (IIb) (IIc) (IId) (III) 
Turkish name -0.109*** -0.117*** -0.110*** -0.079*** -0.109*** -0.070 
 
(0.016) (0.025) (0.016) (0.023) (0.016) (0.053) 
Certificate 0.077** 0.067 0.077** 0.077** 0.076** 0.083* 
 
(0.034) (0.043) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.050) 
Turkish name x  
 
0.021 
   
-0.013 
Certificate 
 
(0.053) 
   
(0.070) 
Share of foreigners t-1 0.001 0.001 0.014 0.001 0.001 0.016 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) 
Turkish name x  
  
-0.027 
  
-0.031* 
Share of foreigners t-1 
  
(0.018) 
  
(0.018) 
Late recruiter 0.091* 0.091* 0.091* 0.117** 0.091* 0.121** 
 
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.056) (0.054) (0.060) 
Turkish name x  
   
-0.052* 
 
-0.060 
Late recruiter 
   
(0.031) 
 
(0.049) 
Vacancies/total jobs t-1 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.033 -0.034 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
Turkish name x  
    
0.017 0.020 
Vacancies/total jobs t-1 
    
(0.015) (0.015) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216 
Pseudo R² 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.049 
Log likelihood -764.143 -764.080 -763.698 -763.729 -763.960 -762.972 
Wald chi-squared 81.306 81.789 80.762 81.164 83.031 82.739 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Each model reports average marginal effects of a probit regression on the callback dummy (Y=1: 
employer calls back the job applicant). Marginal effects are calculated at the mean of all independent variables 
and denote an infinitesimal change in case of continuous variables and a discrete change in case of dummy 
variables. Standard errors clustered on firm level are in parentheses. Regressions consider the entire sample.  
* denotes 10% significance level. ** denotes 5% significance level. *** denotes 1% significance level. 
As model (IIa) indicates, the interaction between the Turkish name and the certificate 
dummy does not significantly increase the minority candidates’ callback probability 
relative to his majority counterpart. In contrast to ‘Hcertificate’, but in line with the 
descriptive findings from above, the provision of a certified internship equally benefits 
both applicants. As a result, the gap in callbacks is not reduced by this additional ability 
signal. Even for different values of the predicted callback probability, the interaction term 
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remains statistically insignificant which underlines the absence of the postulated effect 
(see figure C-5 in the appendix). 
According to ‘Hshare of foreigners’, previous contact with other members of a group increases 
employers’ ability of predicting future productivity. Consequently, a higher share of 
foreign employees should increase the likelihood of a callback for job candidates with a 
migration background. However, model (IIb) does not support this assumption since the 
interaction effect between the Turkish name and the share of foreigners in t-1 turns out to 
be insignificant while the point estimate of the name dummy remains unchanged. Figure 
C-6 in the appendix further shows that the significance level of the interaction effect is 
independent of different combinations of other independent variables included in the 
model. 
Focusing on different hiring behavior between late and early recruiters shows that, similar 
to the gender study, the former tend to discriminate somewhat more which contradicts 
‘Htiming’. While the positive point estimate of the late recruiter variable, i.e., the callback 
probability of the German-named candidate for applications sent out in May, increases, the 
interaction term becomes negative and statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
Thus, in addition to the negative point estimate of the name dummy, the minority 
applicant has a 5.2 percentage points lower chance of being called back from late 
recruiters than the majority candidate. However, recruiter type does not fully explain the 
callback gap as the Turkish name coefficient remains statistically significant. This means 
that even early recruiters discriminate against the minority candidate. 
Model (IId) considers the joint effect that stems from labor market scarcity. Contrasting 
the corresponding hypothesis and preliminary descriptive results (see table 5-29), the 
regression estimates do not indicate any statistically significant relationship between the 
scarcity measure and the name dummy. This is also supported by figure C-8 in the 
appendix which displays the predicted probability at different points of the probability 
distribution. Thus, ‘Hscarcity’ can be rejected. 
Overall, the findings do not support any of the hypotheses reflecting statistical and taste-
based discrimination. Instead, a rather weak late-recruiter effect can be found which, in 
contrast to the timing hypothesis, turns out to be significantly negative. Reasons for these 
ambiguous results as well as alternative explanations will be discussed in the next section. 
  DISCUSSION 5.3.4
In the following, the main results presented above will be discussed while additional 
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estimates and references to the existing empirical literature are used to put the findings 
into perspective.   
5.3.4.1 RELATION TO PRIOR FINDINGS 
The findings on ethnic discrimination mainly support results from previous 
correspondence and audit studies showing that ethnic minorities are systematically 
disadvantaged with respect to access to employment (e.g. Riach and Rich, 2002). Here, the 
German applicant, on average, can expect 4 callbacks for every 10 applications whereas 
his Turkish-named counterpart only receives 3 positive responses for every 10 attempts. 
The average callback differential oscillates around 10 percentage points and thus falls into 
the lower range of what other researchers have reported so far (3 to 43 percentage points; 
see table A-2 in the appendix). However, if the focus is restricted to ethnic Turks, the 
ethnic penalty found in the present context is located at the upper end. While prior 
evidence from Belgium and the Netherlands suggests that Turkish immigrants have a 7 to 
11 percentage points lower callback probability than observationally similar natives 
(Andriessen et al., 2012; Baert et al., 2013), callback gaps found in the German labor 
market are somewhat smaller. Goldberg et al. (1996) on average find a 1 pps gap between 
first generation Turkish immigrants and native Germans whereas Kaas and Manger 
(2012) report a 5 percentage points gap between second generation Turks and their 
German counterparts. In fact, the results indicate that the extent of differential treatment 
turns out to be higher in labor market segments where employees are on average less 
qualified. In other words, minority apprenticeship applicants seem to suffer more than e.g. 
business and economics students that were used as job candidates in the Kaas and Manger 
(2012) study. 
Qualitatively, the findings from present and prior research support what has explicitly 
been tested in a matched-pair experiment by Carlsson (2010). That is, hiring 
discrimination persists for first and second generation immigrants. However, drawing any 
conclusions from the treatment of Turks to other ethnic minorities can only be 
speculative. Former studies suggest that compared to other immigrant groups Turks 
suffer most with respect to both hiring probabilities and wages (e.g. BIBB, 2006; 
Uhlendorff and Zimmermann, 2006; Lehmer and Ludsteck, 2011). Hence, the results 
presented may rather overestimate the actual effect of discrimination faced by the entire 
population with migration background. Still, the findings may explain some of the stylized 
facts on native-immigrant labor market differences, in particular occupational segregation 
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and the gap in (youth) unemployment rates. Furthermore, firms’ discriminatory behavior 
may have caused the share of foreigners participating in dual training to decrease over the 
last decade. Not surprisingly, this reduction has been most noticeable in technical and 
industry apprenticeships such as electronic technician, mechatronic and industrial 
mechanic, all of which have been addressed in the present field experiment (BIBB, 2006). 
Table 5-35: Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Callback Dummy and Interaction of Turkish 
Name Dummy and Firm Characteristics 
Callback (I) 
Turkish name x Medium -0.002 
 (0.041) 
Turkish name x Large 0.080 
 (0.053) 
Turkish name x South 0.013 
 (0.036) 
Turkish name x East 0.040 
 (0.047) 
Turkish name x Industry -0.026 
 (0.047) 
Turkish name x Female responsible 0.110*** 
 (0.034) 
Turkish name x Late recruiter -0.039 
 (0.033) 
Controls Yes 
No. of obs. 1,216 
Pseudo R² 0.052 
Log likelihood -760.980 
Wald chi-squared 90.103 
P-value 0.000 
Notes: The model reports average marginal effects of a probit 
regression on the callback dummy (Y=1: employer calls back the job 
applicant) for the entire sample. Marginal effects are calculated at the 
mean of all independent variables. Standard errors clustered on firm 
level are in parentheses. Controls include all point estimates of the 
variables interacted. * denotes 10% significance level. ** denotes 5% 
significance level. *** denotes 1% significance level. 
Table 5-35 compares whether ethnic discrimination varies with respect to employer 
characteristics. In particular, interactions between the Turkish name and firm dummies 
are tested. The only effect that turns out to be statistically significant originates from 
recruiters’ sex. In line with the findings from e.g. Carlsson and Rooth (2007) and Carlsson 
(2010), the minority candidate has a ceteris paribus 11 percentage points higher callback 
probability if the person responsible for administrating incoming applications is female. 
Put differently, male recruiters tend to discriminate more. However, as has already been 
noted in section 5.2.3.3, the sex of actual decision makers is unobservable so that a causal 
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relationship can only be assumed. 
5.3.4.2 GROUP EXPERIENCE AND THE ROLE OF ADDITIONAL SIGNALS 
The regression estimates presented in table 5-34 indicate that both ‘Hcertificate’ and ‘Hshare of 
females’ need to be rejected. This may imply three possible explanations, i.e., (i) statistical 
discrimination does indeed not affect employers’ rationale to treat majority and minority 
applicants differently, (ii) the operationalization does not adequately reflect group 
differences in asymmetric information and (iii) the information provided helps sufficiently 
assessing the candidates’ future productivity and thus already captures the effect 
originating from statistical discrimination. Explanation (iii) can be supported by looking at 
what applications in Germany generally include. Unlike in most other countries, it is 
obligatory to attach school certificates when officially getting in touch with an employer 
for the first time. In the U.S., for example, such credentials are normally handed in at a 
later stage of the recruitment process (see previous correspondence studies presented in 
chapter 3). In case of labor market entrants, however, school certificates serve as a very 
strong and credible signal which, from an employer’s perspective, leads to a reduction of 
information asymmetries. The larger this reduction, the lower are employers’ perceived 
group differences in unobserved productivity. Consequently, any other variables proxying 
statistical discrimination become insignificant.  
Another argument concerns the operationalization. It assumes that room for statistical 
discrimination exists even in the presence of school certificates. No matter whether these 
credentials reduce asymmetric information or not, minority applicants are still 
significantly disadvantaged if employers are not equipped with further devices (such as 
reference letters) that help assessing applicants’ productivity. Yet, both the share of 
foreign applicants in t-1 as well as the inclusion of extra credentials may simply not serve 
as adequate devices in the context of apprenticeship applications. Concerning the former, 
employers may not care about whom they have evaluated in previous recruiting processes 
as is denoted by the variable ‘share of foreign applicants in t-1’, but use personal work 
experience with members of a group to proxy future performance of an applicant who 
belongs to that same group. Thus, the share of minority workers employed by the firm 
addressed in the field experiment might have led to a better understanding of whether 
differences in group experience affect employment outcomes. Unfortunately, no such data 
were available and, hence, could not be matched with job offers. 
The analysis further indicates that the provision of an additional credential does not 
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reduce the gap in callbacks. This is somewhat in contrast to the results by Kaas and 
Manger (2012). They show that the Turkish-named candidate on average has a 14 percent 
lower callback probability compared to his German-named counterpart, but that 
differential treatment becomes insignificant if reference letters by university professors 
are attached. Interestingly, the provision of these references leaves callbacks to the 
majority candidate unaffected while the minority applicant significantly benefits. The 
latter obviously has to present more credentials to signal the same productivity. This can 
be interpreted as evidence for statistical discrimination (see also Heilman, 1984; Biernat 
and Kobrynowicz, 1997). Other studies, however, challenge these results. Among others, 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) show that blacks realize inferior returns to skills as 
opposed to whites as callback differences increase if high-quality résumés are dispatched. 
Now, employers’ responses in the present study indicate a beneficial effect of extra 
credentials, but do not reveal group differences in their returns (see model (IIa) of table 
5-34 as well as tables C-10 and C-11 in the appendix). As a consequence, the callback gap 
persists and ‘Hcertificate’ cannot be supported. This, of course, does not rule out the 
possibility that additional productivity signals lead to a decrease of the callback 
differential in other labor market segments where e.g. evaluations by former employers 
provide more information on applicants’ abilities.74 
5.3.4.3 LABOR MARKET SCARCITY AND RECRUITER EFFECTS 
As model (IId) in table 5-34 demonstrates, labor market scarcity reflected by the fraction 
of vacancies among all apprenticeships offered in t-1 does not affect the extent of ethnic 
discrimination. In other words, employers do not discriminate significantly less if they are 
confronted with competition for suitable job candidates and are therefore willing to incur 
extra costs due to increased search activities and forgone productivity potentials. Previous 
research provides evidence that employers indeed respond to labor market tightness by 
changing callback behavior, in particular in favor of ethnic minorities (Kalter, 2002; Baert 
et al., 2013). Yet, these findings refer to the occupational and qualificatory rather than the 
regional labor-supply structure. The former two cannot be assessed in the present context 
since neither jobs addressed nor applicants’ résumé quality (except for additional 
                                                             
74 Other effects associated with the provision of extra credentials have been tested, but found to be 
insignificant. Zibrowius (2012), for instance, finds that returns to skills are largest where the share of 
immigrants is lowest. Interacting the certificate dummy with the share of foreign applicants in t-1, 
however, does not yield different effects by demographic groups (results not displayed but available upon 
request). 
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credentials) produce sufficient variation. With regard to regional scarcity, previous 
empirical evidence highlights that the level of employers’ prejudice differs contingent on 
societal attitudes. However, this somewhat contrasts with the idea that employers reveal 
their true tastes only if they face economic pressure in terms of labor market competition 
for talents. The lack of statistically significant results originating from the scarcity measure 
may indicate that taste discrimination either is absent or that alternative proxies (some of 
which have been tested but neither proved to be statistically significant) are required.  
In case preference-based discrimination persists, the assumption that it originates from 
customers’ distastes can be neglected for two reasons. On the one hand, apprentices in 
technical occupations do hardly get in touch with customers and, on the other hand, 
differential treatment is not statistically significant in the service sector where customer 
contact is most likely. Regarding the impact of the remaining two forms, i.e., employer and 
coworker discrimination, however, the data do not allow an unambiguous distinction. This 
point is thus left open for future research. 
Table 5-36: Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Callback Dummy with Sample Split by 
Recruiter Type 
Callback (Ia) (Ib) (IIa) (IIb) 
Turkish name -0.073*** -0.104*** -0.124*** -0.130*** 
 
(0.022) (0.027) (0.021) (0.022) 
Certificate No Yes No Yes 
Foreigners/total applicants t-1 No Yes No Yes 
Vacancies/total jobs t-1 No Yes No Yes 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
No. of obs. 522 522 694 694 
Pseudo R² 0.004 0.111 0.013 0.048 
Log likelihood -346.444 -309.127 -448.344 -432.460 
Wald chi-squared 10.646 42.830 35.191 51.666 
P-value 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Each model reports average marginal effects of a probit regression on the callback dummy (Y=1: 
employer calls back the job applicant). Marginal effects are calculated at the means of all independent 
variables and denote an infinitesimal change in case of continuous variables and a discrete change in case of 
dummy variables. Standard errors clustered on firm level are in parentheses. Models (Ia) and (Ib) consider 
early recruiter sample, models (IIa) and (IIb) late recruiter sample. Either model includes only male-
dominated jobs. * denotes 10% significance level. ** denotes 5% significance level. *** denotes 1% significance 
level. 
Lastly, the analyses indicate that recruiter type at least weakly affects callback 
differentials. However, the estimated effect contradicts what has been hypothesized by 
‘Htiming’. As indicated by model (IIc) in table 5-34, the gap in callback rates is 5.2 percentage 
points higher if applicants address late recruiters. Yet, unlike in the experiment on gender 
discrimination, the negative and statistically significant interaction does not cause the 
effect of the Turkish name dummy to become insignificant. In other words, discrimination 
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can also be found among early recruiters. This can further be demonstrated by splitting 
the sample across recruiter types (see table 5-36). While average marginal effects of the 
ethnicity dummy vary between 7.3 and 10.4 percentage points in the early-recruiter 
sample (model (Ia) and (Ib)), they range from 12.4 to 13.0 percentage points if only late 
recruiters are considered (model (IIa) and (IIb)).  
Again, a plausible explanation for the late-recruiter effect may be based on systematic 
differences in management quality or, more specifically, in recruitment practices. Table 
5-37 tries to capture these differences by conducting two separate probit regressions on 
(i) the probability that the applicant receives any response on behalf of the employer and 
(ii) the probability that the employer reacts after being reminded conditional on that he 
has responded at all. If, ceteris paribus, the late recruiter dummy turns out to be 
statistically significant in any of these specifications, at least some evidence on the 
management quality argument is provided. In fact, it seems that late recruiters lack 
proficiency in administrating applications. They are 15.3 percentage points more likely to 
postpone any reaction unless the job candidate inquires. Recruiter type thus somehow 
acts as a proxy for management quality which in turn seems to affect the extent of ethnic 
discrimination. 
Table 5-37: Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Response and Reaction to Reminder Dummy 
 
(Response) (Reaction to reminder) 
Late recruiter 0.005 0.153*** 
 
(0.032) (0.038) 
Firm 
characteristics 
Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 1,216 962 
Pseudo R² 0.054 0.064 
Log likelihood -589.430 -527.519 
Wald chi-squared 42.912 47.930 
P-value 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Table reports average marginal effects of a probit regression on the response 
(Y=1: applicant receives a response on behalf of the employer) and reacting to 
reminder (Y=1: Firm responds only after being reminded given that a firm responds at 
all) dummy. Standard errors clustered on firm level are in parentheses. * denotes 10% 
significance level. ** denotes 5% significance level. *** denotes 1% significance level. 
Overall, support for the postulated hypothesis from the empirical analyses is rather poor. 
Apart from a weak recruiter effect, taste-based and statistical discrimination do not seem 
to deliver further insights into the systematic patterns of ethnic hiring discrimination.    
5.3.4.4 THE ROLE OF SOCIETAL ATTITUDES 
Perceptions of the role of ethnic minorities in the labor market and in society may vary 
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across regions. People living in the Eastern federal states and rural areas, for example, are 
said to be more prejudiced towards foreigners and fellow citizens with migration 
background. Sociological and psychological approaches assume that tastes prevailing in 
society may shape employers’ attitudes and, as a result, their recruiting behavior (Charles 
and Guryan, 2008). Previous research links employers’ implicit attitudes as well as 
differences in a population’s explicit (i.e., revealed) attitudes to ethnic discrimination. 
Recall that the study by Rooth (2010) finds a 5 percentage points decrease in the minority 
candidate’s callback probability with a one standard deviation increase in recruiters’ 
implicit association test score. Moreover, Carlsson and Rooth (2011) merge results from a 
social survey on attitudes towards ethnic minorities with data from a correspondence test. 
They show that regional variations in people’s opinions on these minorities affect hiring 
probabilities of Middle Eastern-named job candidates significantly.  
To reflect and quantify regional differences in tastes in the course of the present study, 
voting results from the last German Federal Elections in 2009 are used. Fortunately, these 
results can be broken down to areas in which the firms addressed by the applicants are 
located. The parties involved in the election represent different attitudes towards ethnic 
minorities. In this respect, the electorates of the major parties do not substantially differ 
from each other. Some parties may be considered as more devoted to issues on 
integration, but, in general, all of them have tried to establish a foreigner-friendly culture 
in Germany in the recent past. However, one exception known beyond regional levels 
remains. The National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) is a neo-fascist party which, in 
a nutshell, means that they encounter ethnic minorities with extreme prejudice. The share 
of votes assigned to the NPD may thus be considered a proxy for regional distastes. If these 
distastes affect employers’ recruiting decisions, the extent of ethnic discrimination should 
increase with the share of NPD votes. The respective percentage averages 1.86 percent 
and ranges from 0 to 5.8 percent in the sample. 
Table 5-38 shows average marginal effects of probit regressions on the callback dummy. 
Models (Ia) and (Ib) add an interaction between the Turkish name dummy and the share 
of NPD votes excluding and including firm and labor market controls, respectively. In turn, 
models (IIa) and (IIb) include an interaction between the name dummy and a dummy that 
equals one if the share of NPD votes exceeds its average. Again, the former does not 
include controls while the latter does. Surprisingly, the results indicate the opposite to 
what has been expected. In the first two models, only the name dummy turns out to be 
statistically significant. However, in models (IIa) and (IIb) also the interaction effect is 
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positive and statistically significant. Depending on the model specification, the minority 
candidate has an 8.6 to 10.6 higher callback probability in regions where the share of NPD 
votes exceeds the sample average. Even though differential treatment remains, unlike 
expected, the callback gap is substantially reduced in potentially less foreigner-friendly 
areas. This effect persists even if labor market scarcity and the share of foreign applicants 
are controlled for (see model (IIb)). Hence, the present findings seem to contradict the 
results by Rooth (2010) and Carlsson and Rooth (2011) and suggest that societal attitudes 
proxied by electoral results foster a convergence rather than a divergence of the majority-
minority hiring gap. 
Table 5-38: Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Callback Dummy and Interaction of Name 
Dummy and Share of NPD Votes 
Callback (Ia) (Ib) (IIa) (IIb) 
Turkish name -0.130*** -0.141*** -0.137*** -0.153*** 
 (0.033) (0.035) (0.024) (0.025) 
Share NPD votes -0.015 -0.044 -0.023 -0.053* 
 (0.020) (0.031) (0.020) (0.031) 
Turkish name x  0.015 0.017   
Share NPD votes (0.015) (0.016)   
Turkish name x   0.086** 0.106** 
Share NPD votes above average  (0.041) (0.042) 
Controls No Yes No Yes 
No. of obs. 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216 
Pseudo R² 0.009 0.049 0.011 0.052 
Log likelihood -795.331 -762.751 -793.874 -760.695 
Wald chi-squared 44.721 83.312 46.789 88.473 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Table reports average marginal effects of a probit regression on the callback dummy (Y=1: employer 
calls back the job applicant). Marginal effects are calculated at the mean of all independent variables and 
denote an infinitesimal change in case of continuous variables and a discrete change in case of dummy 
variables. Standard errors clustered on firm level are in parentheses. * denotes 10% significance level. ** 
denotes 5% significance level. *** denotes 1% significance level. 
5.4 METHODOLOGICAL VARIATIONS 
This section focuses on the effect of methodological variations, i.e., dispatching only a 
single versus matched-pair applications, on aggregate response and callback rates. In 
particular, it is tested whether competition in correspondence testing systematically leads 
to different hiring outcomes for the majority and minority candidates. Such a comparison 
also enables the researcher to fully exclude any bias from deception on behalf of 
employers which, on the one hand, would result in significantly lower callback rates in 
case of the correspondence method and, on the other hand, would underestimate the 
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extent of discrimination against the minority candidate as a higher fraction of employers 
would treat the candidates equally.  
Therefore, in the last application period (May 2012) in both the study on gender and 
ethnic discrimination not only paired applications were dispatched, but the same set of 
résumés was also sent out individually. The latter is subsequently referred to as the ‘single 
application method’ while the former is either called ‘pairwise application’ or 
‘correspondence method’. Table C-14 in the appendix shows the descriptive statistics of 
the method comparison in the gender study. Apart from the use of the correspondence 
approach where 149 employers were addressed, the male and the female candidate 
applied individually in 73 cases resulting in an overall number of 444 single applications. 
Put differently, around 67 percent of companies’ responses were generated within the 
correspondence setting while the remaining 33 percent arose from single applications. All 
in all, the candidates received a response in 80 percent and were promoted to the next 
stage of the recruitment process in around 40 percent of the cases. Analogously to the 
study presented in section 5.2, men and women dispatched their applications equally 
often. Apart from that, it has to be noted that the majority of the jobs considered here can 
be classified as female-dominated. Hence, the results from above suggest that no 
systematic differences between the two candidate groups should be expected.  
In a similar way as the dataset generated by the résumés for the study on gender 
discrimination, the data for the method comparison with respect to ethnic discrimination 
were collected. In addition to the 101 cases where employers received an application from 
both candidates, in, respectively, 49 and 51 cases either the German- or the Turkish-
named candidate applied. Thus, overall, 302 applications were dispatched of which 
around 80 percent ended with a response and 45.4 percent with a callback. As indicated 
by the correspondence variable, two thirds of the responses originate from pairwise 
application testing while one third goes back to the single application method (see table 
C-15 in the appendix). 
For either subsample, expectations are very similar, i.e., overall response and callback 
rates should not differ conditional on the method chosen. In the same vein, results on 
gender and ethnic discrimination should neither qualitatively nor quantitatively vary. If 
they do, it cannot be excluded that the application method impacts on differential 
treatment. 
Next, the aggregate results from the two methodological approaches are compared for 
both datasets. Table 5-39 reveals no statistically significant differences between the single 
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and pairwise application method for any response type, i.e., no response (3.80 percentage 
points), rejection (3.24 percentage points) and callback (0.56 percentage points). 
Moreover, the differences between the methods separated by gender do also not turn out 
to be statistically significant. The same holds true for a comparison in the context of the 
ethnicity study (see table 5-40). Again, chi-squared tests on method-specific outcome 
differences indicate that neither the overall results nor employers’ responses by name do 
significantly differ as a function of the application method.       
Table 5-39: Firms’ Responses by Method and Gender 
  
Single application 
(N=146) 
Pairwise application 
(N=298) 
Total 
(N=444) 
Differences between 
methods 
  
Male 
(N=73) 
Female 
(N=73) 
Male 
(N=149) 
Female 
(N=149) 
Male 
(N=222) 
Female 
(N=222) 
Male Female 
No response 
21.92 18.12 19.37 3.80 pps 
27.40 16.44 18.79 17.45 21.62 17.12 8.61 pps -1.01 pps 
         
Rejection 
39.04 42.28 41.22 -3.24 pps 
35.62 42.47 40.94 43.62 39.19 43.24 -5.32 pps -1.15 pps 
         
Callback 
39.04 39.60 39.41 -0.56 pps 
36.99 41.10 40.27 38.93 39.19 39.64 -3.28 pps 2.17 pps 
Notes: The table reports detailed responses by method and gender as a fraction of the overall number of 
applications in percent. Overall as well as gender-specific differences between methods are reported in 
percentage points. Chi-squared tests cannot reject the null hypothesis (H0: The single and pairwise application 
methods are equally likely to produce a case of no response, rejection and callback, respectively).  
Table 5-40: Firms’ Responses by Method and Name 
  
Single application 
(N=100) 
Pairwise application 
(N=202) 
Total  
(N=302) 
Differences between 
methods 
  
German  
name  
(N=49) 
Turkish 
name  
(N=51) 
German  
name 
 (N=101) 
Turkish  
name 
 (N=101) 
German 
name 
(N=150) 
Turkish 
 name 
(N=152) 
German  
name 
Turkish  
name 
No response 
16.00 21.78 19.87 -5.78 pps 
10.20 21.57 17.82 25.74 15.33 24.34 -7.62 pps -4.17 pps 
         
Rejection 
36.00 34.16 34.77 1.84 pps 
34.69 37.25 29.70 38.61 31.33 38.16 4.99 pps -1.36 pps 
         
Callback 
48.00 44.06 45.36 3.94 pps 
55.10 41.18 52.48 35.64 53.33 37.50 2.62 pps 5.54 pps 
Notes: The table reports detailed responses by method and name as a fraction of the overall number of 
applications in percent. Overall as well as gender-specific differences between methods are reported in 
percentage points. Chi-squared tests cannot reject the null hypothesis (H0: The single and pairwise application 
methods are equally likely to produce a case of no response, rejection and callback, respectively). 
Subsequently, multivariate analyses are conducted to further investigate what has already 
been suggested by the descriptive results. The full empirical models for the probit 
regressions conducted below look as follows: 
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  (        )                                               
                                                    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗     
and 
  (        )                                                
                                                    ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗       
where    is a constant,    denotes the regression coefficient   of regressor   and    
represents a normally distributed error term of applicant  . The correspondence variable 
is a dummy that equals 1 if two matched applications were sent out in response to the 
same job offer. The dummy representing the minority group equals 1 either if the 
candidate was female or Turkish-named (depending on the dataset). In order to test the 
effect on the probability of receiving a response or a callback by the firms, two regressions 
with these two dependent variables were estimated separately for each sample. Controls 
include firm characteristics, regional labor market data, the certificate dummy, the job 
type (only in the gender study), the number of open positions, the distance as well as the 
dispatching order (which always equals 1 if only a single application is sent out) and the 
résumé design. 
It could further be argued that, for instance, the minority candidate disproportionally 
benefits from not being in competition with an equally qualified applicant from the 
majority group for reasons discussed in the previous sections. The reference group, i.e., 
the German-named male candidate, might suffer if employers are unable to compare his 
application with someone being equipped with similar human capital endowments. Hence, 
the positive effects from direct competition for one candidate may outweigh the negative 
impact for the other candidate and vice versa. Consequently, an interaction term is 
included in the model that equals 1 if the minority group, i.e., the female or Turkish-named 
candidate, applies within the correspondence setting. The estimated coefficient should 
then account for any method-specific differences across groups. 
Models (I) to (III) in tables 5-41 and 5-42 report average marginal effects from probit 
regressions on the response dummy. Both estimations indicate that the selection of the 
application method does not affect the likelihood of whether the employer contacts the job 
candidate or not. The point estimates of the correspondence dummy turn out to be 
statistically insignificant independent of the inclusion of an interaction term. Thus, there is 
no difference in employers’ response behavior between the correspondence and single 
application method. In addition, no gender and name effects can be observed as neither 
interaction coefficient turns out to be statistically significant. Due to the insignificant 
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effects, not surprisingly, the explanatory power of the regression models is rather low. 
This especially applies to the estimates in table 5-41 that do not predict employers’ 
responses any better than the intercept model.  
More convincingly and additionally supportive of the nonexistence of a correspondence 
effect are the results from probit analyses on the callback dummy. Focusing on the gender 
study, models (IV) to (VI) of table 5-41 show that the marginal effects of the 
correspondence dummy are insignificant. Apart from that, the insignificant interaction 
term in model (VI) does not lend support to any gender-specific effect. 
Table 5-41: The Effects of the Correspondence Dummy on Response and Callback Rates in the Gender 
Study  
 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
Correspondence 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.08 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
Female  0.04 0.09  -0.00 0.05 
 
 (0.03) (0.06)  (0.04) (0.08) 
Correspondence 
x Female   
-0.08   -0.09 
  
(0.08)   (0.09) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 444 444 444 444 444 444 
Pseudo R² 0.045 0.047 0.050 0.059 0.059 0.060 
Log likelihood -208.442 -207.889 -207.374 -280.117 -280.113 -279.750 
Wald chi-squared 13.808 14.887 15.463 29.121 29.111 29.648 
P-value 0.540 0.533 0.562 0.016 0.023 0.029 
Notes: Each model reports average marginal effects of a probit regression on the response dummy (Y=1: 
employer gives the applicant either a rejection or a callback) (models (I) to (III)) and the callback dummy 
(Y=1: employer calls back the job applicant) (models (IV) to (VI)), respectively. Marginal effects are 
calculated at the mean of all independent variables and denote an infinitesimal change in case of continuous 
variables and a discrete change in case of dummy variables. Standard errors clustered on firm level are in 
parentheses. Regressions consider the entire sample as of table C-14 in the appendix. * denotes 10% 
significance level. ** denotes 5% significance level. *** denotes 1% significance level. 
In line with this finding, the effect of the correspondence variable also turns out to be 
insignificant if the sample of the study on ethnic discrimination is considered (see models 
(IV) to (VI) of table 5-42). Both, the point estimate and interaction term do not 
significantly affect the hiring outcome. The systematic disadvantage of the Turkish-named 
applicant, however, remains. The minority candidate has an 18 percentage points lower 
chance of being invited to a job interview. If the name is interacted with the 
correspondence dummy, the effect becomes statistically insignificant which is most likely 
due to the small number of observations causing an increase in standard errors. 
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Table 5-42: The Effects of the Correspondence Dummy on Response and Callback Rates in the 
Ethnicity Study 
 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
Correspondence  -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) 
Turkish name 
 
-0.10*** -0.12  -0.18*** -0.16 
 
 
(0.04) (0.08)  (0.05) (0.10) 
Correspondence 
x Turkish name 
  
0.03   -0.02 
  
(0.09)   (0.11) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 302 302 302 302 302 302 
Pseudo R² 0.074 0.088 0.089 0.034 0.056 0.056 
Log likelihood -139.484 -137.261 -137.213 -200.854 -196.429 -196.414 
Wald chi-squared 17.185 23.550 25.760 10.219 22.480 24.982 
P-value 0.246 0.073 0.058 0.746 0.096 0.070 
Notes: Each model reports average marginal effects of a probit regression on the response dummy (Y=1: 
employer gives the applicant either a rejection or a callback) (models (I) to (III)) and the callback dummy 
(Y=1: employer calls back the job applicant) (models (IV) to (VI)), respectively. Marginal effects are 
calculated at the mean of all independent variables and denote an infinitesimal change in case of continuous 
variables and a discrete change in case of dummy variables. Standard errors clustered on firm level are in 
parentheses. Regressions consider the entire sample as of table C-15 in the appendix. * denotes 10% 
significance level. ** denotes 5% significance level. *** denotes 1% significance level. 
Overall, the regression estimates indicate that the study design, i.e., whether single or 
matched pairs of applications are dispatched, neither affects joint hiring outcomes, nor 
callback probabilities by gender and name. These findings are robust across various model 
specifications and for two different datasets. Beyond that, the interaction effects all remain 
statistically insignificant for different combinations of the other independent variables.75 
The implications are thus twofold.  
First, the presence and extent of discrimination demonstrated by the correspondence 
studies in section 5.2 and 5.3 are unbiased from any method-specific effects. Even though 
there has been increasing media coverage as a result of the Kaas and Manger (2012) study 
and the pilot project on anonymous applications (Krause et al., 2012b), the deceptive 
nature of the matched-pair testing apparently has not been revealed. This is further 
supported by findings reported in Carlsson and Rooth (2012) who neither find a 
relationship between public attention and employers’ discriminatory behavior. Second, 
the evidence presented above supports the use of the single application method as an 
alternative to the correspondence testing. On the one hand, it further reduces the 
(involuntary) effort on behalf of employers which may increase acceptance of this 
                                                             
75 Graphics illustrating the interaction effects are available from the author upon request. 
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experimental approach. On the other hand, using the single application method eliminates 
any remaining criticism associated with the correspondence method claiming that 
evidence of discrimination may be biased if employers reveal the deceptive nature of the 
study. For multivariate analyses of firms’ responses, candidates could then be matched 
according to employer characteristics. At least the aggregate results for each demographic 
group should not significantly differ if the candidates apply individually. 
So far, a ceteris paribus comparison of the single and pairwise application method has not 
been conducted. Only Gringart and Helmes (2001) use both approaches simultaneously. 
However, they investigate whether paired and single applications produce the same hiring 
outcomes if unsolicited applications rather than applications addressing publicly available 
job offers are dispatched. They draw the same conclusion with respect to aggregate hiring 
outcomes, but do not focus on any group-specific differences. Thus, to the best of the 
author’s knowledge, the present study is the first showing that both procedures come to 
equivalent results. In fact, the single application method proves to be advantageous 
relative to correspondence testing in terms of lower costs to employers and higher 
feasibility on behalf of the researcher. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
The last chapter begins with a summary of the main findings (6.1). Section 6.2 outlines 
where the present thesis has made a contribution to the academic literature before a 
special focus is laid upon policy implications and a discussion under which conditions any 
policy measures are likely to eliminate hiring discrimination (6.3). Finally, the thesis 
concludes by highlighting limitations and suggesting directions for future research (6.4). 
6.1 SUMMARY OF OVERALL FINDINGS 
This thesis has presented results of two large-scaled field experiments designed to 
investigate gender and ethnic discrimination in predominantly male-dominated jobs in the 
German labor market for apprenticeships. Apprenticeships matter for both the labor 
market’s demand and supply side. In Germany, a significant number of school graduates 
start their working careers as apprentices and quite often use dual training as a doorstep 
into regular employment. Employers, in contrast, either satisfy their current labor demand 
with apprentices or strategically invest in apprenticeship training to guarantee the supply 
of qualified labor in the future.  
Firms offering apprenticeship positions in the years 2011 and 2012 were addressed by 
two equally equipped applicants that only differed with respect to one demographic 
characteristic such as gender in the first and ethnic background in the second study. The 
matched-pair design allows separating a treatment effect based on these characteristics 
from any other factors driving labor market differences. In particular, the pre-selection 
stage in the recruitment process, i.e., employers’ callbacks to written applications, were 
reported for either candidate and compared between the control and minority group.  
The study on gender discrimination, first of all, highlights that differential treatment 
mainly depends on the job type. Discrimination against the female candidate can only be 
observed in male-dominated occupations where women have a 19 percent (6.5 percentage 
points) lower callback probability as compared to men. A closer look at the factors 
influencing differential treatment shows that prior experience with female applicants as 
well as above-average labor market scarcity in the previous year have a statistically 
significant and positive impact on women’s callback probabilities, but are economically 
marginal at best. In other words, the overall disadvantage of the female candidate neither 
disappears nor substantially decreases. Instead, the point in time when women apply for 
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an apprenticeship affects their hiring probabilities relative to men. While male applicants 
have statistically the same callback rates independent of the application period, 
discrimination against the female candidates is restricted to late recruiters that publish 
their job offers shortly before the scheduled start of the contract.   
With regard to the correspondence test investigating discrimination against Turkish-
named applicants, the prevalence of discriminatory treatment has been found, although its 
sources remain rather suggestive. In fact, the minority candidate has a 32 percent (10.2 
percentage points) lower chance of receiving a positive response from the firms 
addressed. Recruiter-type weakly affects the magnitude of this effect whereas late 
recruiters discriminate somewhat more. Hypotheses directly reflecting taste-based and 
statistical discrimination, however, are not supported. The inclusion of an additional 
credential equally benefits the majority and minority candidate and thus does not reduce 
the callback gap. Similarly, employers’ behavior does not systematically change with a one 
standard deviation increase in the share of foreign applicants and in the ratio of unfilled to 
total apprenticeships. 
Lastly, a subsample of both studies has been used to assess whether the results produced 
with the correspondence method persist if single rather than pair-wise applications are 
dispatched. The analyses here indicate that the findings are independent of 
methodological variations and yield the same outcomes.   
6.2 CONTRIBUTION TO ACADEMIC RESEARCH 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first study that uses the correspondence 
method to investigate gender discrimination in access to employment in the German labor 
market. The study design not only allows identifying the prevalence of discriminatory 
treatment, but (also) provides direct evidence of its sources, none of which has been 
considered in the context of apprenticeship training thus far. The general findings are in 
line with similar field experiments from other countries and suggest that females are 
discriminated in male-dominated jobs. Yet, the involvement of both taste-based and 
statistical discrimination in employers’ decision making process has not been found to 
exist to date. Most strikingly is the fact that the market seems to be divided into 
discriminators and non-discriminators where evidence is provided that links recruiter-
type to managerial proficiency. Whether recruiter-type is endogenous, i.e., proves to be a 
result of inferior labor market reputation through systematic discriminatory treatment in 
the past, cannot be answered with the data at hand. Moreover, the cross-sectional 
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character does not permit any conclusions on whether discriminators are driven out of the 
market in the long run, which would be a direct consequence of Becker’s taste for 
discrimination approach. 
With regard to the study on ethnic discrimination, results from prior research are 
qualitatively supported. Quantitatively, the extent of discrimination oscillates around the 
lower end of what has been found in foreign labor markets, but turns out to be higher 
compared to other studies conducted in Germany (see Goldberg et al., 1996; Kaas and 
Manger, 2012). The latter is in line with the predictions by Kaas and Manger (2012) who 
expect discrimination to be more prominent in low-qualified jobs. The evidence presented, 
however, goes along with the taste-based discrimination approach, given that 
misplacement of high-qualified positions is more costly and high-qualified employees are 
more difficult to find. Conversely, in relation to the findings from other labor markets, the 
relatively small hiring gap can be related to the increasing importance of apprentices to 
satisfy employers’ future labor demand and their exposed position compared to other 
entry-level and low-qualified jobs predominantly analyzed in previous research. 
Overall, the role of taste-based and statistical discrimination seems to be arguable. In fact, 
most of the hypotheses reflecting any of these approaches cannot be supported. 
Undoubtedly, further research studying and disentangling the effects from economic 
motives of discrimination is required. When designing future field experiments, though, 
results from methodological variations have shown that researchers should consider using 
(previously matched) single applications to approach employers as a suitable alternative 
to pair-wise testing.  
6.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Regarding the situation in the German labor market, the results presented are somewhat 
surprising. Even though employers continuously claim that their demand for qualified 
labor, especially in technical occupations, cannot, or at least not sufficiently, be satisfied, 
minority workers still face disadvantages in access to these jobs. This particularly 
counteracts initiatives with the goal to increase, for example, the fraction of women in 
male-dominated jobs and contradicts statements in job offers that prompt female 
candidates to apply. Given this affirmative environment, one would expect that women 
are, all other things equal, even favored when applying for male-dominated jobs. Selecting 
into these jobs may signal additional skills (e.g. assertiveness and ambition) which are not 
directly conveyed by written applications. Yet, the opposite holds true so that, as a result, 
  
171 
 
labor market segregation persists with far-reaching consequences, inter alia, for wages, 
career profiles and even pre-market investment decisions. The results also quite 
convincingly outline the discrepancy between what employers state and how they actually 
(re)act. Reconsidering the ongoing discussion on voluntary and obligatory female quotas 
in top-management positions, similar developments can obviously be observed in other 
labor market segments, i.e., employers claim their good will, but lack revealing 
consequences.   
From a policy-maker perspective, the discussion should rather emphasize how the 
callback differences found in the data can be eliminated or, at least, reduced. On a 
macroeconomic level, researchers have investigated the impact of changes in the 
legislation on equal opportunities in access to employment and have found that the 
introduction of anti-discrimination laws has been beneficial to females as well as racial 
minorities (e.g. Beller, 1982; Heckman and Payner, 1989). On firm level, though, the 
evidence is quite heterogeneous (Pager and Shepherd, 2008). The effects of Equal 
Employment Opportunity Laws are often hard to separate from any convergences that go 
back to increasing human capital endowments and improved schooling quality. Not 
surprisingly, differential treatment unrelated to productivity may still prevail as the 
present study shows. 
One way to overcome intended and unintended discriminatory behavior is the 
implementation of some forms of blinding measures. While blind auditions indeed have 
raised the share of females in U.S. orchestras (Goldin and Rouse, 2000), a much more 
frequently used procedure in regular recruitment settings are anonymous applications. 
With this method, any information that allows inferences on applicants’ demographic 
characteristics such as names, profile pictures and dates is made inaccessible to recruiters. 
In this way, the focus is solely upon productivity-driving factors that can actively be 
influenced by applicants. Unlike in the German labor market, highlighting human capital 
endowments and covering characteristics pre-determined by birth is very common in 
other countries (Krause et al., 2010). However, empirical evidence of its success in 
promoting minorities’ employment opportunities is very limited and has only produced 
spurious results in favor of this procedure (Åslund and Nordström Skans, 2012; Krause et 
al., 2012a). In fact, reports following a pilot project that has tested anonymous 
applications in Germany show only marginally improved hiring opportunities for minority 
groups (Krause et al., 2012b). A thorough analysis of the costs and benefits associated with 
this procedure is, yet, missing.  
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Another way to address differential treatment is the implementation of affirmative action 
policies that actively promote the recruitment of minority applicants and may reach as far 
as exerting reverse discrimination, i.e., favoring minorities, all other things being equal 
(Holzer and Neumark, 2000a). Previous evidence shows that affirmative action policies 
increase the number of employers’ recruiting and screening practices as well as their 
actual hires of ethnic minorities and females without suffering from a decrease in 
applicants’ and employees’ quality (Holzer and Neumark, 2000b).  
As an alternative to measures that are embedded in the formal and organizational 
structure of the firm, results from audit and correspondence tests can be used simply to 
raise recruiters’ consciousness on the prevalence of discrimination and its sources 
(Greenwald and Banaji, 1995). Understanding the latter is particularly crucial when 
deciding upon the implementation of a particular measure or a set of measures. Given the 
prevalence of taste-based discrimination, anonymizing applications would only postpone 
discriminatory treatment to the next stage of the recruitment process where, for example, 
in a face-to-face interview most demographic characteristics are revealed. As a 
consequence, discrimination persists while, simultaneously, both employers and 
applicants are confronted with higher costs from e.g. the time spent for preparing, 
travelling and conducting job interviews. On the other hand, in the presence of statistical 
discrimination, anonymous applications may well serve as a means to not only increase 
minorities’ callbacks, but also their hiring probabilities. Having passed the first stage of the 
recruitment process, minorities have the possibility to convince employers of their 
individual quality and thus discard any negative perceptions based on group membership. 
If only statistical discrimination prevailed, the treatment effects would have been more 
prominent than actually reported. This, in turn, gives rise to the current results from the 
gender study indicating the presence of both statistical and taste-based discrimination. 
Initial blinding measures would therefore only eliminate differential treatment at 
workplaces where employers, coworkers and customers have neutral preferences.  
Any recommendations with respect to diversity initiatives on firm level originating from 
the present findings remain somewhat suggestive. Previous evidence, for instance, finds 
that minority hires increase if the person responsible for the recruitment process belongs 
to the same minority group (e.g. Stoll et al., 2004; Giuliano and Levine, 2009). However, 
whether these effects reflect prejudices and information asymmetries or can be explained 
by sociological approaches such as similarity attraction (Byrne, 1971) or social identity 
theory (Tajfel, 1982) remains unanswered. Unfortunately, in the current context, gender 
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and ethnic background of the actual decision maker cannot be retraced with certainty 
which makes any inferences on e.g. in-group favoritism sensitive to bias. Similarly, no 
information on demographic characteristics of employers’ workforces is available which 
makes empirical investigations on the role of workforce diversity on discriminatory 
practices impossible. 
Undoubtedly, the present findings stimulate the discussion on inequalities in access to 
employment. Policy makers may use the results to raise awareness among employers. 
Employers, in turn, may check their current recruitment practices for any group bias and, 
if necessary, establish more formalized procedures that leave less room for personal 
preferences and productivity misperceptions based on group membership. Besides, it 
seems worthwhile for employers to assess how coworkers’ distastes influence hiring 
discrimination and what can be done to decrease the costs associated with group 
preferences.  
From an applicant’s perspective, the results from both the gender and ethnicity study 
strongly suggest minority candidates to address job offers from early recruiters as this 
significantly narrows the gap in callback rates between them and equally qualified 
majority applicants. After all, policy implications should be closely linked to the type of 
discrimination. 
6.4 LIMITATIONS AND OUTLOOK 
The field experiments entail a couple of limitations concerning the methodological 
approach, the data collected and the generalizability of results. First, matched-pair testing 
with fictitious applicants only allows observing the initial stage of the recruitment process. 
While previous research suggests that discrimination is most prominent when first 
contact takes place, it cannot be ruled out that the actual hiring gap is abolished, reduced 
or increased. Second, the market for apprenticeships only represents a snapshot of the 
German labor market as a whole. The prevalence and magnitude of discrimination may 
thus vary depending on the labor market segment investigated which calls for the 
inclusion of other industries and occupational positions. Third, the results unveiling the 
presence of ethnic discrimination refer to ethnic Turks but should not be regarded as 
evidence for discrimination against other ethnic minorities. According to previous 
empirical findings from the German labor market, callback rates of other minority groups 
are very likely to deviate from those of second generation Turks (see literature review in 
chapter 3.2.2). The fourth limitation concerns data availability. Unfortunately, no 
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information on the entire applicant pool, the quality of applications as well as firms’ 
training portfolios and threshold levels is available. As a consequence, no evidence on the 
relationship between recruitment standards, labor-supply competition, employers’ 
reputation as a training company and differential treatment could be produced.  
Finally, some problems are associated with the use of regional labor market data. Since 
companies all over Germany were referred to, while, at the same time, administrative 
constraints restricted the number of observations, for some regions employers’ responses 
to only one correspondence pair exist. This, in turn, may result in small observation biases. 
Besides, the number of job offers in a region may be endogenous to the attractiveness of 
employers operating in that area. Employers’ attractiveness, on the other hand, may be 
based upon their reputation in the labor market which, as has been argued in the 
empirical section, may negatively correlate with (the extent of) discriminatory behavior. 
Future research should address the issues outlined above and continue focusing on the 
separation of taste-based and statistical discrimination. The design of further 
correspondence tests should permit more in-depth analyses of differences in returns to 
schooling and additional credentials. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), for example, 
create low and high quality résumés and find different return rates between white and 
black applicants, ceteris paribus. In the same vein, future research may vary years of 
schooling, school grades as well as the number and quality of work certificates. Thus, 
analyzing whether both, either or none of the applicant groups benefit from an increase in 
skill levels and amount of information provided is made possible. If the callback gap 
diminishes with supplemental credentials, the prevalence of statistical discrimination 
would be supported. In contrast, if not only informational deficits are abolished, but more 
ability is signaled, a decrease in discrimination would be a rational response to higher 
costs associated with ongoing and more intense search efforts and thus signal taste-based 
discrimination. Thus, the inclusion of credentials may be used as a proxy for different 
types of discrimination which should be considered carefully if matched-pair studies are 
set up. In order to clearly identify the effect of labor market scarcity, the extent of 
discrimination between a small number of a priori selected regions and occupations that 
differ with respect to labor supply and demand need to be compared (one such example is 
presented by Baert et al. (2013)). 
Enhancing the number of observations by repeating matched-pair tests (retaining the 
experimental design) at the same employers in subsequent years would enable the 
researcher to build a (balanced) panel and allow further analyses of the recruiter effects 
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by using fixed and random effects regressions. In particular, this would enable the 
researcher to observe whether recruiters respond to increasing/ decreasing labor market 
scarcity by shifting from late to early job offers and vice versa.  
Even though the present studies empirically confirm the prevalence of hiring 
discrimination, it also remains subject to forthcoming research whether and under which 
conditions these systematic differences persist. In light of the demographic changes, 
higher skill requirements, voluntary and obligatory affirmative action policies and the 
increasing importance of employer branding, discrimination in the labor market may 
disappear in the long run. However, other trends might hinder or stop the discrimination-
driven convergence of employment gaps. Investigating these trends promises further 
insights and therefore is a fruitful ground for future empirical research. 
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APPENDIX 
A. OVERVIEW OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS FROM CORRESPONDENCE STUDIES 
Table A-1: A Partial List of Correspondence Studies Investigating Gender Discrimination 
Author(s) and 
year of 
publication 
Location 
Time 
period 
Occupation 
No. of job 
offers 
addressed 
Callback rate 
Men Women Difference 
Carlsson (2011) 
Sweden 
(Stockholm, 
Gothenburg) 
05/2005-
02/2006 
Computer professional 106 0.22 0.23 -0.01 
Motor-vehicle driver 78 0.24 0.21 0.03 
Construction worker 64 0.30 0.20 0.10 
Business sales assistant 278 0.35 0.41 -0.06** 
Lower secondary school teacher 
(language) 60 0.47 0.47 0.00 
Upper secondary school 
teacher 
64 0.33 0.3 0.03 
Restaurant worker 140 0.08 0.19 -0.11*** 
Accountant 186 0.13 0.21 -0.08*** 
Cleaner 62 0.08 0.11 -0.03 
Preschool teacher 184 0.61 0.67 -0.06 
Shop sales assistant 200 0.15 0.15 0.00 
Lower secondary school teacher 
(math and science) 42 0.57 0.55 0.02 
Nurse 150 0.33 0.29 0.04 
Albert et al. 
(2011)1 
Spain 
(Madrid) 
10/05-
11/05 & 
01/06-
06/06 
Sales representative 1,130 0.17 0.16 0.01 
Marketing technician 1,080 0.02 0.02 0.00 
Accountant assistant 990 0.08 0.11 -0.03*** 
Accountant 830 0.06 0.07 -0.01 
Administrative 
assistant/receptionist 
880 0.03 0.10 -0.07*** 
Executive secretary 400 0.05 0.16 -0.11*** 
Booth and Leigh 
(2010)1 
Australia 
(Brisbane, 
Melbourne, 
Sydney) 
04/07-
10/07 
Waitstaff 863 0.30 0.40 -0.10*** 
Data-entry 851 0.19 0.33 -0.14*** 
Customer service 832 0.26 0.29 -0.03 
Sales 819 0.25 0.26 -0.01 
Riach and Rich 
(2006b) 
U.K.  
(London) 
N/A 
Chartered accountant 339 0.10 0.13 -0.03* 
Computer analyst programmer 130 0.14 0.23 -0.09*** 
Engineer  173 0.17 0.12 0.05* 
Secretary 231 0.09 0.19 -0.10*** 
Weichselbaumer 
(2004) 
Austria 
(Vienna) 
Early 
1998 – 
fall 1999 
Network technician 117 0.73 0.58 0.15*** 
Computer programmer 88 0.82 0.81 0.01 
Accountant 149 0.40 0.43 -0.03 
Secretary 123 0.20 0.44 -0.24*** 
Neumark (1996) 
U.S. 
(Philadelphia) 
N/A 
High-priced restaurants 23 0.61 0.26 0.35** 
Medium-priced 
restaurants 
21 0.62 0.43 0.19 
Low-priced restaurants 21 0.19 0.38 -0.19 
Riach and Rich 
(1987) 
Australia 
(State of 
Victoria) 
11/1983– 
11/1986 
Computer analyst 152 0.57 0.50 0.07** 
Computer operator 99 0.43 0.41 0.02 
Computer programmer 115 0.52 0.56 -0.03 
Gardener 148 0.39 0.32 0.07** 
Industrial relations 
officer 
94 0.33 0.35 -0.02 
Management accountant 211 0.46 0.43 0.04 
Payroll clerk 172 0.41 0.42 -0.01 
Levinson (1975) 
U.S.  
(Atlanta) 
Spring 
1974 
Female-dominated job 110 N/A N/A -0.44*** 
Male-dominated job 146 N/A N/A 0.28*** 
Notes: 1 As no information on the number of matched-pairs is available, number of single applications is 
reported. * denotes 10% significance level, ** denotes 5% significance level and *** denotes 1% significance 
level of a chi-squared test that the male and female candidates are equally likely to receive a callback at any 
matched-pair application. 
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Table A-2:  A Partial List of Correspondence Studies Investigating Ethnic Discrimination 
Author(s) 
and year of 
publication 
Location 
Time 
period 
Occupation(s) 
Minority 
group(s) 
No. of job 
offers 
addressed 
Callback rate 
Natives 
Ethnic 
minorities 
Difference 
Baert et al. 
(2013) 
Belgium 
(Flanders) 
11/2011- 
03/2012 
Bottleneck 
occupations 
Turks 
181 0.17 0.17 0.00 
Non-bottleneck 
occupations 
195 0.21 0.10 0.11*** 
Andriessen 
et al. (2012) 
The 
Netherlands 
05/2008- 
12/2008 
62 high- and 
low-skilled 
professions in 5 
sectors 
Moroccans  323 0.51 0.46 0.05** 
Turks  338 0.49 0.42 0.07** 
Surinamese 356 0.42 0.34 0.08*** 
Antilleans 323 0.42 0.36 0.06** 
Maurer-
Fazio (2012) 
China 
(6 different 
regions) 
Summer 
2011 
Accountants, 
administrative 
assistants, sales 
representatives 
Mongolians 3,594 0.08 0.06 0.02*** 
Tibetans 3,548 0.08 0.04 0.04*** 
Uighurs 3,654 0.08 0.04 0.04*** 
Arai et al. 
(2011) 
Sweden 
(Stockholm) 
03/2006- 
07/2007 
Computer specialists, 
drivers, 
accountants, senior 
high school teachers, 
assistant nurses 
Arabs 
(Men) 
374 0.42 0.23 0.19*** 
Arabs 
(Women) 
192 0.37 0.15 0.22*** 
Jacquemet 
and Yannelis 
(2012) 
U.S. 
(Chicago) 
08/2009- 
02/2010 
Healthcare, 
accounting, IT 
Black name 330 0.23 0.16 0.07*** 
Foreign 
name 
330 0.23 0.16 0.07*** 
McGinnity 
and Lunn 
(2011) 
Ireland 
(Dublin) 
03/2008- 
10/2008 
Accountancy, 
lower 
administration, 
retail sales 
Africans 81 0.27 0.11 0.16*** 
Asians 80 0.34 0.19 0.15** 
Germans 79 0.37 0.18 0.19*** 
Booth et al. 
(2012) 
Australia 
(Brisbane, 
Melbourne, 
Sydney) 
04/2007- 
10/2007 
Waitstaff,  
data entry, 
customer 
service,  
sales jobs 
Middle 
Easterners 
845 0.35 0.22 0.13*** 
Native 
Australians 
848 0.35 0.26 0.09*** 
Italians 835 0.35 0.32 0.03* 
Chinese 845 0.35 0.21 0.14*** 
Carlsson 
(2010) 
Sweden 
(Stockholm, 
Gothenburg) 
08/2006- 
04/2007 
Shop sales assistants, 
construction 
workers, restaurant 
workers, motor 
vehicle drivers, 
accountants, 4 types 
of teachers, business 
sales assistants, 
computer 
professionals, 
nurses 
Middle 
Easterners 
(1st gen.)  
1,314 0.41 0.20 0.21*** 
Middle 
Easterners 
(2nd gen.) 
1,314 0.41 0.24 0.17*** 
Kaas and 
Manger 
(2012) 
Germany 
12/2007- 
01/2008, 
12/2008 
Management 
and economics 
student 
internships 
Turks  
(2nd gen.) 
528 0.40 0.35 0.05* 
Oreopoulos 
(2011) 
Canada 
(Toronto) 
04/2008- 
11/2008 
Administrative, 
finance, 
marketing, 
sales, 
programmer, 
retail 
Indians 328 0.16 0.05 0.11***1 
Chinese 302 0.16 0.05 0.11***1 
Pakistanis 187 0.16 0.05 0.11***1 
Brits 299 0.16 0.14 0.021 
Wood et al. 
(2009) 
U.K.  
(Bradford, 
Bristol, 
Glasgow, 
Leeds, 
London, 
Manchester) 
11/2008- 
05/2009 
IT technicians, 
accountants, HR 
managers, 
teaching assistants, 
IT support, account 
clerks, office 
assistants, 
care assistants 
Black 
Africans 
400 0.13 0.08 0.052 
Black 
Caribbeans 
399 0.10 0.05 0.052 
Chinese 393 0.10 0.06 0.042 
Indians 393 0.11 0.06 0.042 
Pakistani/ 
Bangladeshi 
389 0.10 0.06 0.042 
Cediey and 
Foroni 
(2008) 
France 
(Lille, Lyon, 
Nantes, 
Paris, 
Strasbourg) 
End 
2005-  
mid  
2006 
21 occupations in 10 
sectors (e.g. hotel 
and restaurants, 
commerce, personal 
and community 
services, tourism and 
transport, 
management and 
administration) 
North and 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africans 
694 0.27 0.10 0.17*** 
  
L 
 
Carlsson and 
Rooth 
(2007) 
Sweden 
(Stockholm, 
Gothenburg) 
05/2005- 
02/2006 
See Carlsson 
(2010) 
Middle-
Easterners 
1,552 0.29 0.20 0.09*** 
Bursell 
(2007) 
Sweden 
(Stockholm) 
03/2006- 
09/2007 
15 different 
occupations 
Arabs and 
Africans 
1,776 0.37 0.20 0.17*** 
Bertrand 
and 
Mullainathan 
(2004) 
U.S.  
(Chicago, 
Boston) 
07/2001- 
01/2002 
(Boston), 
07/2001- 
05/2002 
(Chicago) 
Sales, 
administrative 
support, clerical 
services, 
customer 
services 
African-
Americans 
 
2,435 0.10 0.06 0.04*** 
Goldberg et 
al. (1996) 
Germany 
(Berlin, 
Rhine-Ruhr 
region) 
02/1994- 
N/A 
11 occupations 
in 3 sectors (e.g. 
caring 
professions, 
commercial 
professions, 
technical 
professions 
Turks 
(1st gen.) 
2,633 0.10 0.09 0.012 
Bovenkerk 
et al. (1996) 
The 
Netherlands 
(Randstad 
area) 
10/1993- 
06/1994 
Teachers, lab 
assistants, 
admin/ finance 
managers, 
personnel 
managers 
Surinamese 290 0.46 0.36 0.10** 
Bendick et 
al. (1991) 
U.S. 
(Washington 
D.C.) 
02/1992-
03/1992 
Sales, service 
and office jobs 
Latinos 741 0.19 0.22 -0.03 
Riach and 
Rich (1991) 
Australia 
(State of 
Victoria) 
11/1983- 
11/1988 
Sales 
representatives, 
clerks, 
secretaries 
Greeks 462 0.35 0.31 0.042 
Vietnamese 519 0.29 0.20 0.092 
Firth (1981) U.K. 
10/1977- 
03/1978 
Accounting and 
financial 
management 
jobs 
Australians 282 0.85 0.75 0.102 
Frenchmen 282 0.85 0.68 0.172 
Africans 282 0.85 0.53 0.322 
Indians 282 0.85 0.44 0.412 
Pakistani 282 0.85 0.44 0.412 
West 
Indians 
282 0.85 0.48 0.372 
Jowell and 
Prescott-
Clarke 
(1970) 
U.K. 
(4 different 
regions) 
Spring 
till 
summer 
1969 
Sales and 
marketing, 
accountancy 
and office 
management, 
electrical 
engineering, 
secretarial jobs 
Australians 32 0.78 0.78 0.00 
West 
Indians 
32 0.78 0.69 0.092 
Cypriots 32 0.78 0.69 0.092 
Asians 32 0.78 0.35 0.432 
Notes: 1 Results reported for immigrants with foreign education and work experience. 2 Level of significance not 
indicated. If not explicitly stated, callback rates are based on own calculations with information provided in the 
studies. Ethnic affiliation is generally signaled by names. * denotes 10% significance level, ** denotes 5% 
significance level and *** denotes 1% significance level of a chi-squared test that the native and ethnic minority 
candidates are equally likely to receive a callback at any matched-pair application. 
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B. SELECTED SAMPLE OF APPLICATIONS USED IN THE FIELD EXPERIMENTS 
B.1 GERMAN-NAMED MALE APPLICANT 
Cover Letter 
 
Jan Lange 
XXX 
XXX 
 
Employer’s address 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX, 25 May 2011 
Application for an industrial mechanics apprenticeship  
 
Dear Mr./Mrs. XXX, 
 
I am writing to you in response to your advertisement, which appeared on the job platform of 
the Federal Employment Agency and directly caught my attention. Having collected further 
information on your firm as well as on the expertise required, I would like to apply for the 
offered apprenticeship since I will be shortly moving to your region.    
 
I am currently in 10th grade of Secondary School from which I will graduate this summer. At 
school as well as in my free-time I pursue my passion for technology leading to excellent 
grades especially in the natural science subjects. To make use of my interests and abilities, I 
would like to put the focus of my professional career on this specific area. Therefore, I decided 
to apply for an apprenticeship in your company.  
 
According to my friends and teachers, I am an attentive and ambitious person. Furthermore, I 
like facing new challenges and possess the ability to easily get in touch with other people. Due 
to my experiences from playing handball, I am aware of the significance of relying on other 
group members and reaching goals in a team.  
 
I would be happy to be invited for an interview to personally convince you of my qualifications. 
I am looking forward to hearing from you.  
 
Yours sincerely, 
Jan Lange 
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Curriculum Vitae 
 
Curriculum vitae 
Jan Lange 
 
XXX 
XXX 
Mobile: 0176-74684211 
Email: janlange94@gmx.de 
 
 
Personal Details 
Date of Birth: 18 September 1994 
Nationality: German 
Family Status: Single 
School Education 
08/2005 - present Secondary School Carl Theodor Ottmer , XXX 
08/2001 – 07/2005 Primary School Humboldtstraße, XXX 
Additional Skills 
Languages:  German as native language 
 Good command of English 
Computer Skills:  Good knowledge in MS Word 
 Basic skills in MS Excel and MS Powerpoint 
Driving license:  Category M 
Leisure Time Activities 
 
  Handball, running 
 Building and extending railway models 
 
XXX, 25 May 2011 
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B.2 FEMALE APPLICANT 
Cover Letter 
 
Anna Schneider 
XXX 
XXX 
 
Employer’s address 
XXX 
XXX 
 
 
XXX, September 2011 
 
Application for an apprenticeship as an industrial mechanics 
 
Dear Mr./Mrs. XXX, 
 
Your job offer posted on the job website of the Federal Employment Agency 
has called my attention and aroused my interest for your business and the 
apprenticeship as an industrial mechanic. After in-depth internet research 
on the professional requirements and on your company, I decided to send 
you this application. 
 
Graduating this summer with the secondary education certificate, I intend 
to do a dual apprenticeship in a technical occupation. As my grades and the 
participation in the voluntary fire brigade show, my strengths and interests 
definitively cover this field. Additionally, first practical experiences have 
confirmed that doing technical work fascinates me and requires the skills 
and the understanding I possess.  
 
According to my leisure time activities, I am a team player who knows that 
relying on each other is essential. Furthermore, I am a curious person and 
always open to minded. In addition to that, my work constantly shows great 
thoroughness. 
 
Since I am planning to move to your region shortly after having completed 
school, I will be resident to and hence in direct reach of your company. With 
regard to the training program, I am sure that my willingness and 
commitment to acquire new skills will convince you. Therefore, I would be 
happy to presenting myself in a personal interview. I look forward to 
hearing from you.  
 
Yours faithfully, 
Anna Schneider 
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Curriculum Vitae 
 
Curriculum Vitae 
 
Personal Data 
 
 
ANNA SCHNEIDER 
 
XXX 
XXX 
Mobile: 0176-63009012 
Mail: annaschneider95@gmx.net 
 
Date of Birth:  September 3, 1995 
Family Status: Single 
Nationality:  German 
 
 
 
 
 
Schooling 
 
Since 08/2006 Middle School, XXX 
  
 
08/2002 – 07/2006 Primary School, XXX 
 
 
Internships 
 
02/2011 School internship at a machine tools producer 
  
  
Other Qualifications and Extracurricular Activities  
 
Languages German: First language 
 English: Good skills 
  
Computer Skills Good knowledge in Word 
 Basic skills in Excel and Powerpoint 
 
Driving License Mopeds (Category M) 
 
Leisure Time Activities Voluntary fire brigade 
 Table tennis 
 
XXX, September 2011 
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B.3 TURKISH-NAMED MALE APPLICANT 
Cover Letter 
 
Kenan Yilmaz 
XXX 
XXX 
 
Employer’s address 
XXX 
XXX 
 
XXX, September 2011 
 
Application for an industrial mechanics apprenticeship 
 
Dear Mr./Mrs. XXX, 
 
The website of the Federal Employment Agency has drawn my attention to the 
training program for industrial mechanics offered by your company. The job 
profile and the tasks described sound very interesting to me and have 
convinced me to apply for an apprenticeship. 
 
I will be shortly graduating from secondary school. As I have been interested in 
technical issues since my early childhood and especially like doing handicrafts 
and tinkering, I intend working in this specific field. At school I particularly enjoy 
following scientific courses. This pleasure has led to excellent grades and was 
also quite helpful when doing a school internship.  
 
I am a very committed person that has a great willingness to learn new things 
and likes being challenged. Additionally, I am a reliable as well as aim-oriented 
person and like working in teams. Furthermore, friends and teachers appreciate 
my readiness to speak up for others and to always give a helping hand. 
  
I look forward to attending a job interview in order to get further information on 
your company and to persuade you of my personal strengths. Although spatial 
distance to your company currently exists, I will soon be moving to your region 
with my family. 
 
With kind regards, 
Kenan Yilmaz 
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Curriculum Vitae 
 
Curriculum Vitae  
 
 
  PERSONAL DATA 
 
  Kenan Yilmaz 
  XXX 
  XXX 
  0176-74688046 
  Kenanyilmaz95@gmx.de 
  September 10, 1995 
  Single 
 
 
  SCHOOL EDUCATION 
 
Since 8/2006 Secondary School, XXX 
 
8/2002 - 7/2006 Primary School, XXX 
 
 
  PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE 
 
02/2011 School internship, XXX 
 
 
  ADDITIONAL SKILLS 
 
  Computer Skills:  
  Word Excellent skills 
  Excel, Powerpoint Good knowledge 
 
  Languages:  
  German Native language 
  Turkish Native language 
  English  Good command 
  
  Driving licence:  
  Category M (mopeds)  
 
 
  LEISURE ACTIVITIES 
 
Playing tennis and bicycling 
Tinkering with motor scooters  
 
 
XXX, September 2011
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C. SUPPLEMENTAL DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND REGRESSION TABLES 
C.1 STUDY ON GENDER DISCRIMINATION 
Table C-1: Firms’ Responses by Gender in Male-Dominated Jobs 
  
Male 
(N=540) 
Female 
(N=540) 
Total 
(N=1,080) 
Difference 
No response 20.00% 17.59% 18.80% 
 
 
(108) (95) (203) 
 
Rejection 39.07% 47.96% 43.52% 
 
 
(211) (259) (470) 
 
Callback 40.93% 34.44% 37.69% 6.49 pps** 
  (221) (186) (407) (35) 
Notes: The table reports detailed responses by gender in male-dominated jobs as a fraction 
of overall applications in percent. Absolute numbers are in parentheses. ** denotes 5% 
significance level of a chi-squared test (H0: The male and female candidates are equally 
likely to receive a callback at any matched-pair application). 
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Table C-2: Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Response Dummy (Gender Study) 
Response (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Female 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Medium  0.086*** 0.088*** 0.085*** 
 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Large  0.121*** 0.122*** 0.120*** 
 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
South  0.008 0.003 0.006 
 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
East  -0.105** -0.109** -0.085* 
 
 (0.049) (0.050) (0.049) 
Industry  0.001 0.000 0.003 
 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Late recruiter  0.054 0.031 0.016 
 
 (0.044) (0.067) (0.065) 
Female responsible  0.044 0.044 0.042 
 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) 
Share of females t-1   0.010 -0.142 
 
  (0.025) (0.086) 
Vacancies/total jobs t-1   0.004 0.006 
 
  (0.015) (0.015) 
Certificate    0.015 
 
   (0.024) 
Female-dominated job    0.246*** 
 
   (0.075) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 
Pseudo R² 0.013 0.046 0.046 0.050 
Log likelihood -619.372 -598.300 -598.076 -595.741 
Wald chi-squared 13.291 41.443 42.526 45.217 
P-value 0.065 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Each model reports average marginal effects of a probit regression on the response dummy (Y=1: 
employer gives the applicant either a rejection or a callback). Marginal effects are calculated at the means of all 
independent variables and denote an infinitesimal change in case of continuous variables and a discrete 
change in case of dummy variables. Standard errors clustered on firm level are in parentheses. Regressions 
consider the entire sample. * denotes 10% significance level. ** denotes 5% significance level. *** denotes 1% 
significance level. 
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Table C-3:  Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Callback Dummy for Male Applicants 
Callback (Ia) (Ib) (IIa) (IIb) (IIIa) (IIIb) 
Certificate 0.068* 0.074 0.063 0.068 0.089 0.061 
 
(0.040) (0.052) (0.045) (0.061) (0.093) (0.100) 
Lukas Schmidt 0.063 0.041 0.019 -0.023 0.127 0.101 
 
(0.072) (0.085) (0.132) (0.169) (0.094) (0.107) 
Male photo B -0.066 -0.025 0.160 0.115 -0.103 -0.085 
 
(0.068) (0.083) (0.155) (0.181) (0.092) (0.102) 
Distance -0.000* -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 0.001** 0.001** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Design B 0.014 0.018 0.034 0.040 -0.000 -0.008 
 
(0.044) (0.045) (0.051) (0.052) (0.094) (0.102) 
Design C 0.075 0.075 0.081 0.082 
-/- -/- 
 
(0.053) (0.055) (0.055) (0.057) 
Rank 2 0.030 0.032 0.035 0.037 0.015 0.022 
 
(0.039) (0.040) (0.044) (0.045) (0.094) (0.107) 
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
No. of obs. 656 656 540 540 116 116 
Pseudo R² 0.012 0.032 0.020 0.040 0.054 0.141 
Log likelihood -437.018 -428.124 -358.205 -350.778 -72.315 -65.671 
LR chi-squared 10.011 26.074 13.607 24.982 7.792 18.593 
P-value 0.188 0.128 0.059 0.125 0.254 0.233 
Notes: Each model reports average marginal effects of a probit regression on the callback dummy (Y=1: 
employer calls back the job applicant). Marginal effects are calculated at the means of all independent 
variables and denote an infinitesimal change in case of continuous variables and a discrete change in case of 
dummy variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions restrict the sample to male 
applicants. The models in (I) report the effects of all applications by the male candidate while models (II) and 
(III) show the results for male- and female-dominated jobs, respectively. * denotes 10% significance level. ** 
denotes 5% significance level. *** denotes 1% significance level. 
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Table C-4: Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Callback Dummy for Female Applicants 
Callback (Ia) (Ib) (IIa) (IIb) (IIIa) (IIIb) 
Certificate 0.033 -0.035 0.053 -0.022 -0.036 -0.103 
 (0.040) (0.049) (0.044) (0.058) (0.097) (0.102) 
Laura Müller -0.008 -0.018 -0.065 -0.078 0.044 -0.052 
 (0.069) (0.079) (0.153) (0.168) (0.094) (0.104) 
Female photo B 0.059 0.079 -0.021 -0.036 0.085 0.150 
 (0.072) (0.083) (0.168) (0.180) (0.094) (0.100) 
Distance -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Design B -0.055 -0.052 -0.071 -0.069 0.015 0.083 
 (0.044) (0.045) (0.050) (0.052) (0.094) (0.100) 
Design C -0.071 -0.055 -0.073 -0.059 
-/- -/- 
 (0.050) (0.052) (0.054) (0.055) 
Rank 2 -0.071* -0.058 -0.059 -0.047 -0.166* -0.148 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.047) (0.047) (0.096) (0.104) 
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
No. of obs. 656 656 540 540 116 116 
Pseudo R² 0.008 0.030 0.010 0.026 0.040 0.166 
Log likelihood -423.210 -413.929 -344.150 -338.566 -75.135 -65.315 
LR chi-squared 7.225 24.575 6.899 17.198 5.864 24.561 
P-value 0.406 0.175 0.439 0.510 0.439 0.056 
Notes: Each model reports average marginal effects of a probit regression on the callback dummy (Y=1: 
employer calls back the job applicant). Marginal effects are calculated at the means of all independent 
variables and denote an infinitesimal change in case of continuous variables and a discrete change in case of 
dummy variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions restrict the sample to female 
applicants. The models in (I) report the effects of all applications by the female candidate while models (II) and 
(III) show the results for male- and female-dominated jobs, respectively. * denotes 10% significance level. ** 
denotes 5% significance level. *** denotes 1% significance level. 
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Table C-5: Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Callback Dummy for a Standard Applicant at 
a Standard Employer (Gender Study) 
Callback (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) X 
Female -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.051*** -0.071*** 0 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021)  
Medium 
 
0.107*** 0.108*** 0.105** 0.107** 1 
 
 
(0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042)  
Large 
 
0.081 0.081 0.079 0.080 0 
 
 
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065)  
South 
 
-0.054 -0.045 -0.044 -0.042 1 
 
 
(0.056) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)  
East 
 
0.061 0.067 0.067 0.068 0 
 
 
(0.056) (0.057) (0.058) (0.059)  
Industry 
 
-0.069 -0.070 -0.071 -0.071 1 
 
 
(0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)  
Late recruiter 
 
-0.014 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 1 
 
 
(0.059) (0.086) (0.086) (0.087)  
Female responsible 
 
0.019 0.019 0.018 0.019 1 
 
 
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)  
Share of females t-1 
  
-0.004 -0.015 -0.016 0 
 
  
(0.032) (0.120) (0.122)  
Vacancies/total jobs t-1 
  
-0.011 -0.011 -0.011 0 
 
  
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)  
Certificate 
  
 0.026 0.025 0 
 
  
 (0.033) (0.033)  
Female-dominated job 
  
 0.032 -0.019 0 
 
  
 (0.321) (0.321)  
Female x  
  
  0.107** 0 
Female-dominated job 
  
  (0.051)  
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
No. of obs. 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312 1,312  
Pseudo R² 0.010 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.022  
Log likelihood -861.957 -852.607 -852.331 -852.064 -851.026  
Wald chi-squared 17.315 29.007 29.341 30.279 35.429  
P-value 0.015 0.010 0.022 0.035 0.012  
Notes: Each model reports average marginal effects of a probit regression on the callback dummy (Y=1: 
employer calls back the job applicant). Marginal effects are calculated at the mean in case of continuous and at 
the modus in case of discrete independent variables (see last column for value of independent variables). 
Standard errors clustered on firm level are in parentheses. Regressions consider the entire sample. * denotes 
10% significance level. ** denotes 5% significance level. *** denotes 1% significance level. 
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Table C-6: Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Callback Dummy (Including Models without Control Variables) and Hypotheses Testing (Gender Study) 
Callback (Ia) (Ib) (IIa) (IIb) (IIc) (IId) (IIe) (IIf) (IIg) (IIh) (IIIa) (IIIb) 
Female -0.065*** -0.067*** -0.057** -0.062** -0.065*** -0.067*** -0.029 -0.029 -0.065*** -0.067*** 0.047 0.043 
 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.028) (0.028) (0.019) (0.019) (0.025) (0.027) (0.019) (0.020) (0.062) (0.062) 
Certificate 0.039 0.025 0.049 0.033 0.040 0.026 0.039 0.025 0.038 0.024 0.095* 0.078 
 
(0.036) (0.036) (0.046) (0.046) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.057) (0.056) 
Female x Certificate 
  
-0.021 -0.016 
      
-0.107 -0.100 
   
(0.057) (0.057) 
      
(0.079) (0.078) 
Share of females t-1 -0.011 -0.021 -0.011 -0.021 -0.035* -0.047** -0.011 -0.021 -0.011 -0.021 -0.037* -0.049** 
 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) 
Female x  
    
0.049** 0.052** 
    
0.052** 0.055** 
Share of females t-1 
    
(0.021) (0.022) 
    
(0.021) (0.022) 
Late recruiter -0.035 -0.021 -0.035 -0.021 -0.035 -0.021 -0.001 0.017 -0.036 -0.021 0.035 0.052 
 
(0.044) (0.088) (0.044) (0.088) (0.044) (0.088) (0.048) (0.091) (0.044) (0.088) (0.055) (0.095) 
Female x  
      
-0.069* -0.072* 
  
-0.136** -0.134** 
Late recruiter 
      
(0.036) (0.038) 
  
(0.059) (0.059) 
Vacancies/total jobs t-1 -0.013 0.002 -0.013 0.002 -0.013 0.002 -0.013 0.002 -0.030 -0.016 -0.026 -0.012 
 
(0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) 
Female x  
        
0.033* 0.037** 0.026 0.030 
Vacancies/total jobs t-1 
        
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
No. of obs. 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 1,080 
Pseudo R² 0.008 0.026 0.008 0.026 0.010 0.028 0.009 0.027 0.009 0.027 0.013 0.031 
Log likelihood -710.026 -696.980 -709.969 -696.948 -708.660 -695.456 -709.327 -696.244 -709.385 -696.198 -706.341 -693.120 
Wald chi-squared 16.472 31.831 16.747 32.142 26.185 42.605 18.103 32.828 20.247 35.728 34.227 49.631 
P-value 0.006 0.016 0.010 0.021 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.018 0.003 0.008 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Each model reports average marginal effects of a probit regression on the callback dummy (Y=1: employer calls back the job applicant). Marginal effects are 
calculated at the means of all independent variables and denote an infinitesimal change in case of continuous variables and a discrete change in case of dummy variables. 
Standard errors clustered on firm level are in parentheses. Regressions consider only male-dominated jobs. * denotes 10% significance level. ** denotes 5% significance 
level. *** denotes 1% significance level. 
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Figure C-1: Interaction Effect between Female and Certificate Dummy 
  
Figure C-2: Interaction Effect between Female Dummy and Share of Females t-1 
  
Figure C-3: Interaction Effect between Female and Late Recruiter Dummy 
  
-.018
-.016
-.014
-.012
-.01
In
te
ra
c
ti
o
n
 E
ff
e
c
t 
(p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 p
o
in
ts
)
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Predicted Probability that y = 1
Correct interaction effect Incorrect marginal effect
Interaction Effects after Probit
-5
0
5
10
z
-s
ta
ti
s
ti
c
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Predicted Probability that y = 1
z-statistics of Interaction Effects after Probit
.03
.035
.04
.045
.05
.055
In
te
ra
c
ti
o
n
 E
ff
e
c
t 
(p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 p
o
in
ts
)
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Predicted Probability that y = 1
Correct interaction effect Incorrect marginal effect
Interaction Effects after Probit
-5
0
5
10
z
-s
ta
ti
s
ti
c
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Predicted Probability that y = 1
z-statistics of Interaction Effects after Probit
-.08
-.07
-.06
-.05
-.04
In
te
ra
c
ti
o
n
 E
ff
e
c
t 
(p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 p
o
in
ts
)
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Predicted Probability that y = 1
Correct interaction effect Incorrect marginal effect
Interaction Effects after Probit
-5
0
5
10
z
-s
ta
ti
s
ti
c
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Predicted Probability that y = 1
z-statistics of Interaction Effects after Probit
  
LXIV 
 
Figure C-4: Interaction Effect between Female Dummy and Vacancies/Total Jobs t-1 
  
Table C-7: Firms’ Responses of Correspondence Testing by Gender and Apprenticeship Program 
 
Firms' responses Callback rates 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
No. of paired  
applications 
Rejection/ 
no 
response 
At least 
one 
callback 
Both 
Only 
male 
Only 
female 
Male 
(4+5)/(1) 
Female 
(4+6)/(1) 
Difference 
(7)-(8) 
Industrial mechanic 52.02 47.98 56.63 28.92 14.46 
0.410 0.341 
0.069 
(p=0.183) (173) (90) (83) (47) (24) (12) 
Electronics technician 47.83 52.17 80.56 8.33 11.11 
0.464 0.478 
-0.014 
(p=0.865) (69) (33) (36) (29) (3) (4) 
Milling machine 
operator 
65.22 34.78 58.33 29.17 12.50 
0.304 0.246 
0.058 
(p=0.446) 
(69) (45) (24) (14) (7) (3) 
Mechatronics fitter 51.96 48.04 61.22 26.53 12.24 
0.422 0.353 
0.069 
(p=0.314) (102) (53) (49) (30) (13) (6) 
Warehouse logistics 
operator 
39.39 60.61 40.00 45.00 15.00 
0.515 0.333 
0.182 
(p=0.135) 
(33) (13) (20) (8) (9) (3) 
Mechanic in plastics 
and rubber processing 
54.26 45.74 55.81 30.23 13.95 
0.394 0.319 
0.074 
(p=0.286) 
(94) (51) (43) (24) (13) (6) 
Geriatric nurse 25.00 75.00 72.22 11.11 16.67 
0.625 0.667 
-0.042 
(p=0.763) (24) (6) (18) (13) (2) (3) 
Industrial clerk 51.16 48.84 52.38 19.05 28.57 
0.349 0.395 
-0.047 
(p=0.655) (43) (22) (21) (11) (4) (6) 
Management assistant 
for office 
communication 
61.22 38.78 42.11 26.32 31.58 
0.265 0.286 
-0.020 
(p=0.821) 
(49) (30) (19) (8) (5) (6) 
Notes: This table shows the distribution of firms’ responses. Absolute numbers are in parentheses. Column 
(1) displays the number of employers in each stratum. Column (2) reports the fraction of firms that gave none 
of the candidates a callback, so the remainder in column (3) called back at least one applicant. Firms that gave 
both candidates a positive answer, column (4), are considered as equal treatment, while the rest preferred 
either the male or the female candidate (columns (5) and (6)). Columns (7) and (8) contain the callback rate 
for the male and female applicant, respectively, while column (9) computes the difference in callback rates 
between the two candidate groups. In column (9), p-values of a chi-squared test that the male and female 
candidates are equally likely to receive a callback at any matched-pair application are in parentheses. 
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C.2 STUDY ON ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION 
Table C-8: Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Response Dummy (Ethnicity Study) 
Response (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Turkish name -0.029* -0.028* -0.028* -0.028* 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Medium  0.098*** 0.099*** 0.099*** 
 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Large  0.171*** 0.172*** 0.172*** 
 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
South  -0.043 -0.043 -0.043 
 
 (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) 
East  -0.109** -0.123** -0.123** 
 
 (0.055) (0.061) (0.061) 
Industry  -0.088** -0.089** -0.089** 
 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Late recruiter  0.046 0.045 0.046 
 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Female responsible  0.056* 0.056* 0.056* 
 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Share of foreigners t-1   -0.009 -0.009 
 
  (0.019) (0.019) 
Vacancies/total jobs t-1   0.004 0.005 
 
  (0.015) (0.015) 
Certificate    0.007 
 
   (0.029) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs. 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216 
Pseudo R² 0.013 0.058 0.059 0.059 
Log likelihood -615.354 -586.867 -586.638 -586.610 
Wald chi-squared 15.244 49.486 49.729 49.777 
P-value 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Each model reports average marginal effects of a probit regression on the response dummy (Y=1: 
employer gives the applicant either a rejection or a callback). Marginal effects are calculated at the means of all 
independent variables and denote an infinitesimal change in case of continuous variables and a discrete 
change in case of dummy variables. Standard errors clustered on firm level are in parentheses. Regressions 
consider the entire sample. * denotes 10% significance level. ** denotes 5% significance level. *** denotes 1% 
significance level. 
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Table C-9: Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Callback Dummy for a Standard Applicant at 
a Standard Employer (Ethnicity Study) 
Callback (I) (II) (III) (IV) X 
Turkish name -0.108*** -0.116*** -0.116*** -0.113*** 0 
 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)  
Medium  0.082* 0.080* 0.076 1 
 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)  
Large  0.089 0.086 0.082 0 
 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.068)  
South  -0.047 -0.034 -0.033 1 
 
 (0.060) (0.062) (0.062)  
East  0.020 0.038 0.034 0 
 
 (0.062) (0.067) (0.068)  
Industry  -0.161*** -0.165*** -0.174*** 1 
 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.061)  
Late recruiter  0.083 0.089 0.096* 1 
 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.057)  
Female responsible  0.086** 0.086** 0.087** 1 
 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.039)  
Share of foreigners t-1   0.002 0.001 0 
 
  (0.023) (0.023)  
Vacancies/total jobs t-
1 
  -0.027 -0.026 
0 
 
  (0.023) (0.023)  
Certificate    0.081** 0 
 
   (0.035)  
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  
No. of obs. 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216  
Pseudo R² 0.023 0.044 0.045 0.048  
Log likelihood -783.842 -767.369 -766.136 -764.143  
Wald chi-squared 58.024 76.345 78.194 81.306  
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Notes: Each model reports average marginal effects of a probit regression on the callback dummy (Y=1: 
employer calls back the job applicant). Marginal effects are calculated at the mean in case of continuous and at 
the modus in case of discrete independent variables (see last column for value of independent variables). 
Standard errors clustered on firm level are in parentheses. Regressions consider the entire sample. * denotes 
10% significance level. ** denotes 5% significance level. *** denotes 1% significance level. 
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Table C-10: Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Callback Dummy for German-Named 
Applicants 
Callback (Ia) (Ib) 
Certificate 0.080* 0.076 
 
(0.042) (0.055) 
Lukas Schmidt -0.002 -0.105 
 
(0.080) (0.094) 
Photo B 0.071 -0.035 
 
(0.083) (0.101) 
Distance -0.001*** -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Design B 0.064 0.073 
 
(0.048) (0.049) 
Design C 0.081 0.098* 
 
(0.054) (0.056) 
Rank 2 -0.009 0.009 
 
(0.041) (0.043) 
Controls No Yes 
No. of obs. 608 608 
Pseudo R² 0.020 0.040 
Log likelihood -405.779 -397.440 
LR chi-squared 15.963 31.891 
P-value 0.025 0.023 
Notes: Each model reports average marginal effects of a probit regression 
on the callback dummy (Y=1: employer calls back the job applicant). 
Marginal effects are calculated at the means of all independent variables 
and denote an infinitesimal change in case of continuous variables and a 
discrete change in case of dummy variables. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. The sample is restricted to German-named applicants. 
Controls include firm characteristics and labor market data. * denotes 10% 
significance level. ** denotes 5% significance level. *** denotes 1% 
significance level. 
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Table C-11: Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Callback Dummy for Turkish-Named 
Applicants 
Callback (Ia) (Ib) 
Certificate 0.082** 0.080 
 (0.041) (0.053) 
Onur Öztürk -0.004 -0.066 
 (0.078) (0.099) 
Photo B -0.067 -0.083 
 (0.082) (0.102) 
Distance -0.000** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Design B 0.010 0.003 
 (0.047) (0.048) 
Design C -0.002 0.009 
 (0.050) (0.052) 
Rank 2 0.025 -0.005 
 (0.041) (0.042) 
Controls No Yes 
No. of obs. 608 608 
Pseudo R² 0.015 0.055 
Log likelihood -375.707 -360.491 
LR chi-squared 11.484 41.405 
P-value 0.119 0.001 
Notes: Each model reports average marginal effects of a probit regression on the 
callback dummy (Y=1: employer calls back the job applicant). Marginal effects are 
calculated at the means of all independent variables and denote an infinitesimal change 
in case of continuous variables and a discrete change in case of dummy variables. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. The sample is restricted to Turkish-named 
applicants. Controls include firm characteristics and labor market data. * denotes 10% 
significance level. ** denotes 5% significance level. *** denotes 1% significance level. 
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Table C-12: Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Callback Dummy (Including Models without Control Variables) and Hypotheses Testing (Ethnicity 
Study) 
Callback (Ia) (Ib) (IIa) (IIb) (IIc) (IId) (IIe) (IIf) (IIg) (IIh) (IIIa) (IIIb) 
Turkish name -0.103*** -0.109*** -0.107*** -0.117*** -0.103*** -0.110*** -0.072*** -0.079*** -0.103*** -0.109*** -0.052 -0.070 
 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.025) (0.025) (0.015) (0.016) (0.022) (0.023) (0.015) (0.016) (0.053) (0.053) 
Certificate 0.101*** 0.077** 0.096** 0.067 0.101*** 0.077** 0.101*** 0.077** 0.101*** 0.076** 0.115** 0.083* 
 
(0.032) (0.034) (0.041) (0.043) (0.032) (0.034) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.034) (0.048) (0.050) 
Turkish name x    0.010 0.021       -0.029 -0.013 
Certificate   (0.053) (0.053)       (0.069) (0.070) 
Share of foreigners t-1 -0.018 0.001 -0.018 0.001 -0.007 0.014 -0.018 0.001 -0.018 0.001 -0.005 0.016 
 
(0.018) (0.022) (0.018) (0.022) (0.020) (0.024) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) (0.022) (0.020) (0.024) 
Turkish name x      -0.023 -0.027     -0.027 -0.031* 
Share of foreigners t-1     (0.017) (0.018)     (0.017) (0.018) 
Late recruiter 0.021 0.091* 0.021 0.091* 0.021 0.091* 0.047 0.117** 0.021 0.091* 0.055 0.121** 
 
(0.040) (0.054) (0.040) (0.054) (0.040) (0.054) (0.042) (0.056) (0.040) (0.054) (0.046) (0.060) 
Turkish name x        -0.054* -0.052*   -0.070 -0.060 
Late recruiter       (0.030) (0.031)   (0.048) (0.049) 
Vacancies/total jobs t-1 -0.029 -0.025 -0.029 -0.025 -0.029 -0.025 -0.029 -0.025 -0.036* -0.033 -0.037* -0.034 
 
(0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.023) 
Turkish name x          0.013 0.017 0.016 0.020 
Vacancies/total jobs t-1         (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
No. of obs. 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216 
Pseudo R² 0.018 0.048 0.018 0.048 0.019 0.048 0.019 0.048 0.018 0.048 0.020 0.049 
Log likelihood -787.804 -764.143 -787.787 -764.080 -787.478 -763.698 -787.334 -763.729 -787.686 -763.960 -786.710 -762.972 
Wald chi-squared 53.483 81.306 53.500 81.789 53.171 80.762 54.574 81.164 55.370 83.031 56.698 82.739 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Each model reports average marginal effects of a probit regression on the callback dummy (Y=1: employer calls back the job applicant). Marginal effects are calculated 
at the means of all independent variables and denote an infinitesimal change in case of continuous variables and a discrete change in case of dummy variables. Standard 
errors clustered on firm level are in parentheses. Regressions consider the entire sample. * denotes 10% significance level. ** denotes 5% significance level. *** denotes 1% 
significance level. 
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Figure C-5: Interaction Effect between Turkish Name and Certificate Dummy 
    
Figure C-6: Interaction Effect between Turkish Name Dummy and Share of Foreigners t-1 
  
Figure C-7: Interaction Effect between Turkish Name and Late Recruiter Dummy 
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Figure C-8: Interaction Effect between Turkish Name Dummy and Vacancies/Total Jobs t-1 
  
Table C-13: Marginal Effects from Probit Regression on Late Recruiter Dummy 
Late recruiter (I) 
Medium -0.26*** 
 
(0.05) 
Large -0.35*** 
 
(0.07) 
South 0.11** 
 
(0.05) 
East 0.37*** 
 
(0.05) 
Industry -0.07 
 
(0.07) 
Female responsible -0.09** 
 
(0.04) 
Share of foreigners t-1 0.03 
 
(0.03) 
Vacancies/total jobs t-1 -0.07*** 
 
(0.02) 
Open positions -0.03* 
 
(0.02) 
No. of obs. 1,216 
Pseudo R² 0.129 
Log likelihood -723.861 
Wald chi-squared 90.631 
P-value 0.000 
Notes: Table reports average marginal effects of a probit 
regression on the late recruiter dummy (Y=1: firm offers vacancy 
in May) for the entire sample. Standard errors clustered on firm 
level are in parentheses. * denotes 10% significance level. ** 
denotes 5% significance level. *** denotes 1% significance level. 
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C.3 STUDY ON METHODOLOGICAL VARIATIONS 
Table C-14: Descriptive Statistics of the Method Comparison in the Study on Gender Discrimination 
Variable Operationalization # of Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES           
Response 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the applicant receives a response 
(either invitation or rejection) by the employer, 0 
otherwise 
444 0.806 - 0 1 
Callback 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the applicant receives a callback 
(e.g. invitation) by the employer, 0 otherwise 
444 0.394 - 0 1 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES           
Method             
Correspondence 
Dummy: Equals 1 if pairwise applications are sent 
out, 0 otherwise 
444 0.671 - 0 1 
Applicant information           
Female 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the applicant is female, 0 
otherwise 
444 0.500 - 0 1 
Design 
      
 
Design A 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the application has design A, 0 
otherwise 
444 0.502 - 0 1 
 
Design B 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the application has design B, 0 
otherwise 
444 0.498 - 0 1 
Rank 
      
 
Rank 1 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the application was sent out first, 
0 otherwise 
444 0.665 - 0 1 
 
Rank 2 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the application was sent out 
second, 0 otherwise 
444 0.336 - 0 1 
        
Certificate 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the applicant provides an 
additional certificate, 0 otherwise 
444 0.541 - 0 1 
Distance 
Linear distance between applicant's home and 
location of employer (in km) 
444 243.38 110.15 0 533 
Information on jobs           
Female-
dominated job 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the majority in the respective 
apprenticeship is female, 0 otherwise (i.e., the 
majority is male) 
444 0.777 - 0 1 
Firm characteristics          
Size 
      
 
Small 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the employer has less than 50 
employees, 0 otherwise 
444 0.570 - 0 1 
 
Medium 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the employer has between 50 
and 500 employees, 0 otherwise 
444 0.405 - 0 1 
 
Large 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the employer has more than 500 
employees, 0 otherwise 
444 0.025 - 0 1 
Location 
      
 
Other 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the employer is not located in the 
South or East of Germany, 0 otherwise 
444 0.405 - 0 1 
 
South 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the employer is located in the 
South of Germany, 0 otherwise 
444 0.383 - 0 1 
 
East 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the employer is located in 
Eastern Germany, 0 otherwise 
444 0.212 - 0 1 
        
Industry 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the employer operates in the 
industry sector, 0 otherwise (i.e., service sector)  
444 0.293 - 0 1 
Female 
responsible 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the person responsible for 
recruiting as mentioned in the job offer is female, 0 
otherwise 
444 0.570 - 0 1 
Open positions 
Number of open positions for an apprenticeship as 
indicated by the employer's job offer 
444 1.28 0.928 1 10 
Labor market data           
Vacancies/total 
jobs t-1 
Ratio of vacancies and total apprenticeships in the 
corresponding Employment Agency region of the 
employer in 2010/2011 
444 0.057 0.035 0.009 0.163 
Share of females 
t-1 
Share of female applicants in the corresponding 
Employment Agency region of the employer in 
2010/2011 
444 0.520 0.201 0.120 0.740 
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Table C-15: Descriptive Statistics of the Method Comparison in the Study on Ethnic Discrimination 
Variable Operationalization # of Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES           
Response 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the applicant receives a response 
(either invitation or rejection) by the employer, 0 
otherwise 
302 0.801 - 0 1 
Callback 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the applicant receives a callback 
(e.g. invitation) by the employer, 0 otherwise 
302 0.454 - 0 1 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES           
Method             
Correspondence 
Dummy: Equals 1 if pairwise applications are sent 
out, 0 otherwise 
302 0.669 - 0 1 
Applicant information           
Turkish name 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the applicant has a Turkish-
sounding name, 0 otherwise 
302 0.501 - 0 1 
Design 
      
 
Design A 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the application has design A, 0 
otherwise 
302 0.510 - 0 1 
 
Design B 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the application has design B, 0 
otherwise 
302 0.490 - 0 1 
Rank 
      
 
Rank 1 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the application was sent out first, 
0 otherwise 
302 0.666 - 0 1 
 
Rank 2 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the application was sent out 
second, 0 otherwise 
302 0.334 - 0 1 
        
Certificate 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the applicant provides an 
additional certificate, 0 otherwise 
302 0.520 - 0 1 
Distance 
Linear distance between applicant's home and 
location of employer (in km) 
302 254.00 98.78 39 494 
Firm characteristics           
Size 
      
 
Small 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the employer has less than 50 
employees, 0 otherwise 
302 0.460 - 0 1 
 
Medium 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the employer has between 50 and 
500 employees, 0 otherwise 
302 0.487 - 0 1 
 
Large 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the employer has more than 500 
employees, 0 otherwise 
302 0.053 - 0 1 
Location 
      
 
Other 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the employer is not located in the 
South or East of Germany, 0 otherwise 
302 0.262 - 0 1 
 
South 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the employer is located in the 
South of Germany, 0 otherwise 
302 0.523 - 0 1 
 
East 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the employer is located in Eastern 
Germany, 0 otherwise 
302 0.215 - 0 1 
        
Industry 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the employer operates in the 
industry sector, 0 otherwise (i.e., service sector)  
302 0.871 - 0 1 
Female 
responsible 
Dummy: Equals 1 if the person responsible for 
recruiting as mentioned in the job offer is female, 0 
otherwise 
302 0.424 - 0 1 
Open positions 
Number of open positions for an apprenticeship as 
indicated by the employer's job offer 
302 1.25 0.683 1 8 
Labor market data           
Vacancies/total 
jobs t-1 
Ratio of vacancies and total apprenticeships in the 
corresponding Employment Agency region of the 
employer in 2010/2011 
302 0.053 0.027 0.004 0.130 
Share of 
foreigners t-1 
Share of foreign applicants in the corresponding 
Employment Agency region of the employer in 
2010/2011 
302 0.103 0.081 0.000 0.340 
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